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Political salaries, electoral selection and the incumbency advantage: Evidence from a wage reform

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dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Economíaes
dc.contributor.authorPalguta, Ján
dc.contributor.authorPertold, Filip
dc.contributor.funderComunidad de Madrid
dc.contributor.funderUniversidad Carlos III de Madrid
dc.date.accessioned2022-03-14T16:19:54Z
dc.date.available2022-03-14T16:19:54Z
dc.date.issued2021-12-01
dc.description.abstractIncumbents tend to gain solid electoral advantage in many voting systems. In this study, we examine the relationship between salaries prescribed to politicians and the incumbency advantage by exploiting a political wage reform and data from close elections in a proportional semi-open list system in the Czech Republic. We show that higher salaries reduce the average incumbency advantage, as they increase the probability to run again for previously non-elected candidates much more than for incumbents. Still, we find that higher wages improve candidate selection, especially by encouraging repeated candidacy from university-educated incumbents. Higher wages also improve relative positions of re-running incumbents on candidate lists compared to previously non-elected re-running candidates. Our results overall suggest that incumbency per se changes the relationship between political wages and candidate selection.en
dc.description.sponsorshipPalguta gratefully acknowledges financial support from Comunidad de Madrid (Spain), grants 2017/T2-SOC-5363 and EPUC3M11 (V PRICIT). Pertold acknowledges financial support from the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (Czech Republic), grant SHARE-CZ+ (CZ.02.1.01/0.0/0.0/16_013/0001740).en
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitationPalguta, J., & Pertold, F. (2021). Political salaries, electoral selection and the incumbency advantage: Evidence from a wage reform. En Journal of Comparative Economics, 49 (4), pp. 1020-1047es
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2021.04.004
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage1020es
dc.identifier.publicationissue4es
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage1047es
dc.identifier.publicationtitleJournal of Comparative Economicses
dc.identifier.publicationvolume49es
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10016/34365
dc.identifier.uxxiAR/0000029485
dc.language.isoenges
dc.publisherElsevieres
dc.relation.projectIDComunidad de Madrid. 2017/T2-SOC-5363es
dc.relation.projectIDComunidad de Madrid. EPUC3M11
dc.relation.projectIDAT-2021
dc.rights©2021TheAuthorses
dc.rightsAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España*
dc.rights.accessRightsopen accesses
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/*
dc.subject.ecienciaEconomíaes
dc.subject.jelD72
dc.subject.jelJ45
dc.subject.jelM52
dc.subject.otherElectoral selectionen
dc.subject.otherIncumbency advantageen
dc.subject.otherLocal electionsen
dc.subject.otherPolitical salariesen
dc.subject.otherRegression discontinuityen
dc.titlePolitical salaries, electoral selection and the incumbency advantage: Evidence from a wage reformen
dc.typeresearch article*
dc.type.hasVersionVoR*
dspace.entity.typePublication
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