Publication:
When collective ignorance is bliss: Theory and experiment on voting for learning

dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Economíaes
dc.contributor.authorGinzburg, Boris
dc.contributor.authorGuerra, Jose Alberto
dc.contributor.funderComunidad de Madrides
dc.contributor.funderMinisterio de Economía y Competitividad (España)es
dc.date.accessioned2022-07-14T11:16:47Z
dc.date.available2022-07-14T11:16:47Z
dc.date.issued2019-01-01
dc.description.abstractWhen do groups and societies choose to be uninformed? We study a committee that needs to vote on a reform which will give every member a private state-dependent payoff. The committee can vote to learn the state at no cost. We show that the committee votes not to learn the state whenever independent voters are more divided than partisans. This implies that groups with conflicting preferences tend to seek less information. A laboratory experiment shows that committees are substantially more likely to vote against acquiring information when the theory predicts them to do so. We also observe deviations from theory that are largely explained by cognitive limitations. At the same time, subjects with more experience or with greater strategic competence are more likely to vote in line with the theory, providing evidence for external validity of the model.en
dc.description.sponsorshipWe thank Universidad del Rosario for hosting the experiment, and the financial support from Central Bank of Colombia grant 3754, Spanish Ministry of the Economy grant MDM 2014-0431, and Comunidad de Madrid grant S2015/HUM-3444en
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitationGinzburg, B., & Guerra, J.-A. (2019). When collective ignorance is bliss: Theory and experiment on voting for learning. Journal of Public Economics, 169, pp. 52-64.en
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.10.010
dc.identifier.issn0047-2727
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage52es
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage64es
dc.identifier.publicationtitleJOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICSen
dc.identifier.publicationvolume169es
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10016/35462
dc.identifier.uxxiAR/0000023086
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherElsevieres
dc.relation.projectIDComunidad de Madrid. S2015/HUM-3444es
dc.relation.projectIDGobierno de España. MDM 2014-0431es
dc.rights© 2018 Elsevieres
dc.rightsAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España*
dc.rights.accessRightsopen accessen
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/*
dc.subject.ecienciaEconomíaen
dc.subject.jelD72
dc.subject.jelD83
dc.subject.jelC92
dc.subject.otherVotingen
dc.subject.otherCollective learningen
dc.subject.otherReform adoptionen
dc.subject.otherPreference heterogeneityen
dc.subject.otherLaboratory experimenten
dc.titleWhen collective ignorance is bliss: Theory and experiment on voting for learningen
dc.typeresearch article*
dc.type.hasVersionAM*
dspace.entity.typePublication
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