Sponsor:
YM is supported by MICINN (Spain) through the Ram´on y Cajal Programme. This work has been partially supported by MICINN through Grants FIS2006-12781- C02-01, FIS2008-01240 and MOSAICO, and by Comunidad de Madrid (Spain) through Grant SIMUMAT-CM.
Rights:
Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
Abstract:
Recent results have shown that heterogeneous populations are better suited to support
cooperation than homogeneous settings when the Prisoner’s Dilemma drives the evolutionary
dynamics of the system. The same occurs when the network growth is coevolving togeRecent results have shown that heterogeneous populations are better suited to support
cooperation than homogeneous settings when the Prisoner’s Dilemma drives the evolutionary
dynamics of the system. The same occurs when the network growth is coevolving together with
the evolutionary dynamics, which also gives rise to highly cooperative scale-free networks. In the
latter case, however, the organization of cooperation is radically different with respect to the case
in which the underlying network is static. In this paper we study the structure of cooperation
in static networks grown together with evolutionary dynamics and show that the general belief
that hubs can only be occupied by cooperators does not hold. Moreover, these scale-free networks
support high levels of cooperation despite having defector hubs. Our results have several important
implications for the explanation of cooperative behavior in scale-free networks and highlight the
importance that the formation of complex systems have on its function.[+][-]