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OF MARRIED WOMEN

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Breaking the Marriage Trap: Unilateral Divorce and its Effects on Labor Supply of Married Women^{*}

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Abstract

We assess the impact of the 2005 divorce law reform in Spain, which reduced the time length and the costs of marriage termination, on the labor market outcomes of married women. We use independent cross sections of the Spanish Labor Force Survey between 2001 and 2009. As the reform affected married couples but not unmarried couples, we undertake a differences-in-differences approach to estimate the causal effect. Our results show that the reform substantially increased the participation and the occupation rates of married women by 4 and 3 percentage points, respectively, but reduced their average working hours by 5 percent. This latter result comes along with a large increase in part time employment due to the reform. The effects were more pronounced for women without young children, with low education levels, and living in provinces where separate property was the default marital regime.

JEL classification: J22, J12, J16, K36, C21, D19.

Keywords: marriage market, household bargaining, divorce reform, gender inequality, female participation, labor supply, differences-in-differences.

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1 Introduction

The historical gender gap in labor force participation and employment rates is a clear indication of gender discrimination in the labor market, which reflects significant cultural differences in the social and economic roles assigned to men and women. Married women, in particular, have historically exhibited much lower participation rates compared to men and unmarried women, with the gender division of labor between market and home-specific activities within the marriage playing a significant role in this gap (Becker et al. 1977). Traditional gender norms that hinder the bargaining position of women within the marriage have perpetuated this divide.

In Spain, the gender gap in labor force participation was 26 percentage points in 2001, but this gap has since narrowed to 11 percentage points in 2020, largely due to the substantial increase in participation among married women. Despite this progress, the gender participation and wage gaps in Spain remain high compared to other OECD countries (Guner et al, 2014). Other important labor market indicators also reflect gender inequalities in Spain. Women tend to work fewer hours on average than men, and this is largely driven by the prevalence of female part-time employment. Furthermore, women with children often experience greater labor market inequalities than men or women without children (Hupkau and Ruiz-Valenzuela, 2022).

The rise in married women's participation in recent years entails a challenge to the traditional family structure as the dominant one and a shift towards more egalitarian families that overcome the gender distinction of partners' roles. This increase in labor market participation has provided women with more opportunities outside of marriage, which in turn may increase their relative bargaining power within the marriage. Furthermore, the availability of outside opportunities also affects each partner's perceived utility in the event of a divorce. Making divorce easier may alter the behavior of married women in two ways. First, it makes the threat of divorce more credible, thereby altering the balance of power between partners. Second, it may encourage married women to engage more in labor market activities to improve their position in the event of a divorce.

We are intrigued on how divorce legislation affects the labor market behavior of married women. For such purpose, we exploit the occurrence of an unexpected reform in the divorce legislation in Spain in July 2005. This reform allowed for no-fault, unilateral divorce, and eliminated the mandatory period of legal separation before divorce. In the first year following the reform, the number of divorces increased by 170% (Brassiolo, 2016). The reform entailed a significant reduction on the cost of marriage termination for married couples, while leaving unmarried couples unaffected, providing us with a quasi-experimental framework. We will measure the causal effect of the divorce law reform by comparing the average change in labor outcomes for married women (the treatment group) with the counterfactual average change in labor outcomes for unmarried women cohabiting with a partner (the comparison group). Our data source is the Spanish Labor Force Survey between 2001 and 2009, which is a representative microeconomic dataset of the Spanish working-age population. We will focus on three different labor market outcomes: labor-force participation, employment status, and weekly working hours.

Our main findings reveal that the divorce law reform had a significant impact on the labor market behavior of married women. Specifically, we found that the odds of participation and employment of married women increased, while their average working hours decreased. These effects are both statistically and economically significant, with an average increase in participation and employment of 4 and 3 percentage points, respectively, and an average reduction in working hours of 5 percent. Importantly, the labor outcomes of married men were not affected by the reform. Our results are consistent with previous studies that have examined the effects of divorce law reform in other countries, such as the US (Peters, 1986; Stevenson, 2008) and Ireland (Bargain et al, 2012), which have also found increases in the labor force participation of married women. The reduction in average working hours for employed married women was mostly due to an increase in part-time employment.

We also examined how the effects of the divorce law reform varied depending on the characteristics of the married women and their households, such as the presence of young children, educational attainment, and the default marital property regime in their province of residence. We found that the increase in participation and employment, as well as the decrease in average working hours, were driven primarily by women without young children, while women with young children were not significantly affected by the reform. Regarding education, the reform had a larger impact on the participation of lower-educated women, although the estimated effects on the odds of employment by education were less precise. Finally, we also found that the effects of the reform on participation and employment were larger in provinces where separate property was the default marital regime, compared to those where community property was the default regime. However, the opposite was true

for the effect on average working hours, which fell more for married women in provinces where community property was the default regime. These results suggest that the impact of the divorce law reform on the labor market behavior of married women is heterogeneous and may vary depending on their individual and household characteristics, as well as the legal context in which they live.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we review the household bargaining models and their predictions on the relationship between costs of divorce and labor outcomes of married women. In section 3 we describe the Spanish legislation on divorce and the law changes occurred in 2005 that originated the source of exogenous variation that justifies our empirical approach. Section 4 presents the data and the preliminary descriptive evidence, and in section 5 we explain our empirical approach. In section 6 we provide and discuss the estimation results and section 7 concludes.

2 Theoretical background and previous empirical evidence

Changes to divorce laws that reduce the costs of marriage termination have the potential to affect both the probability of divorce and the division of time and resources within marriages that remain intact. These issues have been the subject of considerable research in economics, with two competing models of household decision-making providing different predictions about the effects of such legal changes. The neoclassical pooling model suggests that divorce law changes may affect labor supply of married women only if the likelihood of divorce was affected, while the bargaining models of household allocation propose that such changes may also influence the behavior of partners within the marriage.

According to pooling models, the household head maximizes joint household utility subject to total household income, so time allocation among partners is independent of the distribution of wealth and relative power within the marriage. Therefore, a change in the divorce law is only expected to affect partners' time allocations if it changes divorce probabilities (Gray, 1998). If the divorce reform did not affect the likelihood of divorce, it should not have any impact on the labor supply of married women. However, if the reform increased the probability of divorce, leading to a higher risk of future income loss for both partners, the reservation wage of a married woman is likely to decrease. This could, in turn, increase the probability of her participating in the labor market (Genadek et al., 2007). For married women already in the labor force, an increase in the probability of divorce may encourage them to increase their working hours.

In household bargaining models, the behavior of partners is determined by their relative bargaining power within the marriage, which is influenced by their opportunities outside of the marriage (Manser and Brown, 1980; McElroy and Horney, 1981). In these models, partners will continue their marriage as long as their utility as a married couple is higher than the expected utility of divorce, net of divorce costs. As a result, a reduction in divorce costs, as seen with the introduction of no-cause unilateral divorce, will increase the utility of the spouse who desires divorce the most (Brassiolo, 2016). When divorce becomes easier due to law reform, it can result in higher labor market participation of married women for two reasons. First, the law reform may improve the bargaining power of the wife within the marriage, leading to a change in the allocation of market and non-market time among spouses, and increasing the participation of women in the labor market. Second, if the law reform leads to a higher probability of divorce by reducing the costs of divorce, it may encourage wives to participate in the labor market to increase their outside opportunities in the event of marriage termination.

Under symmetric, perfect information about each partner's preferences and outside opportunities, the Coase Theorem predicts that bargaining between partners will result in an efficient allocation. If the joint utility of remaining married is lower than the sum of partners' utilities in the event of divorce, marriage will be dissolved, and efficient intrafamily transfers will be made to the partner who wants to remain married if unilateral divorce is not allowed. If, on the other hand, the joint utility of remaining married is higher than the sum of partners' utilities in the event of divorce, marriage will remain intact, and if unilateral divorce is allowed, efficient intrafamily transfers will be made to the partner who wants divorce the most. Therefore, introducing unilateral divorce under symmetric information affects the situations under which intrafamily transfers will be made, but is not expected to increase the likelihood of divorce.

However, when there is asymmetric information about partners' preferences and outside options, intrafamily transfers are likely to fall short of efficient levels. As a result, the likelihood of divorce is expected to increase after the introduction of unilateral divorce.

The evidence about the effect of introducing unilateral divorce on the probability of divorce is mixed. Peters (1986) and Gray (1998) find that the introduction of unilateral

divorce in different US states did not increase the odds of divorce; this result would provide support to spouses' perfect information about each other spouse's preferences and outside opportunities. However, Friedberg (1998) and Wolfers (2006), for the US and González and Viitanem (2009) for European countries, find that the divorce rate increased after the introduction of no-cause unilateral divorce, which is consistent with the presence of asymmetric information about each other spouse's preferences. Likewise, Friedberg and Stern (2014) find empirical support regarding inefficiencies in partners' bargaining that make intrafamily transfers in the case of marriage conflict too small and thus rise the risk of divorce.

While a change in divorce law can increase the probability of divorce for all marriages, individual and household characteristics can cause married women to respond differently to the law change. Heterogeneity in potential opportunities outside marriage, influenced by factors such as the presence of young children in the household, women's human capital, and the underlying marital property regime, can have varying effects. First, the presence of young children may partially offset the decline in the cost of divorce, as the divorce process can be prolonged and monetary costs can increase due to decisions regarding child custody and alimony. Moreover, women with young children are less likely to participate in the labor market and may have worse labor market prospects due to their higher marriagespecific skills compared to women without young children (Genadek et al., 2007). Second, a woman's education level can affect her labor market prospects and, therefore, her economic opportunities outside marriage. Hence, married women with poorer prospects outside of marriage may take less advantage of the declining cost of divorce. However, an increase in the probability of divorce may incentivize them to participate more in the labor market to improve their economic prospects in case of a divorce. Finally, the marital property regime can affect the allocation of marital resources during a divorce. Community property regimes tend to give wives a stronger bargaining position than common law or separate property regimes (Gray, 1998). Hence, common law creates stronger incentives for married women to improve their outside opportunities if divorce becomes more likely than community property regime.

3 The divorce legislation in Spain

The first divorce law in Spain was established in 1932, but it was banned in 1939 and was not restored until June 1981, when a new law allowing divorce was passed by the Spanish parliament. The 1981 law established a two-step court process that required a mandatory period of legal separation whose length was between 1 and 5 years. The length of the separation period depended on the court decision, and was typically shortened if there was mutual consent for marriage termination or the divorce lawsuit was based on "fault" grounds. As a consequence, even though the law also allowed no-fault, unilateral divorce lawsuits, they were typically much more costly than mutual consent or fault lawsuits, because the sentenced time length of mandatory separation and the judiciary costs were much higher.

In July 2005, the Spanish Parliament approved a reform of the divorce law, popularly known as "express divorce" law. The 2005 law reform allowed filing for divorce irrespective on the existence of either mutual consent or fault grounds, and very importantly, removing the mandatory legal separation period. It also reduced sharply the judiciary costs of the divorce process. Overall, the new law established the unilateral and no-fault divorce without mandatory previous separation and with low court costs, thus reducing substantially the transaction costs.

A key issue is that the divorce law reform was completely unanticipated, because it was promoted shortly after the unexpected victory of the Socialist Party in the general elections in March 2004 (Brassiolo, 2016). Despite the electoral polls a few days earlier predicted a substantial election victory for the incumbent Popular Party, the election outcome dramatically changed after a large-scale terrorist attack just 3 days before the elections (Montalvo, 2011).

Figure 1 shows the divorce and separations claims between 1998 and 2012. The divorce claims increased by 74 percent between 2004 and 2006, just after the divorce reform law was approved. This increase was much higher than the decrease in separations, with a net annual increase in the sum of divorce and separation claims in 2006 of 6 percent. This evidence is consistent with the existence of asymmetric information about the preferences of each other partner. Also, Figure 2 shows that the proportion of divorce lawsuits filed by women increased after the year of the reform. This evidence is consistent with the fact that the change in the divorce law benefited women more than men.

4 Data and descriptive evidence

We exploit individual data from the Spanish Labor Force Survey (LFS), using independent cross sections corresponding to the second quarters of the years 2001 to 2009. The survey, officially called Economically Active Population Survey, is run quarterly by the Spanish National Statistics Institute over a representative sample of about 65,000 households with the aim of featuring information about the behavior of the Spanish population with respect to the labor market. All members within the drawn households, aproximately 160,000 people, are interviewed. Household and individual information, as well as the kinship shared with the remaining individuals in the household, is provided. The household information includes the province of residence and household composition, among others. The individual information includes marital status, age group, education level, labor market status, as well as detailed information about the characteristics of the jobs for those who were currently working at the time of the survey (type of contract, weekly working hours, daily working schedule, etc.). We have restricted our sample to individuals between 25 and 59 years old.¹ However, our data set does not include information on the duration of marriage for married individuals.

The individuals potentially affected by the divorce law reform are married women cohabiting with their partners. As comparison group, we will consider unmarried women cohabiting with their partners, for whom the reform had no effect. For the purpose of validation, we will also consider the group of unmarried women without cohabiting partner.

Our analysis focuses primarily on three different labor market outcomes: participation (being employed or looking for a job versus being out of the labor force), employment (being working versus being unemployed or out of the labor force) and weekly hours worked (for those currently working at the time of the survey). Our measures of participation and employment are binary indicators of being in the labor force and being working, respectively. Our measure of working hours is the number of hours worked by the individual in the week before the survey. This way, we can analyze the causal effect of the divorce law reform on the extensive margin (participation and employment) for all married women, and on the intensive margin (hours worked) for working married women. In addition, we will also consider complementary information about the duration of the working day for employed

¹This criterion enables us to focus on individuals who have likely completed their education, are likely to have non-adult children, and are not yet at the age of early retirement (we have excluded individuals aged 60 to 64, just before the legal retirement age of 65).

individuals, distinguishing between full time and part-time jobs, as well as the reasons for working part-time. Specifically, we note whether individuals report having chosen part-time work voluntarily (because they prefer it to full-time work) or involuntarily (because they could not find full-time work).

Table 1 provides summary statistics for the three outcome variables (participation, employment, and weekly hours worked) and individual, partner, and household characteristics. We present data for three groups: married women, unmarried women cohabiting with a partner, and women without partners, both before and after the divorce law reform. We observe that married women have lower participation and employment rates than unmarried women, regardless of the period considered. Additionally, the average weekly hours of work for employed married women are lower than those for unmarried women. Furthermore, women with cohabiting partners, particularly married women, are more likely to work part-time. Unmarried women with or without a partner show some differences in labor market behavior, but the differences are generally small.

After the divorce law reform, there was an increase in participation and employment rates for all women, but the largest increase was observed among married women (approximately 10 percentage points for both participation and employment). Although there was an unconditional increase in average weekly hours for all women, when we only consider employed women, we see a decrease in average weekly hours, with the largest drop being for married women (approximately 5 percent). Therefore, the overall increase in working hours is mainly due to the increase in participation, while the average working hours per week for female workers decreased following the reform.

To better understand the decrease in average working hours, it is important to analyze the role of part-time work. Over the past two decades, part-time work has steadily increased and is highly gender-segregated, with women being the dominant group and men playing a relatively minor role. Prior to the divorce law reform, approximately 17% of working women held part-time jobs, with the proportion being even higher among married women. Moreover, married women are more likely than unmarried women to prefer part-time work over full-time work, as it provides them with the flexibility to balance household and family care responsibilities. This finding suggests that many married women were fulfilling the role of secondary workers within their households, in accordance with traditional gender norms (Insarauto, 2021).

Following the reform, the proportion of women in part-time employment increased from 17% to 22% of the total female workforce, with married women accounting for a larger share, which approached 25%. It is worth noting that the number of women in involuntary part-time work almost doubled after the reform, affecting all female groups, but especially married women. Those women who entered the labor market after the reform were more likely to have poorer job prospects compared to women who had already established themselves in the labor market. Additionally, married women disproportionately bear the burden of family care and household activities, resulting in less time for work outside the home. Before the reform, about 20% of married women's part-time employment was due to voluntary family care reasons, increasing to 43% after the reform. This increase was also seen among unmarried women, particularly those living with a partner. However, it is unclear whether part-time work for family care reasons can truly be considered voluntary, given that many women with young children or dependent elders face significant constraints from rigid work schedules and caregiving responsibilities (Guner et al, 2014; Hupkau and Ruiz-Valenzuela, 2022). Understanding the role of part-time work is critical to explaining the changes in average working hours observed among married women.

On average, married women tend to be older and less educated compared to unmarried women, with their partners also having lower education and employment rates. These differences are statistically significant. Additionally, married women are more likely to have non-adult children living at home than unmarried women, as expected. Unmarried women without a cohabiting partner are much less likely to have children than both married and unmarried women with a cohabiting partner. Interestingly, while the probability of having young children (below 5 years old) is similar between the two latter groups, married women are much more likely to have older children than unmarried women with cohabiting partner.

5 Empirical approach

Our empirical strategy employs a "differences-in-differences" approach (Heckman et al., 1999) that leverages the exogenous variation resulting from the 2005 divorce law reform, which impacted only women in married couples while leaving those in unmarried couples unaffected. The reform provides a natural experiment that allows us to identify the causal effect of this change on the labor market behavior of married women. Notably, Brassiolo (2016) previously used the reform of the divorce law to examine its impact on the risk of

male partner abuse against married women.

The reform of the divorce law meets the two necessary conditions that make it a natural experiment. Firstly, as previously discussed, the evidence suggests that the reform was unanticipated. It was implemented by the left-wing government that unexpectedly won the general elections against a right-wing incumbent party that opposed the reform. This rules out any strategic behavior of those potentially affected by the reform. Secondly, the purpose of the reform was to remove potential constraints that spouses may face when deciding to continue or terminate their marriage. The reform was not related to labor market decisions, making it exogenous to labor market outcomes.

The treatment group in our study consists of married women cohabiting with their husbands, who experienced a substantial reduction in the cost of terminating their relationship due to the divorce law reform. On the other hand, the control group consists of unmarried women cohabiting with a male partner, whose costs of terminating their relationship remained unchanged after the reform. Therefore, by comparing the changes in the outcomes of the two groups, we can identify the causal effects of the reform on the labor market behavior of women in cohabiting relationships.

The key assumption in our study is the parallel trends assumption, which states that the treatment and control groups would have followed similar trends in outcome variables in the absence of the reform. This implies that the observed mean outcome change in the control group can be used as a counterfactual outcome change for the treatment group had the reform not occurred. However, this assumption may be threatened if there were any shocks or events during the study period that had a differential impact on outcomes between the treatment and control groups.

We will exploit 8 independent cross sections between 2001 and 2009, excluding the year of the reform 2005, so we observe each individual i just once. Denoting Y_i as the labor market outcome variable for individual i, we consider, using the subsample of women, married or not, who are cohabiting with a partner, the following specification,

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Married}_i + \beta_2 \left(\text{Married}_i \times \text{After}_i \right) + \sum_{\substack{t=2002\\t\neq 2005}}^{2009} \delta_t Dt_i + \gamma' \mathbf{X}_i + u_i.$$

where Married is a binary variable taking on value 1 if individual is married and 0 otherwise and After is a binary variable taking on value 1 if individual is observed after the divorce law and 0 otherwise. In order to control for common aggregate shocks, we also consider year dummies, Dt_i , which take on value 1 if the individual is observed in year t ($t = 2002, \ldots, 2004, 2006, \ldots, 2009$) and 0 otherwise. The causal effect is given by β_2 , the coefficient of the interaction between Married and After. The vector **X** contains a set of individual variables capturing individual characteristics (age and education), partner characteristics (employment status and education) and household composition (variables indicating whether or not there are non-adult children living at home by age categories: under 5 years old, between 5 and 9 years old, between 10 and 16 years old), as well as a set of geographical binary variables of the province of residence.

We will use OLS estimators and compute heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors to account for any arbitrary form of conditional heteroskedasticity. Since treatment allocation is determined solely by marital status and not by the place of residence, there is no concern about potential dependence between the error terms of the control and treatment groups (Bertrand et al., 2004). It is also worth mentioning that detecting the effect of variable interactions can be more challenging than detecting the effect of individual variables due to lower statistical power. Nevertheless, our full sample includes a sufficiently large number of treatment and control units to ensure precise estimates.

6 Estimation results

The analysis of our labor market outcomes involves three alternative specifications for each outcome. The baseline specification excludes any covariate, while the augmented specification adds individual characteristics such as age and level of education,² and household characteristics such as province of residence and the presence of non-adult children in three different age ranges. The full specification includes all of the aforementioned individual and household characteristics, as well as partner characteristics, such as their employment status and level of education.

6.1 Validating the identifying strategy

To assess the parallel trends assumption, we perform a placebo test by estimating the same specifications as before, but only for the pre-treatment period of 2001-2004. In this case, we

²The age variable is grouped into 5-year intervals, and we create a set of binary indicators to represent each age group. Education is categorized into four different levels of completed education: less than primary, primary, secondary, and college.

define the binary variable After0, which equals 1 for 2003 and 2004 and 0 otherwise. The estimated coefficients of the variable (Married \times After0) for the three outcomes are reported in columns 1-3, 4-6, and 7-9 of Table 2, for participation, employment, and working hours respectively. We find that the estimated effects are quantitatively small and statistically insignificant, providing no evidence against the parallel trends assumption.

We conduct an additional validity check by using unmarried women without a partner as a placebo treatment group, instead of married women cohabiting with a partner. The comparison group remains unmarried women cohabiting with a partner. Since all unmarried women, with or without a partner, were unaffected by the reform, any differential change after the reform between unmarried women without a partner and those with a partner cannot be attributed to the divorce law reform but rather to any other event that may have taken place at the time of the reform. Therefore, a significant causal effect of the reform for this placebo treatment group would challenge our identification approach. Table 3 shows that the coefficient estimates of the variable (No partner \times After) for the three labor outcomes and all specifications are statistically insignificant. This indicates that no other events, aside from the divorce law reform, occurred during the same period that could explain the differential changes among women by marital or cohabiting status.

As our sample lacks information on the duration of marriages, we cannot determine the marital status of individuals at the time of the reform. This leaves open the possibility of unobserved changes in the composition of the treatment and comparison groups, which may have been partly due to the reform. To address this concern, Brassiolo (2014) used the Spanish census of marriages to investigate whether the divorce law reform of 2005 had a causal impact on the marriage rate and the composition of newly married couples. The analysis found no evidence of a change in the propensity to marry due to the reform, as indicated by the absence of a structural break in the monthly time series of marriages in observable characteristics of newly married couples following the reform, using microdata from the census of marriages conducted between 2001 and 2007. Although some statistically significant changes were observed, the magnitudes of these changes were generally small, suggesting that there were no relevant composition changes in spouses that could be attributed to the divorce law reform.

6.2 Main estimation results

Table 4 displays the estimation results using the full sample of women cohabiting with a partner. The impact of the divorce law reform on participation is presented in columns 1-3. In the first column (baseline specification), we find a significant and positive causal effect of 5.6 percentage points. The estimated effect decreases but remains significant when we add controls for women's characteristics, the presence of children, and fixed effects for provinces in column 2. Our preferred estimate, in column 3, which also includes partner characteristics, yields a significant and similar effect to that of column 2. After accounting for the characteristics of the woman, her partner, and household, which are jointly significant, we find that the divorce law reform increased the probability of participation of married women by approximately 4 percentage points. This corresponds to a 7.5% increase in the participation rate of married women, a magnitude that is economically relevant.

Regarding employment status (columns 4-6), we observe a much higher estimate in the baseline specification (column 4), but the full specification in column 6 is the most appropriate due to the joint significance of individual and background variables. After controlling for the relevant factors, we find that the divorce law reform led to an increase in the employment probability of married women by approximately 3 percentage points, which is statistically significant. Given the employment rate prior to the reform, the increase in the employment rate of married women due to the divorce law reform is around 6.4%.

The remaining columns of Table 4 present the estimated effects of the divorce law reform on the logarithm of weekly working hours for working women cohabiting with a partner. We find that all covariates are jointly and individually significant, and thus, our preferred estimates correspond to column 9. The estimated effect is statistically significant, indicating that the divorce law reform reduced the average weekly working hours of married women by 5%.

While the divorce law reform led to a significant increase in the extensive margin for married women, as reflected in the higher number of married women participating and working, we find the opposite result in the intensive margin. Our analysis reveals that average working hours decreased for the subsample of married working women. This is consistent with the results in Table 1, which show a decline in the average working hours of employed women, especially among married women, as a result of the increase in female part-time jobs. Table 5 offers further insights into the impact of the divorce law reform on working women, with a focus on part-time employment among the subsample of working women using the full specification with all the covariates. The first column of the table presents the results for the probability of being employed in any part-time job, showing a significant increase of approximately 4 percentage points in the likelihood of married women being employed in such jobs as a result of the reform. This increase accounted for a large share of the observed employment growth among married women and helped explain the estimated decline in the average working hours of employed married women. The column also highlights other factors that make part-time employment more likely, irrespective of marital status. For example, having non-adult children increases the probability of part-time employment, with the effect being greater for younger children. Moreover, the probability of part-time employment decreases with woman's age and education level. Women who face greater time constraints due to childcare needs and have shorter labor market histories and lower education are more likely to face worse job opportunities than others.

The results in column 2 of Table 5 indicate that the divorce law reform led to a 1 percentage point increase in the probability of married women being involuntarily employed in part-time jobs. This effect is statistically significant at the 5% level. Given that only 2.5% of married women were involuntarily employed in part-time jobs prior to the reform, the estimated effect implies a 40% increase in involuntary part-time employment for married women. Furthermore, results from column 3 in Table 5 show that the probability of married women being voluntarily employed in part-time jobs due to family care reasons increased by almost 4 percentage points as a result of the reform. This effect is statistically significant and economically relevant, accounting for a large share of the employment growth among married women following the reform.

To sum up, the divorce law reform had a significant impact on the participation and employment rates of married women compared to unmarried women with a cohabiting partner, after accounting for individual and background characteristics. The reform led to a 4 percentage point increase in the participation rate and a 3 percentage point increase in the employment rate among married women, representing a 7.5% and 6.4% increase, respectively. However, there was a 5% decline in the average working hours of employed married women, largely due to the increase in part-time employment, which exceeded the increasing trend in part-time jobs for other women. Our data source allows us to estimate the effects of the divorce law reform on the labor market behavior of married men cohabiting with their wives, as compared to unmarried men cohabiting with a female partner. The results, presented in Table 6, show that the divorce law reform had no impact on the labor market behavior of married men, both in the extensive and intensive margins. In contrast to working wives, husbands did not reduce their working hours following the reform. This may be attributed to the high feminization of home-specific activities such as housework and family care. It is possible that wives who were just entering the workforce chose jobs with shorter working hours to balance their home-specific activities, while husbands did not change their labor market behavior. It is worth emphasizing that these results suggest that the divorce law reform had a genderspecific impact on the labor market, primarily affecting the employment and working hours of married women, but not married men.

6.3 Heterogenous impacts of the reform

To gain a more nuanced understanding of the impact of the divorce law reform, we examine potential heterogeneous effects based on household and woman characteristics. Specifically, we investigate how the presence of young children (under 5 years old) in the household, the woman's level of education, and the default marital property regime in the province of residence may have influenced the impact of the reform. By examining these factors, we can better understand how the effects of the reform may have varied depending on specific household and individual characteristics.

Children are often considered an important asset in a marriage, and their value may decrease significantly if the marriage dissolves. Following a divorce, one parent typically has less contact with the children, while the other parent may need to devote more time to child rearing at the expense of other activities (Becker et al., 1977). This is especially true for young children, who require substantial time investments for primary childcare and other shared activities, much more so than older children. Given that women tend to bear the burden of these activities, regardless of their marital status, the effective reduction in divorce costs associated with the law reform may have been much lower for married women with young children than for other married women (Genadek et al., 2007).

To investigate the impact of the divorce law reform on women with and without young children, we separate our sample of women cohabiting with a partner into two groups based on whether they have young children at home or not. We report the estimation results in Table 7, which clearly indicate that the reform had no effect on labor market outcomes for married women with young children. In contrast, we find significant and sizeable effects for married women without young children, similar to the estimates for the full sample reported in Table 4. These results suggest that the increase in participation and employment, as well as the drop in average working hours, was driven by the behavior of women without young children, who had fewer childcare and other marriage-specific activities to attend to. These findings are consistent with a more substantial reduction in the divorce costs, including non-pecuniary costs, for married women without young children than for married women with young children.

Education is a key factor in women's labor market decisions and can affect their options outside of marriage. The impact of the divorce law reform may vary depending on the bargaining power of wives with different opportunities outside of marriage (Gray, 1998). Women with limited prospects may not benefit as much from a reduction in divorce costs (Brassiolo, 2016). Notwithstanding, unilateral divorce increases the likelihood of divorce for marriages where one spouse is on the margin of continuing or ending the marriage. In such cases, women who perceive a higher risk of divorce due to the reform may be more likely to react and take steps to improve their opportunities outside of marriage.

We present the estimation results in Table 8 by dividing the sample into three groups based on completed education level: primary or less, secondary, and college. Using the full specification with individual and background covariates, we find that the divorce law reform only had a significant effect on women with lower education levels. The increase in participation rates after the reform is driven by low-educated married women, with smaller and statistically insignificant effects for medium and highly educated women. Thus, the increase in divorce odds after the reform may encourage women with limited prospects to improve their situation by enhancing their economic empowerment.

The results regarding employment are not very precise precise by education. The estimated positive effect of the divorce law reform on employment rates is only significant for highly educated married women (at around 2.2 percentage points). However, the reform had a negative impact on the average working hours of all married working women, with statistically significant effects for low and medium educated women (at around 5-6% reductions in hours worked). This suggests that the reduction in average working hours after the divorce reform is driven by low and medium skilled married women, who are more likely to work part-time. Women with higher education enjoy better employment conditions and bargaining power within their marriages because of their skills.

Finally, the underlying marital property regime affects the relative bargaining power among spouses and the potential gains and losses in the event of divorce. In Spain, spouses can choose, at the time of marriage, the property regime ruling their marriage, choosing between either separate (common law) property or community property. Under the separate property regime, each spouse is entitled to sole ownership of certain assets, while community property regime states that every income, property and debts generated during marriage are equally shared by spouses. A divorce reform that eases divorce entails an implicit redistribution of assets to the wealthiest partner (often, the husband) under common law property and to the less wealthy partner (often, the wife) under community property (Gray, 1998). On the other hand, the divorce law reform affected differently the expected gains of divorce for each partner depending on the marital property regime. Under separate property (community property), the expected gains of divorce increase (decrease) for the wealthiest partner.

In Spain, there is a default marital property regime in each province that applies at the start of the marriage unless the spouses choose otherwise. Community property is the default regime in 40 provinces, while separate property is the default regime in 10 Northeast provinces, including Catalonia, Aragon, Balearic Islands, Navarre, and the Basque province of Vizcaya. Although we do not know the specific marital property regime for each married individual in our sample, we can determine whether the divorce law reform had varying effects in provinces with different default marital property regimes. Interestingly, in Spain the default property regime is strongly correlated with the marital regime actually chosen by married couples in each province. In addition, the mobility rate in Spain is strikingly low: as shown by the data provided by the Spanish National Statistics Institute in 2005, around 76% of women and 74% of men aged between 25 and 59 years who were born in Spain, were still residing in the same province where they were born.

The results are presented in Table 9. We found that after the reform, the participation and employment rates of married women increased more in provinces with the default separate property regime than in provinces with the default community property regime. However, the difference was only statistically significant for participation. Married women in provinces with the separate property regime tended to increase their participation in the labor market as a precautionary measure in the event of divorce since they typically owned a smaller share of assets than their husbands. The divorce law reform worsened their economic prospects from divorce under separate property, leading them to seek better economic opportunities. Regarding working hours, the reduction was lower in provinces with the default separate property regime than in provinces with the default community property regime, although the difference was not statistically significant. However, some estimates had less precision due to the smaller sample size after breaking down into subsamples.

In summary, our analysis reveals heterogeneous effects among married women based on their household composition, human capital, and the underlying marital property regime. First, we found that while the divorce law reform had no discernible effect on married women with younger children, it did have a significant impact on those without children or with older children. This suggests that the reduction in the costs of divorce resulting from the reform was much higher for women without younger children.

Second, we found that the increase in the participation of married women due to the reform was mainly driven by those with lower levels of education, who typically had lower participation rates and worse labor market prospects than their more educated peers. This result indicates that the higher probability of divorce induced by the reform encouraged more disadvantaged women to seek economic empowerment as a safeguard against the possibility of divorce. However, while average working hours decreased for low and medium educated married women, there was no significant effect on higher educated women. This finding is consistent with the increase in the share of part-time employment, which was more prevalent among lower educated women who faced greater labor market barriers.

Last, our analysis shows that the law reform had differential effects depending on the underlying marital property regime. Specifically, there were higher increases in participation and employment for women in provinces where separate property was the default regime. This result is consistent with the notion that women in such provinces, who typically owned a smaller share of assets than their husbands, had a greater incentive to improve their outside opportunities in the event of divorce, which became more likely after the reform.

7 Conclusions

This paper is concerned with the labor market outcomes of married women in Spain, who have experienced increased participation and employment rates in recent decades but still lag behind men and unmarried women. A key factor contributing to this disparity is the weak bargaining position of women within marriage, which often leads to them dedicating much more time to non-market activities like household and family care, reducing their participation in the labor market. To explore the impact of relative bargaining power among spouses, we analyze the effect of an exogenous change that affected married couples but not unmarried ones: the 2005 divorce law reform in Spain. By reducing the time and cost of the divorce process and increasing the likelihood of divorce, the reform could affect the labor market behavior of married women.

To estimate the causal effect of the reform on married women's labor market outcomes, we use a differences-in-differences approach, comparing changes in the outcomes of married women before and after the reform to those of unmarried women cohabiting with a partner. We analyze data from independent cross sections of the Spanish Labor Force Survey between 2001 and 2009.

The main findings of our study reveal that the 2005 divorce law reform in Spain had a substantial positive impact on the labor market outcomes of married women. Specifically, the reform increased their participation and occupation rates by 4 and 3 percentage points, respectively. Nevertheless, the reform also led to a 5% reduction in their average working hours. This reduction in working hours can be attributed to an increase in part-time employment, which many married women preferred as it allowed them to balance work and family responsibilities. Additionally, the study found a significant increase in involuntary part-time employment, which indicates the labor market disadvantages faced by married women.

Further analysis of the results, taking into account different woman and household characteristics, revealed that the effects of the reform were not uniform. Women without young children experienced the greatest impact on their labor market outcomes, in contrast with those with children, who did not experience a significant reduction in divorce costs due to their higher marriage-specific capital. The increase in labor market participation was primarily observed among women with lower levels of education. Also, the impact of the reform on participation and employment was stronger for women living in provinces where separate property was the default marital regime. These two latter results indicate a desire to improve their opportunities outside of marriage in light of the increasing likelihood of divorce.

Our study reveals that policies aimed at balancing bargaining power between spouses can have a positive effect on gender equality within marriages by weakening traditional gender specialization. However, while the increased participation of married women in the labor market is a welcome development, there are some concerns to consider. We found that the divorce law reform did not have a significant impact on the labor market behavior of husbands, particularly their working hours. In contrast, the average working hours of employed married women were significantly reduced, with a sharp increase in parttime employment. This rise in part-time employment among married women can largely be attributed to the fact that home production and family care activities continue to be primarily handled by wives, while the involvement of husbands in such activities has not increased.

Moreover, our analysis indicates that the gender gap in part-time versus full-time employment is widening, highlighting an important inequality in the labor market conditions faced by married women compared to their male counterparts. Despite some progress in recent years, Spain still falls behind other OECD countries in terms of the coverage and generosity of family policies, as well as flexibility in work schedules to facilitate a better balance between work and family life (Guner et al., 2014). The cost and availability of childcare, as well as rigid work schedules, remain significant barriers to the employment of mothers. Therefore, it is essential to promote public policies that facilitate childcare and increase flexibility in the workplace for parents.

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


Figure 1: Divorce and separations in Spain, 1998-2012. Source: Spain National Statistics




Figure 2: Percentage of divorce claims by petitioner in Spain, 1998-2012. Source: Spain National Statistics

Table 1 Descriptive statistics

		2001-2004	:		2006-2009	
	With	partner	Without	With 1	partner	Without
	Married	Unmarr.	partner	Married	Unmarr.	partner
Participation	0.52	0.78	0.77	0.62	0.82	0.81
Employment	0.45	0.67	0.65	0.55	0.72	0.71
% Part-time (any)	18.82	15.26	13.52	24.76	18.71	15.86
% Involuntary part-time	2.46	3.97	4.15	6.84	7.59	8.49
% Part-time for family care	3.53	1.48	0.59	10.73	5.77	2.08
Weekly working hours						
All women	14.60	22.41	22.36	16.97	23.73	24.08
Working women	32.45	33.45	34.40	30.86	32.96	33.91
Woman age						
25-29	0.06	0.29	0.36	0.05	0.25	0.29
30-34	0.13	0.25	0.16	0.11	0.26	0.16
35-39	0.17	0.17	0.11	0.16	0.19	0.12
40-44	0.18	0.12	0.10	0.19	0.13	0.12
45-49	0.17	0.09	0.09	0.18	0.09	0.11
50-54	0.15	0.05	0.09	0.16	0.05	0.10
55-59	0.14	0.03	0.09	0.15	0.03	0.10
Woman education						
None	0.07	0.04	0.06	0.05	0.03	0.05
Primary	0.57	0.41	0.34	0.19	0.34	0.32
Secondary	0.16	0.22	0.20	0.20	0.25	0.22
College	0.20	0.33	0.39	0.26	0.38	0.41
Has non-adult children						
Any age	0.60	0.40	0.12	0.59	0.46	0.14
<5 yr. old	0.17	0.17	0.01	0.18	0.23	0.02
5-9 yr. old	0.20	0.13	0.03	0.20	0.15	0.04
10-16 yr. old	0.41	0.22	0.10	0.38	0.19	0.11
Partner employed	0.80	0.84		0.80	0.84	
% Part time (any)	1.06	2.11		1.74	3.41	
% Involuntary part time	0.20	0.53		0.65	1.59	
% Part time for family care	0.00	0.00		0.18	0.26	
Partner education						
None	0.11	0.03		0.09	0.03	
Primary	0.53	0.44		0.47	0.41	
Secondary	0.15	0.24		0.19	0.25	
College	0.21	0.29		0.25	0.31	
No. obs	119265	4321	45811	110227	10615	44440

Source: Own calculations from the 2001-2009 Spanish LFS.

	noting anothing a coord into a committee								
		Participation		H	Employment			log(Hours)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)	(2)	(8)	(6)
Married	-0.254^{***}	-0.103^{***}	-0.102^{***}	-0.225^{***}	-0.083^{***}	-0.083^{***}	-0.047^{***}	-0.030^{**}	-0.031^{**}
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Married \times After0	-0.002	-0.000	-0.000	0.008	0.006	0.006	0.002	0.003	0.002
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
No. obs.	123586	123586	123586	123586	123586	123586	52706	52706	52706
R^{2}	0.011	0.167	0.168	0.008	0.162	0.163	0.001	0.034	0.035
Wald tests of joint significance $(p-value)$	significance	(p-value)							
All	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Time effects	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.042	0.051	0.058
Province effects		0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000
Children		0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000
Woman educ.		0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000
Woman age		0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000		0.033	0.047
Partner work			0.489			0.000			0.002
Partner educ.			0.000			0.000			0.000

After 0 is a binary variable taking on value 1 when the year is 2003 or 2004 and 0 otherwise. Source: Own calculations from the 2001-2004 Spanish LFS. * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

Table 3									
Estimates with single women without partner as placebo treatment group	e women	without p	artner as	placebo treat	ment gro	dn			
	Р	Participation	n	Ē	Employment	t		log(Hours)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)	(2)	(8)	(6)
No partner	-0.010	0.012^{**}	0.017	-0.017^{**}	-0.000	0.036^{***}	0.006	-0.002	0.014
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.017)
No partner \times After	-0.007	-0.009	-0.008	0.007	-0.000	0.001	0.002	-0.007	-0.007
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
No. obs.	105187	105187	105187	105187	105187	105187	66651	66651	66651
R^{2}	0.004	0.137	0.138	0.006	0.113	0.114	0.001	0.016	0.016
Wald tests of joint significance	ignificance	(p-value)	e)						
All	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Time effects	0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Province effects		0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000
Children		0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000
Woman educ.		0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000
Woman age		0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000
Partner work			0.015			0.000			0.055
Partner educ.			0.000			0.000			0.415
Robust standard errors in parentheses.	in parenthe	ses.							
Connect Own coloniations from the 2001 2000 Creatish I DC	- thom tho	, 0006 1006	Chanieh I FC	7					

Source: Own calculations from the 2001-2009 Spanish LFS. * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

Table 4									
Main Estimates: Women	Vomen								
		Participation			Employment			log(Hours)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)	(2)	(8)	(6)
Married	-0.256^{***}	-0.112^{***}	-0.112^{***}	-0.220^{***}	-0.085^{***}	-0.085^{***}	-0.046^{***}	-0.011	-0.012
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Married \times After	0.056^{***}	0.039^{***}	0.039^{***}	0.051^{***}	0.030^{***}	0.029^{***}	-0.040^{***}	-0.049^{***}	-0.050^{***}
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
No. obs.	244428	244428	244428	244428	244428	244428	113667	113667	113667
R^{2}	0.027	0.171	0.171	0.021	0.168	0.169	0.004	0.032	0.033
Wald tests of joint significance $(p-value)$	significanc	e $(p-value)$							
All	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Time effects	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Province effects		0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000
Children		0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000
Woman educ.		0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000
Woman age		0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000		0.096	0.084
Partner work			0.088			0.000			0.024
Partner educ.			0.000			0.000			0.000
Robust standard errors in parentheses.	rs in parenthe	eses.							
Source: Own calculations from the 2001-2009 Spanish LFS	ions from the	2001-2009 Sp	anish LFS.						
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01	* p<.01								

Estimates for Working		art-time job of for part-tin	no jeh
	Any	Involuntary	Fam. care
Married	0.008	-0.014^{***}	0.004
Maineu	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Married \times After	0.038***	(0.004) 0.010^{**}	0.038***
	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Children $< 5 (Y/n)$	0.087***	-0.012^{***}	(0.004) 0.104^{***}
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Children 5-9 (Y/n)	0.047***	-0.006^{***}	0.052***
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Children 10-16 (Y/n)	0.021***	0.006***	0.013***
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Primary educ.	-0.075^{***}	-0.025^{***}	-0.009^{*}
r minor y course.	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Secondary educ.	-0.170^{***}	-0.049^{***}	-0.030^{***}
secondary educ.	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.006)
College educ.	-0.232^{***}	-0.065^{***}	-0.057^{***}
	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Age 30-34	0.005	-0.008^{**}	0.016***
0	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Age 35-39	-0.002	-0.015^{***}	0.015***
0	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Age 40-44	-0.015^{***}	-0.021***	0.010***
0	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Age 45-49	-0.030***	-0.030^{***}	0.001
0	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Age 50-54	-0.026***	-0.035^{***}	0.001
0	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Age 55-59	-0.028^{***}	-0.050^{***}	0.005
-	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)
No. Obs	113667	113667	113667
R^2	0.059	0.033	0.065
Wald tests of joint sign	nificance $(p-$	-value)	
All	0.000	0.000	0.000
Time effects	0.000	0.000	0.000
Province effects	0.000	0.000	0.000
Children	0.000	0.000	0.000
Woman educ.	0.000	0.000	0.000
Woman age	0.000	0.000	0.000
Partner work	0.000	0.000	0.000
Partner educ.	0.000	0.000	0.000

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Source: Own calculations from the 2001-2009 Spanish LFS.

* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

	P	articipation		E	Employment	It		log(Hours)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)	(2)	(8)	(6)
Married	-0.014^{***}	0.024^{***}	0.026^{***}	0.015^{***}	0.053^{***}	0.055^{***}	0.015^{***}	0.011^{**}	0.011^{**}
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Married \times After	-0.001	-0.003	-0.004	0.005	0.001	-0.000	-0.003	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
No. obs.	226820	226820	226820	226820	226820	226820	185464	185464	185464
R^2	0.001	0.091	0.093	0.004	0.080	0.083	0.002	0.014	0.014
Wald tests of joint significance	significanc	te $(p-value)$							
All	0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Time effects	0.008	0.007	0.041	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Province effects		0.000			0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000
Children		0.000	-		0.000	0.000		0.000	0.001
Woman educ.		0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000
Woman age		0.000	-		0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000
Partner work			0.000			0.000			0.413
Partner educ.			0.000			0.000			0.000

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>ource: Own calculations fror * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01</pre>

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Table 7						
Estimates by Presence of Young Children: Women	sence of You	ng Children:	Women			
	Partici	Participation	Emple	Employment	log(I	log(Hours)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)
	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	no	\mathbf{Yes}	no	\mathbf{Yes}	ou
Married	-0.081^{***}	-0.111^{***}	-0.036^{**}	-0.090^{***}	-0.023	-0.001
	(0.014)	(0.001)	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.023)	(600.0)
Married \times After	0.010	0.041^{***}	-0.005	0.032^{***}	-0.026	-0.056^{***}
	(0.019)	(0.008)	(0.020)	(0.00)	(0.031)	(0.011)
No. obs.	77016	167412	77016	167412	37442	76225
R^{2}	0.115	0.193	0.143	0.182	0.030	0.033
Wald tests of joint significance	t significanc	e $(p-value)$				
All	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Time effects	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.009	0.000
Province effects	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Children	0.000	0.713	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.001
Woman educ.	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Woman age	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.000
Partner work	0.000	0.000	0.624	0.000	0.057	0.294
Partner educ.	0.000	0.006	0.000	0.005	0.000	0.000
Robust standard errors in parentheses	ors in parenthe	ses.				
Source: Own calculations from the 2001-2009 Spanish LFS.	tions from the	2001-2009 Spai	nish LFS.			
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01	* p<.01					

Table 8									
Estimates by Woman's Education	nan's Educa	ation							
		Participation			Employment		lc	log(Hours)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)	(2)	(8)	(6)
	Prim.	Sec.	Coll.	Prim.	Sec.	Coll.	Prim.	Sec.	Coll.
Married	-0.153^{***}	-0.102^{***}	-0.055^{***}	-0.101^{***}	-0.085^{***}	-0.063^{***}	-0.050^{***}	-0.000	-0.001
	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.011)
Married \times After	0.031^{**}	0.013	0.009	0.018	0.007	0.022^{*}	-0.051^{**}	-0.063^{***}	-0.017
	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.012)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.014)
No. obs.	141709	44896	57823	141709	44896	57823	48473	24657	40537
R^2	0.096	0.062	0.030	0.083	0.053	0.028	0.037	0.028	0.021
Wald tests of joint significance $(p-value)$	t significanc	te $(p-value)$							
All	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Time effects	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.002	0.201	0.055	0.000
Province effects	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Children	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Woman age	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.158	0.006
Partner work	0.836	0.561	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.281	0.954	0.409
Partner educ.	0.002	0.000	0.000	0.004	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.004	0.007
Robust standard errors in parentheses.	ors in parenth	eses.							
Source: Own calculations from the 2001-2009 Sp	tions from the	2001-2009 Sp	anish LFS.						

Source: Own calculations from the 2001-2009 Spanish LF * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

$\begin{tabular}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	$\begin{tabular}{ c c c c c c c } \hline Farticipation & Employment & log(H) \\ \hline 10 & (2) & (3) & (4) & (5$	$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $		
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$\begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $	SeparateCommunitySeparate -0.099^{***} -0.117^{***} -0.066^{***} -0.099^{***} -0.117^{***} -0.066^{***} (0.010) (0.008) (0.012) \times After 0.061^{***} 0.030^{***} 0.041^{***} (0.013) (0.009) (0.015) 53804 190624 53804 53804 190624 53804 53804 0.161 0.168 0.148 0.161 0.168 0.148 0.161 0.168 0.000		(9)
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$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		-0.012
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