Contributor:
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. GIDYJ
Issued date:
2011-10
Citation:
XVII Seminario Hispano-Italiano-Francés de Teoría del Derecho (Getafe, 21-22 de octubre de 2011). Getafe: Grupo de Investigación sobre el Derecho y la Justicia (GIDYJ), 2011, 39 p.
Sponsor:
Este trabajo fue realizado en el marco del proyecto DER2010-21331-C02-02, del Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación (España) y conforme al acuerdo celebrado entre la Universidad de Girona y la Pontifícia Universidade Católica de Rio de Janeiro, Brasil.
Project:
Gobierno de España. DER2010-21331-C02-02
Keywords:
Free will
,
Law
,
Human action
,
Responsibility
,
Neurolaw
Rights:
Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
Abstract:
The topic of freedom in the legal courts, at least
in the North American context, is treated as a
working hypothesis, which was first questioned
by philosophy, and defended in the legal scope
by theorists and philosophers of law. However, in
recent years The topic of freedom in the legal courts, at least
in the North American context, is treated as a
working hypothesis, which was first questioned
by philosophy, and defended in the legal scope
by theorists and philosophers of law. However, in
recent years a new front of uncertainty is
emerging, regarding the conduct of human
freedom; this time through the neural-scientists. Under neurolaw we understand the field of
knowledge which purpose is to explore the
findings of neural-scientific justice. This study
presents the theme of freedom in the context of
the courts of justice in their questionable
application of neural-scientific formulations, in
order to delimit the extent of their use.[+][-]
Description:
Titulo del seminario: "50º aniversario de The Concept of Law"