Publication:
Heterogeneous network games: Conflicting preferences

dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Matemáticases
dc.affiliation.grupoinvUC3M. Grupo de Investigación: Interdisciplinar de Sistemas Complejos (GISC)es
dc.contributor.authorHernández, Penelope
dc.contributor.authorMuñoz-Herrera, Manuel
dc.contributor.authorSánchez, Angel
dc.date.accessioned2015-07-09T10:53:43Z
dc.date.available2015-07-09T10:53:43Z
dc.date.issued2013-05
dc.descriptionProceeding at: 2nd Annual UECE Lisbon Meeting: Game Theory and Applications, took place 2010, November, 4-6, in Lisbon (Portugal). The event Web site http://pascal.iseg.utl.pt/~uece/lisbonmeetings2010/en
dc.description.abstractIn many economic situations, a player pursues coordination or anti-coordination with her neighbors on a network, but she also has intrinsic preferences among the available options. We here introduce a model which allows to analyze this issue by means of a simple framework in which players endowed with an idiosyncratic identity interact on a social network through strategic complements or substitutes. We classify the possible types of Nash equilibria under complete information, finding two thresholds for switching action that relate to the two-player setup of the games. This structure of equilibria is considerably reduced when turning to incomplete information, in a setup in which players only know the distribution of the number of neighbors of the network. For high degrees of heterogeneity in the population the equilibria is such that every player can choose her preferred action, whereas if one of the identities is in the minority frustration ensues.en
dc.description.sponsorshipThis work is supported by the MEC, Spain (ECO-2010-20584) and Generalitat Valenciana (PROMETEO/2009/068) is gratefully acknowledged. A.S. thanks grants MOSAICO, PRODIEVO and RESINEE from MEC, Spain and MODELICO from Comunidad de Madrid, Spain.en
dc.description.statusPublicado
dc.format.extent11
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitationGames and Economic Behavior 79 (2013) May, pp. 56-66en
dc.identifier.isbn0899-8256
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage56
dc.identifier.publicationissueMayen
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage66es
dc.identifier.publicationtitleGames and Economic Behavioren
dc.identifier.publicationvolume79
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10016/21377
dc.identifier.uxxiCC/0000010392
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherElsevieren
dc.relation.eventdate2010, November, 4-6en
dc.relation.eventnumber2
dc.relation.eventplaceLisbon (Portugal)en
dc.relation.eventtitleAnnual UECE Lisbon Meeting: Game Theory and Applicationses
dc.relation.projectIDGobierno de España. FIS2011-22449/PRODIEVOes
dc.relation.projectIDComunidad de Madrid. S2009/ESP-1691/MODELICOes
dc.relation.projectIDGobierno de España. FIS2006-01485/MOSAICOes
dc.relation.projectIDGobierno de España. ECO-2010-20584
dc.relation.publisherversionhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.01.004
dc.rights© 2013 Elsevieren
dc.rightsAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España*
dc.rights.accessRightsopen access
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/*
dc.subject.ecienciaMatemáticases
dc.subject.otherHeterogeneityen
dc.subject.otherSocial networksen
dc.subject.otherIncomplete informationen
dc.subject.otherBayesian equilibriumen
dc.titleHeterogeneous network games: Conflicting preferencesen
dc.typeconference paper*
dc.type.hasVersionAM*
dspace.entity.typePublication
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