The Clock Proxy Auction for Allocating Radio Spectrum Licenses

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Show simple item record Mochón, Asunción Sáez Achaerandio, Yago Gómez-Barroso, J.L. Isasi, Pedro 2012-11-12T16:03:47Z 2012-11-13T08:27:28Z 2012-11-13T08:27:28Z 2011-04
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation Computational Economics. Vol. 37, Issue 4 (Apr. 2011), pp. 411-431
dc.identifier.issn 0927-7099 (Print)
dc.identifier.issn 1572-9974 (Online)
dc.description.abstract The combinatorial clock-proxy auction is analyzed as a selling mechanism of a portion of the “digital dividend” in an European country. We assumed bidders with bounded rationality making their bidding decisions based on a system of recommendation that learns from the environment. The auction outcome when all bidders follow the proposed strategies was compared with the efficient outcome of the auction. Although significant differences were found in the seller’s income, no significant variations were found in the distribution of spectrum licenses among bidders.
dc.description.sponsorship This article has been financed by the Spanish research MCyT project MSTAR, Ref: TIN2008-06491-C04-03/TIN.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.format.mimetype text/plain
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Springer
dc.rights © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.
dc.subject.other Clock-proxy auction
dc.subject.other Radio spectrum
dc.subject.other Genetic algorithms
dc.subject.other Simulations
dc.title The Clock Proxy Auction for Allocating Radio Spectrum Licenses
dc.type article
dc.description.status Publicado
dc.subject.eciencia Informática
dc.identifier.doi 10.1007/s10614-010-9245-8
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
dc.type.version acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage 411
dc.identifier.publicationissue 4
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage 431
dc.identifier.publicationtitle Computational Economics
dc.identifier.publicationvolume 37
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