An impure public good model with lotteries in large groups

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Show simple item record Cabrales Goitia, Antonio Lugo, Haydeé
dc.contributor.editor Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía 2011-03-28T09:35:28Z 2011-03-28T09:35:28Z 2011-03
dc.identifier.issn 2340-5031
dc.description.abstract We analyze the effect of a large group on an impure public goods model with lotteries. We show that as populations get large, and with selfish preferences, the level of contributions converges to the one given by voluntary contributions. With altruistic preferences (of the warm glow type), the contributions converge to a level strictly higher than those given by voluntary contributions, even though in general they do not yield first-best levels.
dc.format.mimetype application/octet-stream
dc.format.mimetype application/octet-stream
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries UC3M Working papers. Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseries 11-07
dc.rights Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.subject.other Lotteries
dc.subject.other Public good
dc.subject.other Warm glow
dc.subject.other Efficiency
dc.title An impure public good model with lotteries in large groups
dc.type workingPaper
dc.subject.jel D64
dc.subject.jel H21
dc.subject.jel H41
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
dc.identifier.uxxi DT/0000000885
dc.identifier.repec we1107
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