Social imitation versus strategic choice, or consensus versus cooperation, in the networked Prisoner's Dilemma

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dc.contributor.author Vilone, Daniele
dc.contributor.author Ramasco, José J.
dc.contributor.author Sánchez, Angel
dc.contributor.author San Miguel, Maxi
dc.date.accessioned 2015-07-20T12:06:11Z
dc.date.available 2015-07-20T12:06:11Z
dc.date.issued 2014-08-22
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation Physical Review E 90 (2014) 022810, pp. 1-9
dc.identifier.issn 1539-3755
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/21448
dc.description.abstract The interplay of social and strategic motivations in human interactions is a largely unexplored topic in collective social phenomena. Whether individuals' decisions are taken in a purely strategic basis or due to social pressure without a rational background crucially influences the model outcome. Here we study a networked Prisoner's Dilemma in which decisions are made either based on the replication of the most successful neighbor's strategy (unconditional imitation) or by pure social imitation following an update rule inspired by the voter model. The main effects of the voter dynamics are an enhancement of the final consensus, i.e., asymptotic states are generally uniform, and a promotion of cooperation in certain regions of the parameter space as compared to the outcome of purely strategic updates. Thus, voter dynamics acts as an interface noise and has a similar effect as a pure random noise; furthermore, its influence is mostly independent of the network heterogeneity. When strategic decisions are made following other update rules such as the replicator or Moran processes, the dynamic mixed state found under unconditional imitation for some parameters disappears, but an increase of cooperation in certain parameter regions is still observed. Comparing our results with recent experiments on the Prisoner's Dilemma, we conclude that such a mixed dynamics may explain moody conditional cooperation among the agents.
dc.description.sponsorship This work was supported by the PRISMA project (Grant No. PON04a2 A), within the Italian National Program for Research and Innovation. M.S.M. acknowledges support from INTENSE@COSYP (Grant No. FIS2012-30634) of the Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (MINECO, Spain). J.J.R. also receives funding from the MINECO through the Ramón y Cajal program and through the project MODASS (Grant No. IS2011-24785). A.S. acknowledges support from grant PRODIEVO from the MINECO. In addition, funding from the EU Commission was received through project LASAGNE.
dc.format.extent 9
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher American Physical Society
dc.rights © 2014 American Physical Society
dc.subject.other Evolutionary games
dc.subject.other Dynamics
dc.subject.other Populations
dc.subject.other Emergence
dc.subject.other Altruism
dc.title Social imitation versus strategic choice, or consensus versus cooperation, in the networked Prisoner's Dilemma
dc.type article
dc.description.status Publicado
dc.relation.publisherversion http://dx.doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevE.90.022810
dc.subject.eciencia Matemáticas
dc.identifier.doi 10.1103/PhysRevE.90.022810
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
dc.relation.projectID Gobierno de España. FIS2011-22449/PRODIEVO
dc.relation.projectID info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/EC/FP7/318132
dc.relation.projectID Gobierno de España.FIS2012-30634
dc.type.version publishedVersion
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage 1
dc.identifier.publicationissue 022810
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage 9
dc.identifier.publicationtitle Physical Review. E
dc.identifier.publicationvolume 90
dc.identifier.uxxi AR/0000015587
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