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Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets

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dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Economíaes
dc.contributor.authorRomero-Medina, Antonio
dc.contributor.authorTriossi, Matteo
dc.contributor.editorUniversidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-17T12:56:13Z
dc.date.available2010-09-17T12:56:13Z
dc.date.issued2010-09
dc.description.abstractThis paper presents a sequential admission mechanism where students are allowed to send multiple applications to colleges and colleges sequentially decide the applicants to enroll. The irreversibility of agents decisions and the sequential structure of the enrollments make truthful behavior a dominant strategy for colleges. Due to these features, the mechanism implements the set of stable matchings in Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium. We extend the analysis to a mechanism where colleges make proposals to potential students and students decide sequentially. We show that this mechanism implements the stable set as well.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/octet-stream
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/octet-stream
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.issn2340-5031
dc.identifier.repecwe1018
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10016/9275
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofseriesUC3M Working papers. Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseries10-18
dc.rightsAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.rights.accessRightsopen access
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subject.ecienciaEconomía
dc.subject.jelC78
dc.subject.jelD78
dc.subject.otherStable matching
dc.subject.otherSubgame perfect Nash equilibrium
dc.titleNon-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets
dc.typeworking paper*
dspace.entity.typePublication
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