Price support by bank-affiliated mutual funds

Golez, Benjamin; Marin, Jose M.

dc.contributor.author	Golez, Benjamin
dc.contributor.author	Marin, Jose M.
dc.date.accessioned	2015-10-14T13:24:38Z
dc.date.available	2019-03-01T23:00:05Z
dc.date.issued	2015-03
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation	Goleza, Benjamin; Marin, Jose M. (2015). Price support by bank-affiliated mutual funds. Journal of Financial Economics, v. 115, n. 3, pp. 614–638
dc.identifier.issn	0304-405X
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10016/21704
dc.description.abstract	Fund managers are double agents; they serve both fund investors and owners of management firms. This conflict of interest may result in trading to support securities prices. Tests of this hypothesis in the Spanish mutual fund industry indicate that bank-affiliated mutual funds systematically increase their holdings in the controlling bank stock around seasoned equity issues, at the time of bad news about the controlling bank, before anticipated price drops, and after non-anticipated price drops. The results seem mainly driven by bank managers' incentives. Ownership of asset management companies thus matters and can distort capital allocation and asset prices. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
dc.description.sponsorship	Both authors acknowledge Financial support from the Spanish Ministry of the Economy and Competitiveness (MEC Grant ECO2012-39423)
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.publisher	Elsevier
dc.rights	© Elsevier
dc.rights	Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subject.other	Price support
dc.subject.other	Conflict of interests
dc.subject.other	Mutual funds
dc.subject.other	Banks
dc.subject.other	Secondary offerings
dc.title	Price support by bank-affiliated mutual funds
dc.type	article
dc.relation.publisherversion	http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.10.008
dc.subject.eciencia	Empresa
dc.identifier.doi	10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.10.008
dc.rights.accessRights	openAccess
dc.relation.projectID	Gobierno de España. ECO2012-39423
dc.type.version	acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage	614
dc.identifier.publicationissue	3
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage	638
dc.identifier.publicationtitle	Journal of Financial Economics
dc.identifier.publicationvolume	115
dc.identifier.uxxi	AR/0000016666