Coordination in heterogeneous federal systems

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dc.contributor.author Loeper, Antoine
dc.date.accessioned 2013-04-05T09:38:03Z
dc.date.available 2013-04-05T09:38:03Z
dc.date.issued 2011-08
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation Journal of Public Economics, August 2011, 8, vol. 95, issues. 7–8, pp. 900-912
dc.identifier.issn 0047-2727
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/16622
dc.description.abstract We compare centralized and decentralized policy making in a federation in which policy heterogeneity is inherently costly and preferences vary across jurisdictions: all jurisdictions agree that some harmonization is desirable but no one agrees on the direction of harmonization. This type of collective choice problem arises when members of a federal system have to coordinate nonbudgetary policies such as laws, regulations, standards, or diplomatic policies. Contrary to the common wisdom, decentralization becomes optimal when coordination becomes very important. When coordination costs are symmetric, decentralization dominates centralization irrespective of the magnitude of externalities and the heterogeneity of preferences. In the case of discontinuous network effects, standardization never Pareto dominates decentralization
dc.format.mimetype text/plain
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.rights © Elsevier
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subject.other Federalism
dc.subject.other Decentralization
dc.subject.other Coordination
dc.subject.other Externality
dc.subject.other Reciprocality
dc.subject.other Harmonization
dc.subject.other Law
dc.subject.other Regulation
dc.title Coordination in heterogeneous federal systems
dc.type article
dc.description.status Publicado
dc.relation.publisherversion http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.01.010
dc.subject.jel D62
dc.subject.jel D72
dc.subject.jel H73
dc.subject.jel H70
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.identifier.doi 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.01.010
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
dc.type.version acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage 900
dc.identifier.publicationissue 7-8
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage 912
dc.identifier.publicationtitle Journal of public economics
dc.identifier.publicationvolume 95
dc.identifier.uxxi AR/0000010950
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