Publication: Political salaries, electoral selection and the incumbency advantage: Evidence from a wage reform
dc.affiliation.dpto | UC3M. Departamento de Economía | es |
dc.contributor.author | Palguta, Ján | |
dc.contributor.author | Pertold, Filip | |
dc.contributor.funder | Comunidad de Madrid | |
dc.contributor.funder | Universidad Carlos III de Madrid | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2022-03-14T16:19:54Z | |
dc.date.available | 2022-03-14T16:19:54Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2021-12-01 | |
dc.description.abstract | Incumbents tend to gain solid electoral advantage in many voting systems. In this study, we examine the relationship between salaries prescribed to politicians and the incumbency advantage by exploiting a political wage reform and data from close elections in a proportional semi-open list system in the Czech Republic. We show that higher salaries reduce the average incumbency advantage, as they increase the probability to run again for previously non-elected candidates much more than for incumbents. Still, we find that higher wages improve candidate selection, especially by encouraging repeated candidacy from university-educated incumbents. Higher wages also improve relative positions of re-running incumbents on candidate lists compared to previously non-elected re-running candidates. Our results overall suggest that incumbency per se changes the relationship between political wages and candidate selection. | en |
dc.description.sponsorship | Palguta gratefully acknowledges financial support from Comunidad de Madrid (Spain), grants 2017/T2-SOC-5363 and EPUC3M11 (V PRICIT). Pertold acknowledges financial support from the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (Czech Republic), grant SHARE-CZ+ (CZ.02.1.01/0.0/0.0/16_013/0001740). | en |
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation | Palguta, J., & Pertold, F. (2021). Political salaries, electoral selection and the incumbency advantage: Evidence from a wage reform. En Journal of Comparative Economics, 49 (4), pp. 1020-1047 | es |
dc.identifier.doi | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2021.04.004 | |
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage | 1020 | es |
dc.identifier.publicationissue | 4 | es |
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage | 1047 | es |
dc.identifier.publicationtitle | Journal of Comparative Economics | es |
dc.identifier.publicationvolume | 49 | es |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10016/34365 | |
dc.identifier.uxxi | AR/0000029485 | |
dc.language.iso | eng | es |
dc.publisher | Elsevier | es |
dc.relation.projectID | Comunidad de Madrid. 2017/T2-SOC-5363 | es |
dc.relation.projectID | Comunidad de Madrid. EPUC3M11 | |
dc.relation.projectID | AT-2021 | |
dc.rights | ©2021TheAuthors | es |
dc.rights | Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España | * |
dc.rights.accessRights | open access | es |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ | * |
dc.subject.eciencia | Economía | es |
dc.subject.jel | D72 | |
dc.subject.jel | J45 | |
dc.subject.jel | M52 | |
dc.subject.other | Electoral selection | en |
dc.subject.other | Incumbency advantage | en |
dc.subject.other | Local elections | en |
dc.subject.other | Political salaries | en |
dc.subject.other | Regression discontinuity | en |
dc.title | Political salaries, electoral selection and the incumbency advantage: Evidence from a wage reform | en |
dc.type | research article | * |
dc.type.hasVersion | VoR | * |
dspace.entity.type | Publication |
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