Rights:
Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
Abstract:
In this paper we present a model of war between two rational and completely
informed players. We show that in the absence of binding agreements war can be
avoided in many cases by one player transferring money to the other player. In most
cases, the "rich" In this paper we present a model of war between two rational and completely
informed players. We show that in the absence of binding agreements war can be
avoided in many cases by one player transferring money to the other player. In most
cases, the "rich" country transfers part of her money to the "poor" country. Only when
the military proficiency of the "rich" country is sufficiently great, it could be that the
"poor" country can stop the war by transfering part of its resources to the "rich" country.[+][-]