Heterogeneous network games: Conflicting preferences

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dc.contributor.author Hernández, Penelope
dc.contributor.author Muñoz-Herrera, Manuel
dc.contributor.author Sánchez, Angel
dc.date.accessioned 2015-07-09T10:53:43Z
dc.date.available 2015-07-09T10:53:43Z
dc.date.issued 2013-05
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation Games and Economic Behavior 79 (2013) May, pp. 56-66
dc.identifier.isbn 0899-8256
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/21377
dc.description Proceeding at: 2nd Annual UECE Lisbon Meeting: Game Theory and Applications, took place 2010, November, 4-6, in Lisbon (Portugal). The event Web site http://pascal.iseg.utl.pt/~uece/lisbonmeetings2010/
dc.description.abstract In many economic situations, a player pursues coordination or anti-coordination with her neighbors on a network, but she also has intrinsic preferences among the available options. We here introduce a model which allows to analyze this issue by means of a simple framework in which players endowed with an idiosyncratic identity interact on a social network through strategic complements or substitutes. We classify the possible types of Nash equilibria under complete information, finding two thresholds for switching action that relate to the two-player setup of the games. This structure of equilibria is considerably reduced when turning to incomplete information, in a setup in which players only know the distribution of the number of neighbors of the network. For high degrees of heterogeneity in the population the equilibria is such that every player can choose her preferred action, whereas if one of the identities is in the minority frustration ensues.
dc.description.sponsorship This work is supported by the MEC, Spain (ECO-2010-20584) and Generalitat Valenciana (PROMETEO/2009/068) is gratefully acknowledged. A.S. thanks grants MOSAICO, PRODIEVO and RESINEE from MEC, Spain and MODELICO from Comunidad de Madrid, Spain.
dc.format.extent 11
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Elsevier
dc.rights © 2013 Elsevier
dc.rights Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subject.other Heterogeneity
dc.subject.other Social networks
dc.subject.other Incomplete information
dc.subject.other Bayesian equilibrium
dc.title Heterogeneous network games: Conflicting preferences
dc.type article
dc.type conferenceObject
dc.description.status Publicado
dc.relation.publisherversion http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.01.004
dc.subject.eciencia Matemáticas
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
dc.relation.projectID Gobierno de España. FIS2011-22449/PRODIEVO
dc.relation.projectID Comunidad de Madrid. S2009/ESP-1691/MODELICO
dc.relation.projectID Gobierno de España. FIS2006-01485/MOSAICO
dc.relation.projectID Gobierno de España. ECO-2010-20584
dc.type.version acceptedVersion
dc.relation.eventdate 2010, November, 4-6
dc.relation.eventnumber 2
dc.relation.eventplace Lisbon (Portugal)
dc.relation.eventtitle Annual UECE Lisbon Meeting: Game Theory and Applications
dc.relation.eventtype proceeding
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage 56
dc.identifier.publicationissue May
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage 66
dc.identifier.publicationtitle Games and Economic Behavior
dc.identifier.publicationvolume 79
dc.identifier.uxxi CC/0000010392
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