The quality of political institutions and the curse of natural resources

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dc.contributor.author Cabrales, Antonio
dc.contributor.author Hauk, Esther
dc.date.accessioned 2012-01-17T15:02:42Z
dc.date.accessioned 2012-01-18T11:03:53Z
dc.date.available 2012-01-18T11:03:53Z
dc.date.issued 2010-11-23
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation Economic Journal, vol. 121, nº 551, p. 58-88
dc.identifier.issn 0013-0133
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/12989
dc.description.abstract We propose a theoretical model to explain empirical regularities related to the curse of natural resources, which emphasises the behaviour and incentives of politicians. We extend the standard voting model to give voters political control beyond the elections. This gives rise to a new restriction that policies should not give rise to a revolution. Our model clarifies when resource discoveries might lead to revolutions, namely, in countries with weak institutions. It also suggests that for bad political institutions human capital depends negatively on natural resources, while for high institutional quality the dependence is reversed. This finding is corroborated in cross-section regressions.
dc.description.sponsorship We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology under grants CONSOLIDERINGENIO 2010 (CSD2006-0016), SEJ2006-01717 and SEJ2006-11665-C02-00.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.format.mimetype text/plain
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Wiley-Blackwell
dc.rights © 2010 The Author(s). The Economic Journal
dc.rights © 2010 Royal EconomicSociety
dc.subject.other Recursos naturales
dc.subject.other Desarrollo económico
dc.subject.other Sistema político
dc.title The quality of political institutions and the curse of natural resources
dc.type article
dc.description.status Publicado
dc.relation.publisherversion http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2010.02390.x
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.identifier.doi 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2010.02390.x
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
dc.type.version publishedVersion
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage 58
dc.identifier.publicationissue 551
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage 88
dc.identifier.publicationtitle Economic Journal
dc.identifier.publicationvolume 121
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