Altruism may arise from individual selection

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Show simple item record Sánchez, Angel Cuesta, José A. 2012-07-23T10:03:48Z 2012-07-23T10:03:48Z 2005-07-21
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation Journal of Theoretical Biology, vol. 235, n. 2, 21 july 2005. Pp. 233-240
dc.identifier.issn 0022-5193 (print version)
dc.identifier.issn 1095-8541 (online version)
dc.description.abstract The fact that humans cooperate with non-kin in large groups, or with people they will never meet again, is a long-standing evolutionary puzzle. Altruism, the capacity to perform costly acts that confer benefits on others, is at the core of cooperative behavior. Behavioral experiments show that humans have a predisposition to cooperate with others and to punish non-cooperators at personal cost (so-called strong reciprocity) which, according to standard evolutionary game theory arguments, cannot arise from selection acting on individuals. This has led to the suggestion of group and cultural selection as the only mechanisms that can explain the evolutionary origin of human altruism. We introduce an agent-based model inspired on the Ultimatum Game, that allows us to go beyond the limitations of standard evolutionary game theory and show that individual selection can indeed give rise to strong reciprocity. Our results are consistent with the existence of neural correlates of fairness and in good agreement with observations on humans and monkeys.
dc.description.sponsorship We acknowledge financial support from Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología (Spain) through grants BFM2003-07749-C05-01 (AS) and BFM2003-0180 (JAC).
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Elsevier
dc.rights © Elsevier
dc.subject.other Strong reciprocity
dc.subject.other Individual selection
dc.subject.other Evolutionary theories
dc.subject.other Behavioral evolution
dc.subject.other Evolutionary game theory
dc.title Altruism may arise from individual selection
dc.type article
dc.description.status Publicado
dc.subject.eciencia Matemáticas
dc.identifier.doi 10.1016/j.jtbi.2005.01.006
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
dc.type.version acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage 233
dc.identifier.publicationissue n. 2
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage 240
dc.identifier.publicationtitle Journal of Theoretical Biology
dc.identifier.publicationvolume vol. 235
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