Publication:
Optimal Price of Entry into a Competition

Simple item page
dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Economíaes
dc.contributor.authorGinzburg, Boris
dc.contributor.funderComunidad de Madrides
dc.date.accessioned2022-07-07T17:41:12Z
dc.date.available2022-07-07T17:41:12Z
dc.date.issued2021-01-01
dc.description.abstractA continuum of contestants are choosing whether to enter a competition. Each contestant has a type, and of those who enter, the ones with highest types receive prizes. A profit-maximizing firm controls entry, and charges a price for it. I show that an increase in the value of each prize leads the firm to raise the price while keeping the intensity of entry fixed. Conversely, when the mass of prizes increases, the firm initially keeps the price constant while allowing entry to increase; and later-raises the price.es
dc.description.sponsorshipSupport from Comunidad de Madrid (grant S2015/HUM-3444) is gratefully acknowledged.en
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitationGinzburg, B. (2020). Optimal Price of Entry into a Competition. Economic Inquiry, 59, pp. 280–286en
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12956
dc.identifier.issn0095-2583
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage280es
dc.identifier.publicationissue1es
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage286es
dc.identifier.publicationtitleECONOMIC INQUIRYes
dc.identifier.publicationvolume59es
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10016/35428
dc.identifier.uxxiAR/0000026362
dc.language.isoenges
dc.publisherJohn Wiley & Sons, Inc.en
dc.relation.projectIDComunidad de Madrid. S2015/HUM-3444es
dc.rights© John Wiley & Sons, Inc.es
dc.rights.accessRightsopen accessen
dc.titleOptimal Price of Entry into a Competitionen
dc.typeresearch article*
dc.type.hasVersionAM*
dspace.entity.typePublication
Files
Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Thumbnail Image
Name:
optimal_EI_2020_ps.pdf
Size:
423.74 KB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Description:
Download
Collections
DE - Artículos de Revistas