Managerial turnover and worker turnover

e-Archivo Repository

Show simple item record

dc.contributor.author Alfaro, José A.
dc.contributor.author Tribo Gine, José Antonio
dc.date.accessioned 2006-11-08T13:15:55Z
dc.date.available 2006-11-08T13:15:55Z
dc.date.issued 2001-06
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/131
dc.description.abstract We study the influence of the manager's degree of consolidation within the firm over the firm's labor policy. We argue that non-consolidated (recently-appointed) managers are more worried about short-term results than consolidated managers are. This feature leads the former to bias the labor contracting favoring short-term contracts. This has two main consequences. First, a higher variation in the number of workers hired in each period. And second, a lower increase in unitary labor costs. To contrast these results, we use a database of 1.054 Spanish companies during the period (1994-98), and analyze their managerial turnover as well as their corresponding variation in the number of workers and in unitary labor costs. The theoretical results are confirmed, especially for highly-productive R and D-intensive firms.
dc.format.extent 186069 bytes
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries UC3M Working Papers. Bussiness Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseries 2001-04
dc.title Managerial turnover and worker turnover
dc.type workingPaper
dc.subject.eciencia Empresa
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
dc.identifier.repec wb011304
 Find Full text

Files in this item

*Click on file's image for preview. (Embargoed files's preview is not supported)


This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record