Publication:
Tullock contests reward information advantages

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2018-11-01
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Elsevier
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Abstract
In Tullock contests in which the common value of the prize is uncertain, information advantages are rewarded: if a player i has better information about the value than some other player j, then the payoff of i is greater or equal to the payoff of j, regardless of the information of the other players. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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Tullock contests, Common value, Information advantage
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Aiche, A., Einy, E., Haimanko, O., Moreno, D., Sela, A., & Shitovitz, B. (2018). Tullock contests reward information advantages. Economics Letters, 172, pp. 34-36.