Publication:
Sex-Equal Stable Matching

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2001
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Springer
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Abstract
The paper defines a measure on the set of stable matchings in the marriage problem. This measure is based on the minimization of the envy difference between the sets of men and women, while preserving stability and selects stable matchings with the least conflict of interest between both groups of agents. The solution concept proposed is called Sex-equal Matching (SEM) and the paper also provides an algorithm to compute the set of SEM.
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The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com
Keywords
Matching markets, Fair distribution, No-envy
Bibliographic citation
Theory and Decision. 2001, vol. 50, nº 3, p. 197-212