Publication: Why do banks promise to pay par on demand?
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2006
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Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta
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Abstract
We survey the theories of why banks promise to pay par on demand and examine evidence about
the conditions under which banks have promised to pay the par value of deposits and banknotes on
demand when holding only fractional reserves. The theoretical literature can be broadly divided into four
strands: liquidity provision, asymmetric information, legal restrictions, and a medium of exchange. We
assume that it is not zero cost to make a promise to redeem a liability at par value on demand. If so, then
the conditions in the theories that result in par redemption are possible explanations of why banks
promise to pay par on demand. If the explanation based on customers’ demand for liquidity is correct,
payment of deposits at par will be promised when banks hold assets that are illiquid in the short run. If
the asymmetric-information explanation based on the difficulty of valuing assets is correct, the
marketability of banks’ assets determines whether banks promise to pay par. If the legal restrictions
explanation of par redemption is correct, banks will not promise to pay par if they are not required to do
so. If the transaction explanation is correct, banks will promise to pay par value only if the deposits are
used in transactions. After the survey of the theoretical literature, we examine the history of banking in
several countries in different eras: fourth-century Athens, medieval Italy, Japan, and free banking and
money market mutual funds in the United States. We find that all of the theories can explain some of the
observed banking arrangements, and none explain all of them.
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Banking panics, Suspension of payments, Banking history