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Trust and trustworthiness under information asymmetry and ambiguity

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URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10016/25153
ISSN: 0165-1765
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.08.019
UXXI: AR/0000018346
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trust_clots_EL_2016_ps.pdf (752.26 KB)
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2016-10-01
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Elsevier
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Abstract
We introduce uncertainty and ambiguity in the standard investment game. In the uncertainty treatment, investors are informed that the return of the investment is drawn from a publicly known distribution function. In the ambiguity treatment, investors are not informed about the distribution function. We find that both trust and trustworthiness are robust to the introduction of these changes. (C) 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
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Investment game, Uncertainty, Ambiguity, Trust, Trustworthiness, Reciprocity
Bibliographic citation
Clots-Figueras, I., Hernán González, R. and Kujal, P. (2016). Trust and trustworthiness under information asymmetry and ambiguity. Economics Letters, v. 147, pp. 168-170.
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