Exploring pricing rules in combinatorial sealed-bid auctions

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dc.contributor.author Mochón, Asunción
dc.contributor.author Sáez Achaerandio, Yago
dc.contributor.author Gómez-Barroso, J.L.
dc.contributor.author Isasi Viñuela, Pedro
dc.date.accessioned 2012-11-08T16:56:49Z
dc.date.available 2012-11-08T16:56:49Z
dc.date.issued 2012-05
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 82, issue 2-3 (May 2012),pp. 462-478
dc.identifier.issn 0167-2681
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/15844
dc.description.abstract The allocation of public goods such as the radio spectrum is a difficult task that the government must face. Currently, auctions are becoming an important tool to deal with this duty. In this context, the rules that the auctioneer establishes are particularly relevant, as the final outcome depends on them. When auctioning many related items, such as spectrum licenses, the bidders’ values for one item may depend on the number of items already obtained (complements and substitutes items). In such circumstances, combinatorial auctions are the most appropriate alternative for allocating lots. This paper analyzes the implications of selecting a particular pricing mechanism on the final result in a combinatorial sealed-bid auction. The following pricing rules are selected: the first-price mechanism, the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanism, and the bidder–Pareto–optimal (BPO) core mechanism, a core-selecting auction. To test these pricing rules, a simulator of the auction model has been developed. Then, to tackle the complex problem of simulating bidders’ behavior, a co-evolutionary system has been designed to identify improved strategies. The results revealed that the first-price mechanism yields inefficient outcomes and a notable reduction in the seller's revenues. Both the VCG and BPO mechanisms yield outcomes that are closer to the efficient allocation, and differences in revenues are affected by the presence of asymmetries.
dc.description.sponsorship This article has been financed by the Spanish research MCyT projects MSTAR, Ref: TIN2008-06491-C04-03/TIN and MOVES, Ref: TIN2011-28336.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Elsevier
dc.rights © Elsevier
dc.subject.other Core-selecting package auctions
dc.subject.other Pricing rule
dc.subject.other Co-evolutionary system
dc.subject.other Agent-based model
dc.subject.other Radio spectrum
dc.title Exploring pricing rules in combinatorial sealed-bid auctions
dc.type article
dc.description.status Publicado
dc.relation.publisherversion http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2012.02.018
dc.subject.eciencia Informática
dc.identifier.doi 10.1016/j.jebo.2012.02.018
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
dc.type.version draft
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage 462
dc.identifier.publicationissue 2-3
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage 478
dc.identifier.publicationtitle Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
dc.identifier.publicationvolume 82
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