Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent

Corchón, Luis C.; Triossi, Matteo

Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent

Autor(es): Corchón, Luis C.; Triossi, Matteo

Editorial: Springer-Verlag

Fecha de edición: 2011-02

Cita: Social Choice and Welfare (Feb 2011), 36(2), pp. 179-198

ISSN: 0176-1714

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-010-0470-9

Versión de: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/365

Versión del editor: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0470-9

Palabras clave: Teoría de juegos , Toma de decisiones , Economía del bienestar

URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/13427

Resumen:

In this paper, we present a model of implementation where infeasible allocations are converted into feasible ones through a process of renegotiation that is represented by a reversion function. We describe the maximal set of Social Choice Correspondences th [+]

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