Nonlinear Pricing with Self-Control Preferences

Publication:
Nonlinear Pricing with Self-Control Preferences

dc.affiliation.dpto	UC3M. Departamento de Economía	es
dc.contributor.author	Shum, Matthew
dc.contributor.author	Esteban, Susanna
dc.contributor.author	Miyagawa, Eiichi
dc.contributor.other	The Johns Hopkins University. Department of Economics
dc.date.accessioned	2009-08-26T14:46:00Z
dc.date.available	2009-08-26T14:46:00Z
dc.date.issued	2003
dc.description.abstract	This paper studies optimal nonlinear pricing for a monopolist when consumers' preferences exhibit temptation and self-control as in Gul and Pesendorfer (2001a). Consumers are subject to temptation inside the store but exercise self-control, and those foreseeing large self-control costs do not enter the store. Consumers di®er in their preferences under temptation. When all consumers are tempted by more expensive, higher quality choices, the optimal menu is a singleton, which saves consumers from self-control and extracts consumers' commitment surplus. When some consumers are tempted by cheaper, lower quality choices, the optimal menu may contain a continuum of choices.
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/10016/4995
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Working paper
dc.rights.accessRights	open access
dc.subject.eciencia	Economía
dc.subject.other	Temptation
dc.subject.other	Self-control
dc.subject.other	Commitment
dc.subject.other	Nonlinear pricing
dc.subject.other	price discrimination
dc.title	Nonlinear Pricing with Self-Control Preferences
dc.type	working paper	*
dspace.entity.type	Publication

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