The Power of Persuasion

The Instituto de la Mujer in Spain

Celia Valiente

Government offices involved with the promotion of women’s status arrived later in Spain than in other Western countries. This late start was due to the fact that from the second half of the 1930s until 1975 Spain was governed by a right-wing authoritarian regime that actively opposed the advancement of women’s rights and status. Furthermore, during the 19th and most of the 20th centuries, the feminist movement was weaker and its influence less noticeable in Spain than in other Western democracies. Nevertheless, in 1994 the Instituto de la Mujer (IM) or the Woman’s Institute, the main women’s policy office at the national level, is comparable to agencies in other advanced industrial democracies in terms of goals, budget, and personnel.

The Institute was founded in October 1983, six years after the first democratic elections were held in Spain and one year after the Partido

AUTHOR’S NOTE: I would like to thank Justin Byrne, Elisa Chuliá, Robert Fishman, and Josu Mezo for their comments on earlier drafts of this chapter. These drafts were prepared for the European Consortium for Political Research Joint Sessions of Workshops, Madrid, Spain, April 17-22, 1994; and the Conference “Crossing Borders: International Dialogues on Gender, Social Politics, and Citizenship,” Stockholm, Sweden, May 27-29, 1994.
Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE, Socialist party) first came to power. It remains an important site for women's policymaking within the Spanish state. The IM differs from women's policy machinery in countries with stable democracies in three notable areas. First, the Institute is closely linked to one political party, the PSOE. This means that IM's top posts are filled mainly by Socialist party members or individuals who do not belong to any party. The Institute has not employed people who are active members of other political parties. This connection to the PSOE means that in the event that the Socialists lose control of parliament, the future of the IM is uncertain. Second, like most bureaucratic agencies in the Spanish government, the IM is primarily staffed by civil servants; few are former feminist activists. Third, there are no cooperative links, either formal or informal, between IM femocrats and feminist activists.¹

This chapter will examine these three areas of contrast by discussing the establishment, organization and policy influence of the IM, as well as its relations with women's groups and movements.

Establishment

Surveys suggest that Spanish citizens are more favorable to the state playing a major role in society than citizens of other postindustrial countries (Beltrán, 1990, pp. 318-319). For example, in 1988, 75% of those interviewed in Spain agreed with the statement “the state is responsible for all citizens and has to take care of all people who have problems,” compared with 44% in France (in 1985) and 26% in the United States (in 1985). In Spain, only 23% of those interviewed agreed with the statement “citizens are responsible for their own welfare, and have to take care of themselves when they have problems,” compared to figures of 49% in France, and 74% in the United States. This apparent characteristic of Spanish political culture may encourage the establishment of state institutions to help social groups, such as women, with a set of common pressing problems.

This strong support for state intervention in Spain underscores the extent to which Spanish citizens have displayed a high level of support for the idea of women's policy offices, such as the IM. For
instance, in July 1985, less than 2 years after the foundation of the Instituto, 68% of Spanish women thought that the existence of a women's policy agency was very necessary or quite necessary, whereas 7.9% thought it was scarcely or not necessary. About 5% of women chose the answer "it depends on what the institution does," and 18.8% chose the option "I do not know/I do not answer." Public opinion polls of women in December 1987 and of men and women in December 1988 and December 1991 show that these views on the necessity of a women's policy office have not varied (Instituto de la Mujer, Metra Seis).

Spanish feminists did not make a strong unified call for the creation of women's equality institutions in the 1970s and early 1980s. Indeed, feminist attitudes about state institutions involving women's policy have varied widely. Some groups supported the establishment of the IM, arguing that the objective of a higher degree of formal and real gender-based equality could be attained through legal reforms and equality policies. According to this view, the state could be used to the advantage of women citizens if a significant number of committed feminists were well-established in key decision-making positions.

Other feminists were very skeptical about the usefulness of such structures, believing that their effectiveness depended on many factors, such as the feminist commitment of the employees who would staff the new agency. These feminists neither completely supported nor opposed the creation of the IM, choosing instead to wait until they could evaluate the Institute's performance after some years. A third group of feminists maintained that women should neither try to be equal to men nor attempt to achieve the same rights and status that male citizens already enjoyed. Rather, they argued that women should reorganize all aspects of public and private life in a new, nonhierarchical form. Because these feminists saw the state as an institution that contributed to the perpetuation of the unequal relationship between women and men, they felt that the best strategy to follow was to stay as far away from the state as possible.

At least two contradicting factors have influenced these feminist evaluations of the usefulness of state institutions for women. On one hand, feminist groups that formed in the late 1960s and early 1970s were illegal and participated in the opposition to the authoritarian regime (Scanlon, 1990, p. 94). To varying degrees, this experience left
many feminists suspicious of political power. On the other hand, the PSOE was in power when the IM was founded. Thus, for the first time since the 1930s, the government was in the hands of a party that overtly promoted the advancement of women's rights. Based on its governing record under the Second Republic in the 1930s and its electoral platform in the 1980s, Spanish feminists were ready to give credence to the PSOE's commitment to women's rights. Besides, the feminism associated with the center in the 1920s and 1930s, liberal feminism, had disappeared during the dictatorship, so that most Spanish feminists came from the Left (Threlfall, 1985, p. 47).

A crucial ingredient in the establishment of the IM was the PSOE’s growing commitment to gender equality. This was not an easy process, because the PSOE was a social democratic party. Like similar parties in other countries, the PSOE tended to be more concerned with class inequalities than with gender differences, and feminist activists were often contemptuously labeled bourgeois. Nonetheless, in 1976 a women’s caucus, Mujer y Socialismo, was formed and in 1981, a member of the caucus was elected to the PSOE’s Executive Committee, with others following her in successive years. In December 1984, party leaders decided to raise the women’s caucus to the federal executive level, where it became the women’s secretariat. The feminists in the secretariat successfully added clauses involving women’s issues to PSOE congress resolutions, electoral programs, and other documents. These Socialist feminists also pushed for the inclusion of a women’s policy office in the Socialist cabinet.

In their attempts to commit the PSOE to state institutions for women’s policy, these feminist Socialists sought to create an office that would emulate the Socialist Ministry of Woman’s Rights in France, which they perceived to be highly successful. They also used examples of similar offices in other West European countries to reinforce their arguments for a women’s policy agency with PSOE activists, elected officials, and bureaucrats, who were reticent about establishing such a bureau. As one director of the Institute said, this line of argument was particularly compelling in the context of the strong political support for integrating Spain into the group of economically developed and politically democratic countries. The nations Spain rushed to emulate had, for the most part, some form of government office for women’s equality (personal communication, Carlota Bustelo,
IM director from October 1983 to July 1988). Feminist socialists managed to include a pledge "to create an equality commission guaranteeing nondiscrimination against one gender" in the PSOE’s 1982 electoral program. Right after the Socialist’s electoral victory in 1982, Javier Solana, Minister of Culture, gave Carlota Bustelo, a well-known former PSOE deputy and feminist activist, the task of establishing the IM. The Act of October 24 (no. 16/83), 1983, formally set up the IM.

Organization

The Instituto de la Mujer is not a ministry but an organismo autónomo (autonomous body) within the Ministry of Culture. Autonomy here does not mean independence from the political party in office, but autonomy from ministerial hierarchy. Unlike other departments, where there is an intermediate administrative layer between agency director and minister, the Institute’s director is directly responsible to the minister. The IM’s budget increased from $5 million to nearly $17 million, or 325%, between 1984 and 1992. In the early 1990s, the Institute had a staff of more than 150 people; 182 in 1990, and 166 in 1991 (Instituto de la Mujer, 1991, pp. 11-13; 1992, pp. 18-20). The internal organization of the IM is as hierarchical as any other Spanish government office. Most of the staff are funcionarios (civil servants), differentiated by salaries and administrative grade. They have been recruited from within the bureaucracy. As with most closed systems of administration, entry into the civil service is determined by oposición (examination). Very few of the IM’s staff were recruited because of their record in the feminist movement.

The Spanish state is composed of offices (mainly ministries), each of which tries hard to preserve and augment its own powers. In this context, it is extremely difficult to create a new independent state organ to formulate and implement women’s policies, which usually overlap with the competencies of several other state bodies. As a result, the IM has neither the power nor the budget to formulate and implement most gender equality policies. Instead, it has to convince more powerful state offices, which usually have more resources, to elaborate women’s equality policies. Aware of this dynamic, the first femocrats in the IM structured the Institute to devote most of its
resources, time, and energy to forging and nurturing bonds with other state offices.

Since 1985, the IM's director has been aided by the Consejo Rector (CR) or advisory council, which is primarily composed of representatives from the major ministries. Until the late 1980s, a complete Consejo Rector met at least once every 6 months, and a reduced committee met at least once every quarter. The advisory council has the role of directly involving ministerial representatives in the formulation, implementation, and evaluation of equality policies. Since this initial period of CR action, Convenios (cooperation agreements) between the IM and the ministries have been signed, and the Consejo Rector has met only sporadically (personal communication, Purificación Gutiérrez, IM director from April 1991 to September 1993).

The IM originally was divided into three departments, which were expanded to four after 1989. A large part of one department, the Subdirección General de Cooperación y Difusión (Subdivision of Cooperation and Publicity), is devoted to building and developing relationships with Comunidades Autónomas (regional governments) and Ayuntamientos (local councils). In general, the IM has collaborated with some regional governments in the creation of regional equality institutions and in the establishment and functioning of programs concerning women, for instance, refuges for battered women. The Institute has also helped local councils set up women's policy structures as well, but to a much lesser extent.

The IM was first attached to the Ministry of Culture and then moved to the Ministry of Social Affairs created in 1988. In comparison to other ministries, such as those of the Economy or the Presidency, both have a peripheral status in the state structure, a factor that helps to explain the marginalization of women's issues on the government's agenda. Since 1988, however, the Ministry of Social Affairs has been actively involved with advancing women's rights and status. Matilde Fernández, minister of social affairs from 1988 to 1993, and Christina Alberdi, minister since 1993, dedicated much of their political activity prior to their appointments to feminist causes. As a result, they have been important in lending intergovernmental legitimacy to the IM. Both women have defended the issues and demands raised in the IM and within feminist circles to the cabinet. Before 1988, in contrast, the
Instituto depended on the minister of culture, Javier Solana, a man who displayed sympathy toward women's issues and respect for the IM's autonomy but who had not been active in feminist groups or movements (personal communication, Carlota Bustelo, IM director).

Policy Influence

The evaluation of the IM's influence in Spanish society is difficult because, in the context of its relatively recent creation, much of its political and social impact may not yet be detectable. Nonetheless, an examination of the extent to which the Institute has met the five major goals announced by its act of foundation and its regulations can shed some light on the IM's policy influence.

The first major objective was to promote policy initiatives for women through formal enactment of policy statements, such as legislation or decrees. In order to assess how far this goal has been achieved, it is important to bear in mind the legal status of Spanish women and the state of equality policies in 1983. In some respects, formal equality was already a reality in 1983 (Threlfall, 1985, pp. 60-61). For example, family law provided for joint administration of matrimonial property. In other areas, legal reforms had already been enacted and policies formulated, but their implementation was still incomplete in 1983. In 1978, for instance, the advertising and selling of contraceptives was permitted, but their distribution through the National Health System was not organized. Still, in other areas of women's rights, there was still a great deal of progress to be made. Until 1985, abortion was a crime punishable under the penal code.

Before 1987, IM staff tried to promote and coordinate women's equality measures in different ministries through the meetings of the Consejo Rector. By 1987 it was clear to Carlota Bustelo, then Institute director, and other femocrats that different policy instruments were necessary to avoid the dilution of their efforts and to circumvent the unequal commitment of different ministries to gender-based equality. To address these problems the IM designed a new instrument, the equality plan, which presented a list of goals for ministries to achieve within a specific time period. The IM staff prepared the first equality
plan in 1982, the Primer Plan para la Igualdad de Oportunidades de las Mujeres 1988-1990. It consisted of a comprehensive set of measures and reforms to be taken by 13 ministries, beginning in January 1988 and ending in December 1990. Before presenting the plan to the cabinet, the Institute negotiated its contents with most ministries, in order to sensitize the cabinet to the equality measures and to prevent the inclusion of specific items that would not be implemented by the ministries involved.

Although it is difficult to summarize the contents of the 120 legal reforms and equality actions proposed by the Primer Plan, six different types of measures can be identified (IM, 1990, pp. 15-101):

1. Legal reforms aimed at attaining equality between men and women before the law
2. Initiatives for nonsexist education
3. Equal employment measures
4. Women-specific health programs
5. The development of international cooperation projects related to women in other countries
6. The promotion of feminist associations in Spain

One of the main shortcomings of the plan was that, with the exception of legislative reforms, it was characterized by a high level of abstraction. For instance, Action 3.1.8 was “to carry out studies of female employers.” Yet nothing was said about who was going to conduct such studies, how many were to be made, which institution was to pay for them, what their characteristics would be, and who should receive the results.

When IM staff carried out an evaluation of the implementation of the plan, they concluded that it was highly successful; out of the 120 measures planned, 116 were taken (IM, 1990, p. 106). The IM’s conclusion, however, must be considered with extreme caution. The vague nature of the original objectives makes it difficult to evaluate whether or not they have been achieved. Also, the data and information that constitute the basis of this evaluation were provided by the responsible ministries themselves. This evaluation, therefore, may have overemphasized the positive aspects of their equality actions. A second
equality plan was drawn up for the period of 1993-1995 (IM, 1993). Like the first plan, it contains equality policies that are general and unclear.

Despite the mixed review of the equality plans, femocrats in the IM have been persistent and successful in engaging ministries in the formulation of some of these policies. Ultimately, of course, each ministry has the final word in deciding what those policies are. Even after a ministry has publicly committed itself to following a particular policy, the IM has no power to penalize it for failure to fulfill its commitment. Femocrats, in fact, have often succeeded in persuading other government agencies to act, but only to the extent that the decision makers have been willing to be persuaded. Still, if the IM had not existed, it is unlikely that many ministries would have implemented the equality measures they have put into practice in the last decade.

The second aim forwarded by the founding documents of the Institute was to study all aspects of women's situation in Spain. This is an important task, because when the IM was founded in 1983, little research of this type existed, particularly compared to the level of research on women's status in other advanced industrialized democracies. One of the four main departments of the IM, the Subdirección General de Estudios y Documentación, is devoted to the promotion of women's studies. The IM has published books, given grants to researchers, established awards and prizes for the best books and articles, commissioned pieces of research, and established a documentation center in Madrid to provide information to researchers and feminists. These activities have also contributed to promoting the IM's public image. Given that the IM can organize these research activities independently without the approval of other ministries, this part of the Institute's mission is perhaps the most effective.

The IM's third founding goal was to oversee the implementation of women's policies. It has been mainly through the Institute's legal department, Servicio de Informes Jurídicos, and the meetings of the Consejo Rector that this objective has been carried out. In the CR, ministry representatives have to report on the implementation of equality policies within their area of responsibility. The IM, however, does not have any power to sanction a state body that fails to implement equality measures or that implements policies in an unsatisfac-
Fourth, the IM is responsible for receiving and handling denuncias, women's discrimination complaints. It can only provide legal information to victims and initiate a legal complaint with the appropriate authorities when women victims come forward on their own. It can neither represent women in court nor lodge complaints without the victim's permission. The number of these complaints has been low: 48 in 1986, 86 in 1987, 84 in 1988, 86 in 1989, 60 in 1990, 21 in 1991, 24 in 1992, and 38 in 1993 (personal communication, Charo Padilla, head of the IM legal department). According to the IM staff, this low rate is a result of many women's fear of taking legal action and a low level of awareness about women's rights (personal communication, Charo Padilla and Cristina Blanca, head of the IM information centers).

The fifth major goal of the IM was to increase women's knowledge of their rights. Middle-aged and elderly women were socialized at a time when qualities such as self-abnegation and sacrifice were considered the greatest female virtues. The principal agents of this socialization were the Catholic church, official women's organizations of the authoritarian political regime, and traditional families. Many women of this generation, therefore, see themselves as bearers of obligations rather than citizens with rights. To achieve the goal of education, the IM has set up centros de información de los derechos de la mujer (information centers) in a number of cities, where women can freely obtain information about their rights by inquiring in person, by phone, or by mail. In 1984 there were 3 centers created, 4 in 1985, 10 in 1986 and since 1987, 1. In 1991, the Institute established a toll-free rights information phone number. Although the task is not impossible, it will take time to change well-established attitudes, especially among older generations.

The IM has only an indirect influence on policymaking; thus investing its resources in areas, such as research and dissemination of information, over which it can exert the most influence. The Institute has won public support for these activities. In 1991, about 50% of the population knew about the IM, and a high proportion of those polled have consistently held favorable opinions of its performance. In 1985, 57% of women saw the work of the Institute in a positive light, and in 1991, when the survey was administered to both men and women, 78% of those surveyed gave the IM a positive rating (IM, Metra Seis, 1985-1991).
The Instituto in Spain

Relations With Feminist and Women’s Organizations

The Spanish feminist movement has always been fragmented. According to IM data, approximately 100 women’s associations (not all of them feminist) exist at the national level, and best estimates put their number throughout the country at around 3,000.10 For most feminists, this fragmentation is a rather positive feature of the movement, because it reflects the diversity of women’s interests. In contrast, most femocrats see it as a problem that may hinder their collaboration with feminists, because the movement has not one, or a few, spokespeople, but many.

The Spanish feminist movement has been historically weak, with its activities only involving a minority of women. Durán and Gallego (1986, p. 205) estimate that by the mid 1980s the number of feminist activists accounted for less than 0.1% of adult women. Recently, others have questioned the alleged weakness of the movement in Spain. Kaplan (1992, pp. 208-209) suggests that organizations with headquarters in Madrid and Barcelona show signs of strength and gives the example of national feminist conferences being regularly attended by between 3,000 and 5,000 women. Nonetheless, in comparison with other Western countries, the movement in Spain has not achieved high visibility in the mass media or initiated many public debates.

Generally speaking, informal relationships between IM personnel and members of feminist organizations are weak. There are two reasons for this absence of stronger links. First, for the most part, Institute femocrats were not feminist activists before they entered the institutions. Second, many feminists, especially in the early 1980s, deeply mistrusted people who worked in state institutions, an attitude that has since changed somewhat. Consequently, feminist access to IM decision making was almost nonexistent before 1988 and is still extremely limited. For instance, although the Consejo Rector is supposed to include six people who demonstrate a long commitment to gender equality, called vocales, they often have little contact with feminist groups. The Institute’s director submits nominations to the parent minister, who officially approves them. These suggestions are based on individual career paths and not on any requisite amount of time spent in women’s groups and/or feminist organization.
In 1988, the government formed a commission to monitor the implementation of the first equality plan. The *Comisión consultiva para el seguimiento del Primer Plan para la Igualdad* (CCPP) was exclusively composed of feminists and was supposed to provide femocrats with observations and recommendations for future plans. The CCPP could have been the beginning of a long-lasting collaboration between femocrats and feminists, but the opportunity was apparently lost. Feminists bitterly complained that they were being asked to evaluate a plan they had had no role in preparing. The government did not ask the CCPP to participate in drawing up the second equality plan. Feminists also suspected that the IM staff was not interested in their findings. Numerous disagreements arose among the feminists involved, and some of them dropped out of the Commission before its works had been completed.

After the Commission had finished its tasks in the early 1990s, the government invited three representatives of feminist organizations and representatives of the two major Spanish unions, *Unión General de Trabajadores* and *Comisiones Obreras* to serve on the Consejo Rector (IM, 1991, p. 143). These representatives are now the only formal channel Spanish feminists have to the IM’s decision-making process. Paradoxically, they obtained this access at a time when the CR had virtually ceased to meet. This irony helps to explain why some feminists question the desirability and usefulness of their participation in this body.

Close informal relationships between IM personnel and feminist organizations, combined with access to the Institute’s decision-making process, might have reduced feminists’ distrust of femocrats and encouraged at least some activists to focus their efforts on collaboration with state institutions. Without these two conditions, many feminists have opted to focus on protest-oriented activities and continue to maintain their distance from the women’s policy offices, which appear to have no place for them.

For their part, Institute femocrats explain that because the feminist movement is weak and the Spanish population rarely forms associations, the state should therefore promote the emergence of associations by providing them with subsidies and other types of support, such as space in its buildings, materials, information, and advice on organizing activities. Approximately 10% to 15% of the IM’s budget
The Instituto in Spain has been devoted to subsidizing women's (not necessarily feminist) organizations. It should be noted that subsidies of this type also exist in other countries, for instance France (Mazur, 1994, p. 30), the Netherlands (Outshoorn, 1994a, pp. 12-14), and Germany (Ferree, 1991-1992). In the early years of the Institute, subsidies were given to associations without any criteria for the sort of activities to be organized. This changed in the late 1980s, when the IM started subsidizing only programs strictly defined in accordance with the IM's priorities.

Members of women's groups hold different opinions about the IM's subsidies policy. Although some appreciate it, most feminists are deeply critical of the amount of support they receive from the Institute. Some argue that they do more for the improvement of the situation of women than do IM femocrats, with their high salaries and prestigious and interesting posts. These feminists complain about the fact that most of the IM budget is devoted to maintaining the institution (paying for salaries, office material, and ongoing expenses), rather than to promoting the activities of women's associations. Other activists think that many of these subsidies are given to organizations ideologically close to the PSOE, and not to those who work hardest for feminist causes. Still others think that the Institute is attacking feminist autonomy by imposing its own criteria about the type of projects feminist groups have to run in order to receive subsidies. Indeed, like the creation of the CCPP and the late feminist appointments to the CR, many critics see these subsidies as another "poisoned gift" from the IM. Feminists also argue that because the bureaucratization of the process has increased greatly in the last few years, feminist groups are now required to spend a great deal of time on the formal procedures of applying for funds.

Finally, some feminists suspect that subsidies might have served to coopt the movement by rewarding those organizations that support IM activities: It appears to them that the less an organization protests against IM policies, the more subsidies it receives. In fact, the feminist movement is now less protest-oriented in Spain than it was in the 1970s. This trend might have been reinforced by the IM’s policy of subsidies, but other factors also influenced this tendency: the absence of unifying and mobilizing causes (with the main exceptions of abortion and violence against women) and the recognition of the diversity of women’s interests.
Conclusion

This chapter has argued that one of the main achievements of the IM has been to involve other state bodies in making equality policies. Generally, acceptance of these policies among politicians, civil servants, and society is on the rise. And today Spanish femocrats face what Boneparth (1980) has called “the luxury of diffuse opposition” (p. 4), in that there has been no widespread conservative reaction to their initiatives. Indeed, there are few organized groups in state or society whose principal objective is to limit or eradicate equality policies and to return women to their traditional roles. In part this could be due to the way in which the IM has initiated women’s equality policies, by always seeking the cooperation of other political governmental structures. As Rockman notes (1990, p. 37), this type of policymaking is certainly time and energy consuming. But once several actors have agreed on a particular policy, the support thus obtained makes the probability for success and acceptance much greater.

The IM is linked to the PSOE in the sense that the Institute’s staff generally accepts the official party position on women’s issues. At the same time, the IM does not favor the mobilization of the feminist movement (or of public opinion) as a way of advancing demands that go beyond PSOE gender equality compromises. For example, the IM has avoided the controversial abortion issue. The July 5, 1985, Act (no. 9/1985) allows abortion only in three situations: when the woman has been raped, when pregnancy seriously endangers the life of the mother, and when the fetus is malformed. As such, it is one of the most restrictive laws in Europe. Although the majority of IM femocrats favor a more permissive abortion law, as of June 1994, femocrats have neither made public statements nor mobilized against the 1985 law.

The IM has not been able or perhaps, willing, to break the traditional Spanish pattern of policy formulation and implementation, which affords social groups limited influence in the policy process (Valiente, 1994). Indeed, the IM has appeared to cast its lot with the PSOE. In the event of a conservative party electoral victory, IM femocrats’ close ties to the ruling Socialist party and their distance from potential feminist support threaten the long-term future of the Instituto de la Mujer.
Notes

1. The sources for this chapter include published and unpublished IM documents, legislation, political party documents, press articles, and 31 in-depth personal interviews, conducted in 1993, with IM personnel, members of feminist organizations, and women's sections within trade unions, as well as with the Minister of Social Affairs.

2. All translations are by the author.

3. Information on the feminist movement came from personal interviews with Cristina Garazabal (Women Against Physical Abuse Group); Lourdes Hernández (Alliance of Women's Groups from Neighborhoods and Villages in Madrid); Lucía Mazarrasa (Forum of Feminist Politics); Justa Montero (Pro-Abortion Commission); Ana M. Pérez del Campo (Separated and Divorced Women’s Association); Empar Pineda (Lesbian Feminist Group); Isabel García-Pascual, M. Angeles de Lope, and Pilar Saúces (Free Women); María Jesús Vilches (Comisiones Obreras, a trade union); and Lucía Villegas and Carmen Muriana (Unión General de Trabajadores, a trade union). Those interviewed are not representative of the feminist movement as a whole but of some important currents within it.

4. The first truly democratic regime was established in Spain during the Second Republic (1931-1936). Between 1931 and 1933, a coalition of Republican (liberal) parties and the PSOE governed the country. Many legal reforms and policies for women were instituted then, including voting rights, the prohibition of discrimination, the establishment of divorce, the abolition of prostitution, and the organization of a maternity insurance scheme (Valiente, 1994, pp. 244-295).

5. The IM budget, in Spanish pesetas (U.S. dollars in parentheses) increased from 707.06 (5.2) million in 1984 to 2,297.4 (16.7) in 1992 (IM, 1992, pp. 36-40). The exchange rate on March 26, 1994, was 137 pesetas for one dollar.

6. Spain is a strongly decentralized state with 7 autonomous regions.

7. This is a preliminary evaluation of the relations between the Institute and other women's agencies at the regional and local level, which needs to be complemented by closer analyses of these territorial units.

8. October 24, 1983 (no. 16/83) Act and Royal Decree August 1, 1984 (no. 1456/84).

9. Women's rights information centers have responded to the following number of inquiries (personal communication, Cristina Blanca):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18,891</td>
<td>1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31,685</td>
<td>1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50,164</td>
<td>1986</td>
</tr>
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<td>45,730</td>
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<td>57,633</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>60,701</td>
<td>1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65,583</td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55,366</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58,469</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52,812</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
By the end of 1993, 160,435 calls had been answered.

10. Information provided by Mar García and María Antonia Carretero, from the IM's Subdirección General de Cooperación.

11. This is not a point of view particular to the IM's staff. It was also expressed by bureaucrats in the Ministry of Social Affairs.

12. The amount of money spent in this way was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spanish Pesetas (in millions)</th>
<th>U.S. Dollars (in millions)</th>
<th>Percent of IM Budget</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78.3</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110</td>
<td>8.46</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>282.9</td>
<td>2.06</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>201.7</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>333</td>
<td>2.43</td>
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<td>1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>265</td>
<td>1.93</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Figures are from Instituto de la Mujer, 1992, p. 65, and percentages have been calculated from data contained on pp. 36-40 and 68.