Publication:
Endogenous wage-bargaining institutions in oligopolistic industries

dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Economíaes
dc.contributor.authorPetrakis, Emmanuel
dc.contributor.authorVlassis, Minas
dc.contributor.editorUniversidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
dc.date.accessioned2009-12-11T15:44:44Z
dc.date.available2009-12-11T15:44:44Z
dc.date.issued1996-01
dc.description.abstractThis paper develops a framework of endogenous formation of wage-bargaining institutions regarding the level at which unions and firms negotiate in industries with market power. We show that economic factors, such as asymmetries in productive efficiency and bargaining power, are responsible for the en~ ',gence of various degrees of bargaining centralization. An all unionefficient firms majorit) coalition typically establishes an extra stage of wage negotiations at the sectorial level. If, for given bargaining powers, the productivity differences are sufficiently high, wage negotiations are also conducted at firm-level. Otherwise, the (minimum) wage bargain struck at the sectorial level is simply confirmed by both, firms and unions. This is a case of complete bargaining centralization. If, however, technological and bargaining power asymmetries cancel out, wage negotiations are conducted only at the firm level (decentralized bargaining).
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.issn2340-5031
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10016/6014
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofseriesUC3M Working papers. Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseries1996-02-02
dc.rightsAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.rights.accessRightsopen access
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subject.ecienciaEconomía
dc.subject.otherBargaining institutions
dc.subject.otherOligopoly
dc.subject.otherMinimum wage
dc.subject.otherMajority coalition
dc.titleEndogenous wage-bargaining institutions in oligopolistic industries
dc.typeworking paper*
dspace.entity.typePublication
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