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The international stock pollutant control: a stochastic formulation

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2009-02
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Abstract
In this paper we provide a stochastic dynamic game formulation of the economics of international environmental agreements on the transnational pollution control when the environmental damage arises from stock pollutant that accumulates, for accumulating pollutants such as CO2 in the atmosphere. To improve the cooperative and the noncooperative equilibrium among countries, we propose the criteria of the minimization of the expected discounted total cost. Moreover, we consider Stochastic Dynamic Games formulated as Stochastic Dynamic Programming and Cooperative versus Noncooperative Stochastic Dynamic Games. The performance of the proposed schemes is illustrated by a real data based example.
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Stochastic optimal control, Markov decision processes, Stochastic dynamic programming, Stochastic dynamic games, International pollutant control, Environmental economics, Sustainability
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