Intra-firm bargaining and learning in a market equilibrium

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Show simple item record Drugov, Mikhail
dc.contributor.editor Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía 2011-03-09T10:52:23Z 2011-03-09T10:52:23Z 2011-03
dc.identifier.issn 2340-5031
dc.description.abstract This paper introduces an agency relationship into a dynamic game with informational externalities. Two principals bargain with their respective agents about the production cost which is the private information of the agents and is correlated between them. We find that the agency relationship creates an incentive for simultaneous production, even if this involves an inefficient delay. As the commitment power of the principals decreases, this incentive becomes stronger. When principals compete, the effect of competition is decomposed into two parts. Inter-period competition (from past and future actions) pushes principals towards simultaneous actions, while intra-period competition (from concurrent actions) does the opposite.
dc.format.mimetype application/octet-stream
dc.format.mimetype application/octet-stream
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries UC3M Working papers. Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseries 11-02
dc.rights Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.subject.other Bargaining
dc.subject.other Adverse selection
dc.subject.other Learning
dc.subject.other Information
dc.subject.other Externalities
dc.subject.other Delay
dc.title Intra-firm bargaining and learning in a market equilibrium
dc.type workingPaper
dc.subject.jel C78
dc.subject.jel D82
dc.subject.jel D83
dc.subject.jel L10
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
dc.identifier.uxxi DT/0000000883
dc.identifier.repec we1102
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