Publication: Tullock contests with asymmetric information
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2013-07
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Abstract
We show that under standard assumptions a Tullock contest with asymmetric information has a
pure strategy Bayesian equilibrium. Moreover, two-player common-value Tullock contests in
which one of the players has an information advantage have a unique equilibrium. In equilibrium
both players exert the same expected effort, and although the player with information advantage
wins the prize with probability less than one-half, his payoff is greater or equal to that of his
opponent. In common-value Tullock contests with more players any information advantage is
rewarded, but the other properties of two players contests do not hold
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Tullock contests, Common-values, All pay auctions, Asymmetric information