Acyclicity and singleton cores in matching markets

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dc.contributor.author Romero Medina, Antonio
dc.contributor.author Triossi, Matteo
dc.contributor.editor Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
dc.date.accessioned 2011-09-13T14:19:19Z
dc.date.available 2011-09-13T14:19:19Z
dc.date.issued 2011-08-19
dc.identifier.issn 2340-5031
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/12071
dc.description.abstract This paper analyzes the role of acyclicity in singleton cores. We show that the absence of simultaneous cycles is a sufficient condition for the existence of singleton cores. Furthermore, acyclicity in the preferences of either side of the market is a minimal condition that guarantees the existence of singleton cores. If firms or workers preferences are acyclical, unique stable matching is obtained through a procedure that resembles a serial dictatorship. Thus, acyclicity generalizes the notion of common preferences. It follows that if the firms or workers preferences are acyclical, unique stable matching is strongly efficient for the other side of the market
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries UC3M Working papers. Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseries 11-26
dc.rights Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subject.other Stable matching
dc.subject.other Acyclicity
dc.subject.other Singleton cores
dc.title Acyclicity and singleton cores in matching markets
dc.type workingPaper
dc.subject.jel C71
dc.subject.jel C78
dc.subject.jel D71
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
dc.type.version submitedVersion
dc.identifier.repec we1126
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