This is a postprint version of the following published document:


DOI: [https://doi.org/10.1016/j.comnet.2015.02.008](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.comnet.2015.02.008)

© 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons AttributionNonCommercialNoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
An Analysis of the Economic Impact of Strategic Deaggregation

Andra Lutu\textsuperscript{a,b,*}, Marcelo Bagnulo\textsuperscript{b}, Cristel Pelsser\textsuperscript{c}, Kenjiro Cho\textsuperscript{c}, Rade Stanojevic\textsuperscript{d}

\textsuperscript{a}Institute IMDEA Networks, Avda. del Mar Mediterraneo 22, 28918 Leganes, Madrid, Spain
\textsuperscript{b}University Carlos III of Madrid, Avda. de la Universidad 30, 28911 Leganes, Madrid, Spain
\textsuperscript{c}Internet Initiative Japan (IIJ), Innovation Institute, Tokyo, Japan
\textsuperscript{d}Telefonica Research, Plaza de Ernest Lluch i Martin 5, Barcelona, 08019, Spain

Abstract

The advertisement of more-specific prefixes provides network operators with a fine-grained method to control the interdomain ingress traffic. Prefix deaggregation is recognized as a steady long-lived phenomenon at the interdomain level, despite its well-known negative effects for the community. In this paper, we examine one particular side-effect of deaggregation, namely decreasing the transit traffic bill. Looking past the motivation for deploying deaggregation in the first place, we identify and analyze here the economic impact of this type of strategy. We propose a general Internet model to analyze the effect of advertising more-specific prefixes on the incoming transit traffic burstiness. We show that deaggregation combined with selective advertisements has a traffic stabilization side-effect, which translates into a decrease of the transit traffic bill. Next, we develop a methodology for Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to monitor general occurrences of prefix deaggregation within their customer base. Thus, the ISPs can detect selective advertisements of deaggregated prefixes, and thus identify customers which impact the business of their providers. We apply the proposed methodology on a complete set of data including routing, traffic, topological and billing information provided by a major Japanese ISP and we discuss the obtained results.

Keywords: BGP, Traffic Engineering, Economics, Modeling, Measurements

1. Introduction

The Internet is the interconnection of over 40,000 domains known as Autonomous Systems (ASes), which engage in dynamic relationships that interplay with their technical and economic necessities. The routing between ASes relies on the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), which is responsible for the exchange of reachability information and the selection of paths according to the routing preferences of each entity active in the Internet. By tweaking BGP configurations, network operators implement their
preferences in the form of routing policies, which are designed to accommodate myriad economic and technical goals. Thus, the way in which the traffic flows in the interdomain is influenced both by the path dynamics triggered by the continuous evolution of the Internet topology and by the complexity of the routing policies of each network.

Hence, individual network managers need to permanently adapt to the interdomain changes and, by engineering the Internet traffic, optimize the use of their network. Interdomain traffic engineering requirements are diverse and depend on the connectivity of the AS with others and on the type of business handled by the network [1]. One important task achieved through the use of traffic engineering tools is the control and optimization of the routing function in order to allow the ASes to shift the traffic inside and outside their network in the most effective way.

The injection of more-specific prefixes through BGP represents a powerful traffic engineering tool which offers a fine-grained method to control the interdomain ingress traffic. This technique implies that ASes selectively announce distinct fragments of their address block to different upstream providers. This type of phenomenon is commonly known as prefix deaggregation. For example, using this technique, geographically-spread networks can divert different amounts of traffic corresponding to different points of presence (PoP) through the PoP closest to the final destination. Furthermore, in order to achieve load balancing purposes, deaggregated prefixes are announced to different providers so that the corresponding traffic flows only through the preferred transit links.

Several adjacent phenomena associated with deaggregation have been identified and studied by the research community. The most important negative side-effect of this technique is the artificial inflation of the BGP routing table, which can affect the scalability of the global routing system. This issue has become an important concern of the entire Internet community over the past years [2]. From this perspective, this type of behavior is considered to be harmful [2], as it heavily impacts the global routing table and it acts counter to the goals of the Classless Inter Domain Routing (CIDR) architecture, which encourages aggressive address aggregation.

In this paper we indicate that, in spite of the negative overtone surrounding prefix deaggregation, a series of collateral benefits emerge as by-products from the use of deaggregation, without, however, constituting the central drive for ASes to deploy such strategies in the first place. For example, one alleged benefit is the increased security of the network announcing more specifics in the interdomain. Some even claim that prefix deaggregation can be useful as a technique for reducing prefix-hijacking attacks [3]. Recognizing as a reality the stable usage of prefix deaggregation as an efficient traffic engineering method in the Internet [4], we look past the initial motivations behind deploying this type of strategy, and instead focus on its aftermath. More specifically, we investigate here its potential economic impact, independently on the main reasons driving the network operators to use prefix deaggregation in the first place.

We study the impact address-space fragmentation has on the transit traffic bill of the networks originating the more-specific prefixes, first from a theoretical point of view and then through the analysis of real-world data from an operational ISP. We find that, as a result of the unique interaction between the path dynamics in the current Internet, the asymmetrical popularity of traffic sources and the popular billing method which relies on the 95th percentile of traffic \[5\], \[6\], the ASes which engineer their
incoming traffic using deaggregation might enjoy one collateral benefit which, to the best of our knowledge, has not been previously studied: **the decrease of their transit traffic bill**. We show that by deaggregating, network operators can reduce the route diversity towards each prefix announced and, consequently, also the traffic fluctuations on the corresponding transit link, thus further impacting the monthly traffic bill paid to the transit providers.

First, we propose a model to analyze the effect of different deaggregating strategies on the traffic stability and ultimately on the transit cost for the deaggregating ASes. The model accounts for the route dynamics which are responsible for large traffic shifts in the interdomain, like previously observed in [7]. The general Internet model disencumbers our analysis of the complex Internet phenomena, maintaining a continuous focus on the impact of different deaggregating strategies on the transit traffic stability and ultimately on the transit cost incurred on the customer ASes. We integrate in the Internet model three important elements, i.e., the interdomain routing model, the traffic model and the cost model, whose entanglement offers the necessary underlying structure for the analysis of these intricate Internet phenomena.

Second, we take the point of view of a transit provider to a deaggregating customer and ask a two-staged question:

(1) **How extensive is the use of prefix deaggregation among the customer networks?**

We further propose a methodology to identify cases of deaggregated prefixes within the customer base of an operational ISP within a certain time-window. We enable any operator with the necessary tools to detect the customers which are new deaggregators and monitor their behavior in time.

(2) **Can it be verified that deaggregation combined with selective advertisements decreases the transit bill of some customers?**

For the purpose of this paper, we define strategic deaggregation as the action of splitting the address block and selectively injecting each more-specific prefix to different disjoint subsets of providers. Customers which exhibit this behavior may be able to game the 95th percentile billing rule and possibly have a negative impact on the business of their ISPs. We propose a passive measurement approach for the detection of strategic deaggregation events and to assess their economic consequences.

Our approach requires obtaining and processing routing, topology, traffic and billing information and molding it in order to reach the correct level of understanding on the impact different customers might have on their providers. The novelty of this methodology is the manner in which it merges different types of information characteristic to a transit provider, in order to have a complete picture on the operations of its customer

---

1 We stress that, in this paper, we analyze the existence of an economic **side-effect** of prefix deaggregation. We do not perform here a study of the central motivations driving operators to perform prefix deaggregation in the first place, nor do we defend or encourage the usage of deaggregation in the Internet. We merely acknowledge the popularity of this strategy in the Internet and further investigate the possibility of an inadvertent economic gain for the deaggregating party. Regardless of the main goal to be achieved through deaggregation, we observe that, in certain conditions, the deaggregating AS can indeed enjoy a decrease of its transit traffic bill as a by-product of the deaggregation strategies deployed.

2 We use here the term *strategic* to accentuate the fact that the decision is based on optimizing behavior, since it might increase the benefits for the network deploying it. This relies on definitions provided in rational choice theory.
networks. Any ISP interested in detecting the occurrence of this phenomena within its customer base can construct the dataset containing all the various batches of different data and apply the proposed processing methodology.

The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we show the intuition behind the analyzed network aspects by using a toy example. In section 3 we describe the general model for the Internet to quantify the economic impact of deaggregation techniques. We further propose in section 4 a novel methodology for identifying past occurrences of the scenario analyzed with the Internet model. In section 5 we exemplify the use of the previously proposed methodology on a complex set of real operational data collected from a major Japanese ISP. We discuss in section 6 the limitations of the proposed methodology and the challenges we overcame when working with the real data from the major Japanese ISP. Finally, in section 7, we conclude the paper.

2. Toy Example

Analyzing the Internet ecosystem is a challenging task, since it presents with many dynamic elements acting at different timescales. In order to achieve a better understanding of the impact of prefix fragmentation on the transit bill, we unburden our analysis of the complex Internet characteristics and intuitively present the setup we aim to analyze. We introduce next a toy example to illustrate how a network changing its strategy from non-deaggregation to strategic deaggregation can benefit from a decreased transit traffic bill, and possibly impact the revenues of its providers.

In order to clarify the main phenomena we analyze in this paper, let us consider the simple case of one destination network announcing the same prefix 1.1.0.0/16 over two different transit links, like we can see in Figure 1.a. We reduce the number of sources of the interdomain at two, out of which one is generating $\frac{3}{4}$ of the whole traffic $T$ consumed by the destination network, and the other one, the rest. We analyze next the traffic distribution on each of the two transit links. We consider the 95th percentile pricing model, the most widely used method for charging the IP transit, in which the monthly bill is the function of the peak level of traffic, not the average usage.

We monitor the level of traffic on each link during one month. We consider that source AS 1 is sending its traffic on link $l_1$ for half of the period, after which, due to a routing change, it starts forwarding its traffic on link $l_2$. Source AS 2 suffers the opposite events, namely it sends the traffic during the first half of the month through link $l_2$ and for the second half of the month it switches to link $l_1$. The transit traffic cost is calculated using the 95th percentile rule for each of the two links. As a result, because the traffic on link $l_1$ had a level of $\frac{3T}{4}$ for more than 5% of the billing period, the transit traffic bill for link $l_1$ is $c\frac{3T}{4}$. Similarly, the transit traffic bill for link $l_2$ is also $c\frac{3T}{4}$, as for more than 5% of the billing period the traffic level was $\frac{3T}{4}$. Therefore, the total cost paid for the consumed traffic $T$ is $c\frac{3T}{2}$, which is with $c\frac{T}{4}$ higher than the cost $cT$ paid based on the 95th percentile rule if no routing changes would happen.

We show in this paper that, through selective deaggregation, the destination AS can inadvertently avoid the fluctuations of traffic due to routing changes and thus also decrease its transit traffic monthly bill. Consider that the destination AS divides its address space into two more-specific prefixes and announces each on a separate link,
i.e. announces 1.1.0.0/17 through link $l_1$ and 1.1.128.0/17 through link $l_2$, like we can observe in Figure 1.b. If we assume uniform distribution of incoming traffic for the prefix, this means that each more-specific prefix receives half of the traffic generated by each source. In this scenario, the routing changes do not artificially increase the 95th percentile and the transit traffic monthly bill for the destination AS is $cT$.

In the real Internet, the number of independent sources is much higher that the number assumed in this toy example. Because of this, one may think that due to the large number of sources in the interdomain, the routing changes characteristic to in the global routing system will only lead to small relative fluctuations of traffic. However, the skewness of the traffic distribution on sources has an important effect on the amount of traffic switching between transit links. In other words, if a large source of traffic becomes instable due to interdomain routing changes, then important amounts of traffic shift between different routes, thus heavily impacting the traffic distribution on the incoming links towards a destination.

In [8], the authors actually verify the amount of routing changes possibly affecting how traffic flows towards a destination. Based strictly on the information contained in public BGP routing tables, the authors go to show that those routing changes increase the transit bill of given customer with an average of 5%. Clearly, in the operational Internet some of these customer ASes are much more affected by routing changes than others. However, this average gives us a somewhat concrete idea on the manner in which the combination of routing changes, the skewed distribution of traffic on sources [9] and the popular 95% percentile billing scheme [6, 5] inflate ones transit bill.

The reasons for deploying the deaggregation strategy may include a wide variety and may or may not be related to decreasing ones transit traffic bill. For example, when analyzing the topology from Figure 2, one reason might be the need to avoid the capacity upgrade on the link between the Customer and the Provider, or even the need of the Customer to receive traffic for the more-specific locally from the Peer-Provider, thus avoiding hauling the traffic within his own network. In the scenario from

Figure 1: Toy example representation.
Figure 2: Strategic prefix deaggregation may have additional implications in terms of costs incurred by the provider.

Figure 2, the Provider network also supports an additional cost implied by having to haul the customer traffic through its own network towards the Peer-Provider. Studying the motivation for employing this mechanism is, however, out of the scope of our analysis. We focus instead on the economic impact of deaggregation, regardless of the main reason behind deploying this strategy in the first place. In the following section we propose a general model to analyze the savings in the monthly transit traffic bill incurred by an efficient deaggregating strategy.

3. Model Description

We establish, in this section, the settings of the general Internet model proposed for the study of the impact of prefix deaggregation on the transit traffic bill. By combining three important elements, i.e. the interdomain path changes, the 95\textsuperscript{th} percentile billing rule broadly used in today’s Internet and the skewed distribution of the traffic demand on sources, the model offers the underlying structure for the analysis of the phenomena associated with the deaggregating strategy intuitively captured by the toy example. An initial version of this model was previously presented in [8].

We model the Internet at the AS level, where the networks consist of N sources and one destination AS, as we can observe in Figure 3. This assumption does not impact the generality of our model as, in the current Internet, paths are calculated independently for each destination. Therefore, we focus our analysis on the case of one destination network with n transit links\(^3\) which are accommodating the traffic demand distributed over N sources in the interdomain. We assume a symmetric model where all the links have the same capacity and are equally likely to be a part of the path from a source to the destination in question. For the ease of the presentation, we assume an uniform distribution of incoming traffic on the destination address space. As depicted in Figure 3, we integrate three important elements in the model, i.e. the interdomain routing model, the traffic model and the cost model. Their entanglement offers the necessary underlying structure for studying the influence of various deaggregation techniques on the traffic fluctuations and the interdomain traffic bill.

\(^3\)Without restricting the generality of the analysis, one might consider that one transit link corresponds to a distinct upstream transit provider for the destination AS. However, the proposed Internet model can easily be used to analyze more realistic situations where the number of links between a transit provider and its customer is higher than 1.
3.1. Deaggregation Strategies and the Model for Interdomain Routing Changes

We model several different behaviors with respect to the deaggregation of announced prefixes. First, the AS can decide to announce one aggregated prefix through all its transit links. Alternatively, the AS can decide to divide the \( n \) transit links into \( \lambda \) link sets (where \( \lambda = 2, \ldots, n \)) and announce a single more specific prefix over all the links of each link set. The result is that it announces \( \lambda \) more specific prefixes \( P_1, P_2, \ldots, P_\lambda \) over \( \lambda \) disjoint links sets \( l_1, l_2, \ldots, l_\lambda \).

We also assume that the assigned address space can be divided evenly between the available number of link sets and announced by the destination AS as a single more-specific prefix separately on a different link set\(^4\). Moreover, we assume that the announced prefixes are propagated as injected by the origin i.e. the other ASes honor the origin deaggregation, which is aligned with current operational practices [10]. Additionally, we assume that all the announced prefixes are reachable from every AS in the Internet. This means that every AS in the interdomain receives routes for the \( \lambda \) prefixes corresponding to the originating AS and selects one route for each prefix.

The path selection dynamics towards the destination of interest are the result of the complex interaction between the Internet topology dynamics and the policies of different ASes along the paths between the source and the destination AS. The changes in the selected paths often happen as a consequence of, for example, topological modification in the network or individual routing policies changes. Usually, the timescale characteristic for these routing changes is of a few hours or days.

In order to better understand the impact of the route dynamics on the cost for transit traffic, we analyze the path changes using a timescale relevant for the billing process,

\(^4\)Due to the manner in which the prefix can be split, this is true in the case when the number of links is equal with a power of two. In the other cases, while it is not always true that the evenly divided address space can be announced only as a single aggregated prefix, we can find a particular fragmentation of the address space that would allow us to achieve the uniformity desired and announce the smallest number of more-specific prefixes in the link set.
namely a month period. In particular, if we consider that the destination AS announces a given prefix $P_x$ over all the links contained in the set of links $l_x$, we care about which ingress link of the ones contained in $l_x$ is a part of the path selected by the source AS to send traffic towards the prefix $P_x$.

We model the BGP path dynamics towards the destination of interest as follows. We define the initial state of the interdomain routing and the transitive states of the routing process in the analyzed time period. The initial state consists of the paths used at the beginning of the analyzed time interval by each source AS to reach the prefixes announced by the destination AS. We model this initial set of routes as a random selection between the available BGP paths between each source AS towards any destination prefix. We assume that at the beginning of the interval all the available transit links have the same probability of being a part of the path selected by the a source AS. In other words, if a destination AS announces a prefix over $x$ different transit links, then the probability that any of those links is further a part of the forwarding path from a source towards the destination at the initial state is $\frac{1}{x}$. This implies that if the sink AS with $n$ links is announcing a single prefix through all its links (i.e. $\lambda = 1$), then any source AS will have to randomly select a single route in order to forward its traffic the entire address space of the destination network. If the sink AS is announcing $\lambda$ fragments of the address space over $\lambda$ different link sets, then the source AS must randomly select one path for each most-specific prefix announced (i.e. $\lambda$ different paths) in order to forward its traffic towards the destination AS.

In the rest of the time interval, we analyze the routing state using a time-slotted model. We divide the month into 5 minutes slots, which is consistent with the 95th percentile billing rule currently used in the Internet. We encompass the dynamics of the routing process due to topology or policy changes by considering that in every time slot all the source ASes are independently repeating the route selection process. We consider that with a given probability $p$ the result of the random selection process is different from the initial-state path. This implies that, for a proportion $p$ of time, traffic may shift away from the initial-state transit link towards another of the remaining equiprobable transit links.

We further intend to quantify the cost paid by the destination AS for performing or not deaggregation in the interdomain by comparing the case in which only one prefix is announced over all links, thus allowing for many routing choices for the traffic sources, and the case in which an unique prefix is announced over one link only, thus strictly reducing the path diversity towards that particular set of addresses. Consequently, we calculate the amount of traffic on each incoming link towards the analyzed destination, while accounting for the path changes that may cause traffic to shift towards or away from the transit link.

### 3.2. Traffic model

In this section, we analyze the traffic distribution on the available incoming links, depending on the manner the destination AS injects its prefix(es) in the interdomain.

---

3We do not consider the routing changes due to equipment failures, as these changes cannot be accounted as potential savings since any operational viable deaggregation strategy must support backup links.
We assume that the total amount of traffic $T$ received by the destination AS from the $N$ sources is uniformly distributed across its prefix $P$. This means that if $T$ traffic is sent to $P$, then if we split $P$ into two more specific prefixes $P_1$ and $P_2$, the expected amount of traffic for each of these more specific prefixes is $\frac{T}{2}$. In the case of an uneven traffic distribution, it can be easily proved that a correspondingly proportional prefix fragmentation can be found such that the amounts of traffic per more-specific prefix are comparable. We assume that each source network $j$ included in our model generates an amount of traffic $t_j$ towards a given destination in the interdomain, as depicted in Figure 3. We assume that the generated traffic $t_j$ follows a Gaussian distribution in time characterized by the statistical mean $\mu_j$ and a variance $\sigma_j^2$, which is in line with the results from [11].

3.2.1. Distribution of Traffic on Sources

We assume that the traffic generated towards a given destination is distributed among the existing sources according with Zipf’s law, as previously described in [12]. This assumption is consistent with the traffic measurements in [9], as the Zipf distribution is a particular case of a power law distribution. The Zipf distribution is one particular example of a power law [13]. A simple description of data following such a distribution is the existence of a few elements that have very high values, a medium number of elements with medium values and a huge number of elements with very low values (therefore, the probability of larger values is very low and the probability of low values is very high). Given a ranking of the Internet entities, the Zipf law states that the traffic generated by a network is inversely proportional with its rank. For any destination network we assign the following amount of incoming traffic from AS with rank $j$:

$$t_j = \frac{1}{\sum_{k=1}^{N} \frac{1}{k^\alpha}} T = z_j T,$$

(1)

where $z_j$ is the $j$ ranked element in a Zipf distribution corresponding to AS $j$. The Zipf distribution includes a parameter $\alpha$ that controls the skewness of the traffic distribution on destination networks. The total amount of transited traffic received by the destination AS can be expressed as the sum of all the traffic contributions $T = \sum_{j=1}^{N} t_j$, for all sources $j$ in the Internet.

3.2.2. Distribution of Traffic on Transit Links

The total amount of traffic $T$ consumed by a particular AS in the Internet consists of the contribution of all the sources in the interdomain. We analyze here the traffic distribution on the $n$ ingress links of a destination AS. We capture both the case in which the destination AS deaggregates to different degrees and the case in which the AS does not fragment its address space, and we compare the results.

We begin our analysis by characterizing the distribution of traffic on the incoming links of a destination AS that announces its address space as one single aggregated prefix. Consequently, any of the available links towards the destination network can be a part of the traffic forwarding path. We include in figure 4 an example of the traffic dynamics captured in the distribution of traffic per transit link. For a given destination
AS with \( n \) links we define the subset \( s_i \) of sources which have as initial state path a route which includes link \( i \), where \( i = 1, n \). For example, in figure 4, subset \( s_1 \) includes all the source networks that have chosen transit link 1 in the initial phase of the model. Due to the fact that each link has the same probability of being chosen by each source for traffic forwarding in the initial state of the interdomain routing process, the expected value of the size of source sets \( s_i \) is of \( \frac{N}{n} \) ASes. Consequently, when announcing the same prefix over all the links, the incoming traffic on each link in the initial state of the routing process has a statistical expected value of \( \frac{T}{n} \).

When dividing the month in many equal-sized time-slots, we further consider that the route selection process happens for each source AS in every slot. Therefore, at the beginning of every time interval in the analyzed period, with a probability \( p \) the newly chosen forwarding path is different from the one used in the initial state. This would trigger the shift of a certain amount of traffic from link \( l \) to the rest of the links for the destination AS and the other way around.

We denote with \( \theta_l(t) \) the random variable which represents the traffic leaving at moment \( t \) from link \( i \) and dividing among the rest of the transit links, as we can observe in figure 4. The unstable traffic \( \theta_l(t) \) leaving link \( i \) at moment \( t \) can be further expressed as \( \sum_{j \in s_i} q_j(t) t_j \), where \( t_j \) represents the amount of traffic generated by source AS \( j \), \( q_j \) is either 1 if at moment \( t \) link \( i \) is a part of the forwarding routed used by the source AS \( j \) or 0 in the contrary case and \( s_l \) represents the set of sources with initial state path including link \( i \). Formally,

\[
P(q_j = 1) = p; \\
P(q_j = 0) = 1 - p. \tag{2}
\]

Consequently, the unstable traffic leaving any link \( l \) at time \( t \) follows a Binomial distribution, i.e. \( \theta_l \approx Binomial(\frac{T}{n}, p) \), with \( l = 1, n \). Thus, the mean and variance of the unstable traffic leaving a link, i.e. \( \theta_l(t) \) with \( l = 1, n \), has the following expression.
for any of the $n$ links:

$$\tilde{\mu}_l = p \frac{T}{n};$$

$$\tilde{\sigma}^2_l = p(1 - p) \sum_{j \in s_l} t^2_j. \quad (3)$$

When analyzing the traffic on a link we also have to consider the traffic moving towards the current link $i$ from the rest of the links $k \neq i$. This incoming traffic represents only a fraction of the entire unstable traffic moving away from any link $k \neq i$. We denote with $\theta_k(t)$ the traffic leaving any link $k$, where $k \neq i$. Similar to the case of link $i$, we can express $\theta_k(t)$ as $\sum_{j \in s_k} q_j(t) t_j$, $k \neq i$, where $q_j$ is either 1 or 0 depending if at moment $t$ link $i$ is a part of the forwarding route used by the source AS or not. The traffic shift probability is equal to the probability of path change $p$, i.e. $P(q_j = 1) = p$. The total unstable traffic is represented by $\sum_{k \neq i} \theta_k(t)$. This amount evenly splits between all the $n - 1$ equiprobable alternative links, including the analyzed link $i$. Consequently, the expected value of the incoming traffic on link $i$ is represented by the $\frac{1}{n-1}$ part of all the total unstable traffic, i.e.

$$\frac{1}{n-1} \sum_{k \neq i} \theta_k(t), \quad (4)$$

where $\theta_i(t)$ represents the traffic leaving link $i$ and $\frac{1}{n-1} \sum_{k \neq i} \theta_k(t)$ represents the expected value of the traffic shifting from the rest of the links to link $i$. This yields the following expressions for the mean and variance of the total incoming traffic on a given link $i$:

$$\mu^{(i)}_l = p \frac{T}{n};$$

$$\sigma^{(i)}_l^2 = p(1 - p) \left( \frac{1}{n-1} \right)^2 \sum_{k \neq i, j \in s_k} t^2_{ij}. \quad (5)$$

Therefore, the expressions for the statistical mean and variance for the total traffic on link $i$ when a single prefix is announced over all the available links are:

$$\mu_i = \frac{T}{n};$$

$$\sigma^2_i = p(1 - p) \left[ \left( 1 - \frac{1}{(n-1)^2} \right) \sum_{j \in s_i} t^2_j + \frac{1}{(n-1)^2} \sum_{j=1}^N t^2_j \right]. \quad (6)$$

When each origin AS deaggregates the assigned address block into $\lambda$ more-specific even prefixes, where $\lambda \leq n$, and announces them over different link sets, different
parts of the address space are reachable only through a subset of the total incoming links. Consequently, the source ASes split their traffic evenly for the deaggregated prefixes and choose one path for each fraction of the address space. The size of the set of source ASes with an initial path including one of the incoming links towards a destination prefix is equal with $|s_i| = \frac{\lambda N}{n}$. These sources do not send all their traffic on the chosen link from a given link set, but they only send the corresponding fraction of traffic for the destination prefix, i.e. $\frac{1}{\lambda}$. When the destination AS deaggregates its address block in a number of prefixes smaller than the number of available transit links, we have $\lambda$ sets of links including the $n\lambda$ different links. Consequently, the amount of traffic on each transit link $T_i$ at time $t$ has the following expression:

$$T_i(t) = \frac{T}{\lambda} - \theta_i(t) + \frac{1}{\lambda - 1} \sum_{j \neq i} \theta_j(t). \quad (7)$$

The unstable traffic from link $i$ to the other $\frac{n}{\lambda} - 1$ links in the same set is now $\theta_i(t) = \sum_{|s_j|=\frac{n\lambda}{\lambda}} q_j(t) \frac{1}{\lambda}$, where $|s_i| = \frac{nN}{\lambda}$ represents the number of sources in the source set $s_i$, directly proportional with the number of announced prefixes in the interdomain. We observe that, while the mean value of the incoming traffic remains the same as in the previous case, i.e. $\mu_{i, \lambda} = \frac{T}{\lambda}$, the expression of the traffic variance becomes:

$$\sigma_{i, \lambda}^2 = p(1 - p) \left( \frac{1}{\lambda^2} - \left( \frac{1}{n - \lambda} \right)^2 \right) \sum_{j \in s_i} t^2_j + p(1 - p) \left( \frac{1}{n - \lambda} \right)^2 \sum_{j=1}^{N} t^2_j. \quad (8)$$

When evaluating the traffic variance with the expression in (8) relative to the one in (6) we observe that as the number of announced prefixes $\lambda$ is increasing, the amount of traffic on each link becomes more stable, as its standard deviation is decreasing. This phenomenon is explained by the fact that, as the number of prefixes increases, so does the number of disjoint link sets. We have observed that in the case where only one prefix is announced over all links, there is only one link set including all the available transit links. Contrariwise, when announcing more prefixes, the number of link sets is increasing, also implying that the amount of incoming traffic and the number of different links included in each set are proportionally decreasing. This further translates into a decreasing number of routing choices for the traffic to reach the more-specific prefix announced on a specific link set.

Comparing the two expression from (6) and (8), we obtain the following ratio between the two variances:

$$\gamma = \left( \frac{n - 1}{n - \lambda} \right)^2 \left[ \left( \frac{n - \lambda}{\lambda} \right)^2 - 1 \right] \frac{\sum_{|s_j|=\frac{n\lambda}{\lambda}} t^2_j}{\sum_{j=1}^{n} t^2_j} + \left( (n - 1)^2 - 1 \right) \frac{\sum_{|s_j|=\frac{n\lambda}{\lambda}} t^2_j}{\sum_{j=1}^{n} t^2_j} \left( \frac{\lambda N}{n} \right)^2 \quad (9)$$
For $2 \leq \lambda < n$ and approximating $\sum_{j \in s_l} |s_l| \approx \lambda N$ and $t_j^2 \approx \lambda \sum_{j \in s_l} \frac{N}{j} t_j^2$, we conclude that $\gamma < 1$, which indicates that when the degree of deaggregation is increasing, the variance of the traffic on a link is smaller. This results in a diminution of the traffic burstiness and even smaller fluctuations in the total amount of chargeable traffic.

In the extreme case when the AS is announcing as many more-specific prefixes as number of transit links, the size of the set of sources with a route that includes link $i$ in the initial state is $|s_i| = N$. In other words, every source AS installs in its routing table a stable path for each transit link for the destination AS. This implies that the traffic shifting from one link to the others is zero and, similarly, the traffic incoming from the rest of the links is also null. Therefore, the variance of the traffic on each link resulting from route changes is zero $\sigma_i^2 = 0$, as the traffic forwarding paths are very stable. Consequently, the incoming traffic on each link equal with $T_n$ does not fluctuate during the analyzed period, as this amount of traffic is confined to the preferred incoming link.

3.3. The Cost Model

The 95th percentile rule is currently the most widely-spread billing method among ISPs [6]. This method usually implies that the agreed billing period (usually a month) is sampled using a fixed-sized window, each interval yielding a value that denotes the traffic transferred during that period. The resulting intervals are sorted and the 95th percentile of this distribution is used for billing [6]. Consequently, this billing method is considered as a compromise between billing a customer based on the absolute traffic usage or based on the capacity of the transit links and the peak rates.

A recent transit cost survey [14] has shown that the price per unit of transferred traffic, denoted here by $c_t$, decreases with the increase of the expected volume of transit traffic following a convex dependency. However, this is only true when the increase of the expected amount of traffic is significant i.e. one order of magnitude. In the case where the increase of expected traffic volume is in the same size range as the initial traffic volume, the cost per traffic unit remains constant. We assume that the variations in traffic do not change the order of magnitude of the received traffic, therefore we can also assume a linear cost function for the transit traffic.

In our model we include a cost function with the following expression:

$$C = c_t \times V,$$

where $V$ is the charging traffic volume (i.e. the 95th percentile of the monthly traffic) of the destination AS $i$ and $c_t$ is the corresponding transit traffic unit cost. We consider that the total charging traffic volume for any destination AS, represents the addition of all the chargeable traffic volumes on each incoming link, and therefore can be expressed as

$$V = \sum_{i=1}^{n} (\mu_i + 1.96 \sigma_i),$$

where $n$ represents the number of incoming link for the destination AS, and $\mu_i$ and $\sigma_i$ have the expressions from (6). Given the fact that the traffic on link $l$ follows a Binomial distribution $B(N, p_l)$, we can approximate it with a Normal (Gaussian) distribution.
The expression $\mu + 1.96\sigma$ from (11) represents the estimation of the 95th percentile of a Normal random variable $N(\mu, \sigma^2)$ representing the individual traffic volume on the incoming links.

In order to capture the full impact of deaggregation on the transit traffic bill, we focus on the amount of chargeable traffic in the two extreme cases: (i) no deaggregation: $\lambda = 1$, (ii) strategic deaggregation: $\lambda = n$. We calculate next the total amount of chargeable traffic on each link, i.e. the 95th percentile of the link traffic, when no deaggregation is performed by the destination AS, i.e $v_{i|\lambda=1}$ and when the number of prefixes announced is equal to the number of available links, i.e. $v_{i|\lambda=n}$:

$$v_{i|\lambda=1} = \frac{T}{n} + 1.96\sqrt{p(1-p)} \sqrt{\sum_{j \in s_i} t_j^2 + \frac{1}{(n-1)^2} \sum_{k \neq i} \sum_{j \in s_k} t_j^2},$$

$$v_{i|\lambda=n} = \frac{T}{n}.$$  

(12)

We can easily observe that the additional traffic on each link is

$$\gamma_i = v_{i|\lambda=1} - v_{i|\lambda=n} =$$

$$= 1.96\sqrt{p(1-p)} \sqrt{\sum_{j \in s_i} t_j^2 + \frac{1}{(n-1)^2} \sum_{k \neq i} \sum_{j \in s_k} t_j^2}.$$  

(13)

Furthermore, the difference in the total charging traffic volume for the analyzed destination AS with $n$ links can be expressed as the sum of the traffic fluctuations in all the links, i.e. $V = \sum_{i=1}^{n} (v_{i|\lambda=1} - v_{i|\lambda=n})$. This yields the following expression for the total volume of additional chargeable traffic:

$$\gamma = \sum_i \gamma_i.$$  

(14)

The savings in transit traffic bill represent the cost $c$ paid for the burstable, unstable traffic. Consequently, the additional cost emerging from path instability in the interdomain is

$$c = \gamma c \alpha.$$  

(15)

Henceforth, the saved amount in the transit traffic bill represents a fraction of

$$RS = \frac{\gamma}{T + \gamma}.$$  

(16)

out of the actual price paid for the consumed traffic without deaggregation. Substituting the generated traffic $t_j$ for every source AS $j$ with the expression in (1) yields that the relative transit traffic savings are a function of the number of links towards the destination AS, the instability probability $p$ and the Zipf distribution skewness parameter $\alpha$, which does not depend on $T$: $RS = f(n, p, \alpha)$. 

14
4. Strategic Deaggregation Detection Methodology

In this section, we propose a methodology to identify the strategic deaggregation scenario captured by the model proposed in Section 3. We show how any ISP can monitor the amount of deaggregation generated by its customers and quantify the impact strategic deaggregation may have on its own revenues. The central reasons for the customer network operator to deploy the deaggregation strategy in the first place may include a wide variety and may or may not be related to decreasing ones transit traffic bill. The transit provider, however, might be impacted by its customers’ choices in terms of deaggregation. As previously proven in the Section 3, the unique interaction of three important characteristics of the current Internet, namely the interdomain path changes, the 95th percentile billing rule broadly used in today’s Internet and the skewed distribution of the traffic demand on sources, make it possible for networks to inadvertently decrease their transit traffic bill using strategic deaggregation. We further argue that, by simply detecting the cases of strategic deaggregation, a transit provider can identify the customers who may unknowingly impact in a negative way its revenues. Furthermore, detecting a large number of such cases in ones customer base might provide the necessary incentives for the adoption of a more suited billing model than the sub-optimal 95th percentile billing rule.

We propose a passive measurement approach for the detection of strategic deaggregation events and to assess their economic consequences. The novelty of the approach is the manner in which it merges different types of information characteristic to an ISP in order to have a complete picture on the operations of its customer networks. This requires obtaining and processing routing, topology, traffic and billing information and molding it in order to reach the correct level of understanding on the economic impact different customers might have on their transit providers. Any ISP interested in detecting the occurrence of this phenomena within its customer base can employ the proposed methodology.

The methodology is structured in three parts, each conveying relevant results concerning deaggregation dynamics within the customer base of a transit provider. We summarize in Figure 5 the steps taken in the methodology and show which type of information is required for each part.

Step 1: Detect more-specific prefixes. First, we detect ASes which change their behavior and start using deaggregation within a predefined time-window. For this step we require the BGP routing information from the ISP (i.e., the global BGP routing table from the transit provider), as depicted in the first processing block in Figure 5. We expand on the mechanism in section 4.1.

Step 2: Detect strategic deaggregation. Second, we check for selective advertisements of the more-specific prefixes previously identified. As depicted in the second processing block from Figure 5, in this step we use all the BGP routing information from the monitors active in the the RIPE RIS and RouteViews projects.

Step 3: Evaluate economic impact. Third, we try to determine if performing strategic deaggregation leads indeed to economic benefits for the customer network. For the cases of strategic deaggregation, we monitor the traffic data both (i) before deaggregation, when the address block is injected as one prefix to all providers (i.e. no deaggregation), and (ii) after the strategic deaggregation, when the address block is fragmented
into as many more-specific prefixes as the number of transit providers and each more-specific is selectively advertised to a different provider (i.e. strategic deaggregation). It is important to capture both these states, in order to be able to correctly quantify the economic impact of strategic deaggregation. We evaluate the transit bill for each case and compare. This is depicted in the third processing block from Figure 5.

**Step 3.a:** We extract the traffic data on all the links connecting the provider with the identified customer which is deploying strategic deaggregation. This requires a previous mapping between customers and transit links from the ISP. We obtain this topology data after parsing all the router configuration files provided by the ISP. This step is further depicted in the first sub-block of the third processing block in Figure 5.

**Step 3.b:** Finally, we move to estimating the bill for the aggregated and deaggregated traffic patterns. Thus, by applying the ISP’s billing scheme to the traffic traces, we can quantify the impact of strategic deaggregation on the transit traffic bill. This step is depicted in the last processing block in Figure 5.

The methodology is aimed at working with a large and diverse collection of real data. Any ISP interested in detecting the occurrence of this phenomena within its customer base can build the dataset and employ the proposed methodology. Moreover, the tools we have developed are publicly available for the research community.

### 4.1. Detection of Deaggregation Events

The detection algorithm we propose in **Step 1** for the identification of more-specific prefixes performs a comparative analysis of the BGP information obtained from the ISP. The different states of the algorithm are depicted in Figure 6. We begin by choosing a reference routing table. The time-stamp of the reference routing table represents the reference time. The detection algorithm identifies the customer prefixes based on

---

6The code is available to be downloaded from http://fourier.networks.imdea.org/people/-andra_lutu/ITC25_code/.
the information from the provider (for example, customer routes are tagged with specific informational communities). We assume deaggregated prefixes exist at the reference time and we verify if the more-specific prefixes started to be advertised within the month prior to the chosen reference time. We progressively contrast the content of the reference routing table with each of the previous routing tables collected for a certain period before the reference time. As depicted in Figure 6, we verify the routing information from as much as one month before the reference time in order to capture the dynamics of prefix deaggregation in a timescale that is consistent with the billing period. The analysis of the prefixes advertised by the customer ASes during this particular time-window allows us to separate the newly injected more-specifics prefixes, which first started to be injected in the month prior to the reference time. It further separates this cases in more-specifics that are not active for at least one months post-deaggregation (i.e., the situation depicted in Figure 6.a)) and, contrariwise, more-specifics that are active for one month post-deaggregation (i.e., the situation depicted in Figure 6.b)). This also enables us to determine the presence of a covering prefix injected by the customer network and the approximative moment of deaggregation.

The algorithm can be run on longer timescales (e.g. two months, three months, one year etc.), thus allowing the ISP to get a bigger picture on the deaggregation dynamics within its customer base at different timescales.

4.1.1. The Two-by-Two Routing Tables Comparison

We contrast the entries from the reference routing table with any other routing table collected in the period of analysis, to which we further refer as a pair routing table. We begin by first defining the set of prefixes present only in the reference routing table by separating the prefixes advertised only at the reference time and not present in the pair
routing table, i.e.

\[ \Delta_i = P_{\text{ref}} - P_i \]  

where \( P_{\text{ref}} \) represents the set of prefixes in the reference routing table and \( P_i \), the set of prefixes installed in the paired routing table. For each of the prefixes in the \( \Delta_i \) set defined above, we use a digital tree search [15] to identify the covering prefixes among the entries in the pair routing table. Assuming that no network is less specific than a /8, we are thus able to rapidly build the covering digital tree corresponding to each of the prefixes of interest. From each tree, we retrieve the least-specific prefix, i.e. the tree root, which we further use in the traffic data analysis. We do not examine the intermediate prefixes (shortly appearing intermediate phases in the deaggregation process), since for these there exists a more-specific prefix which can influence the manner in which traffic flows towards the destination.

By performing this comparative study using all the periodically collected routing tables from the ISP, we obtain an accurate picture of the evolution of the prefix deaggregation dynamics within the customer base of the provider. We monitor the changes of the previously defined prefix sets \( \Delta_i \) during the analysis interval. The approximative time of deaggregation is, at the latest, the collection time of the first routing table snapshot which contains the candidate more-specific route known to already be installed in the reference routing table. This moment is marked in the time-line depicted in Figure 6 as the first moment where the more-specific prefix and the covering prefix are both present in the pair routing table.

4.2. Sifting the Results

In order to correctly identify the long-lived deaggregation events which may have an economic impact, we need to make sure that the retrieved more-specifics are not sporadic events. We discard from our analysis the cases of prefixes which, as depicted in Figure 6.a), get re-aggregated in their less-specific covering prefix shortly after the deaggregation was performed. What we are interested to analyze further are cases of deaggregation which match the setting in Figure 6.b), where the more-specific is active for a month after the time of deaggregation.

We apply the same detection algorithm to identify potential re-aggregation cases of more-specifics into their covering prefixes which might happen in the month after the moment of deaggregation. We perform this latter step in order to assure that from the results provided by the algorithm we select only the more-specific prefixes that remain installed in the routing table for at least one month from the moment of deaggregation, and thus may impact the transit traffic bill. For avoiding cases of dynamic deagregation-aggregation behavior, we filter out prefixes with intermittent presence in the routing tables, i.e. with a presence time lower than 5% of the billing period.

Past the reference time, the previously described two-by-two comparison algorithm actively detects cases of re-aggregated more-specific prefixes in the \( \Delta_i \) set. We approximate the time of re-aggregation with the collection time of a pair routing table which contains only the covering prefix after the reference time.
4.2.1. Validation of Selective Advertisements

The selective advertisements validation process is further integrated in Step 2. We combine the internal routing view from the ISP with the external views taken from the ASes participating in the RIPE RIS and RouteViews project. In particular, we identify all the active providers used for reaching both the covering prefix and the more-specific prefix from Step 1.

We aim to check if the covering prefix is injected to all the active providers and the deaggregated prefix is selectively injected. To this end, we analyze all the routing information retrieved during the corresponding time period (one month prior to the moment of deaggregation and one month after) from all the monitors whose routing tables we were able to retrieve from the public collectors. We monitor the routing information from each external AS towards the customer prefixes. Thus, we can infer the approximate number of active transit providers for the destination prefix by identifying the list of unique second last-hops (2LH) in the AS-Path BGP attribute after removing AS-Path prepending. The 2LH is the AS which we see before the destination AS in the AS-Path. This represents the provider used to reach the destination from the traffic source (i.e., for some of the paths, this 2LH should be the ISP providing the data for this study).

We accept a certain error in the inferred connectivity degree of each customer, since we only have partial information on the interdomain routing. Given that the number of monitors active within the RIPE RIS and RouteViews project is limited [16], we have only a partial picture of how external sources of traffic reach the interest prefixes. However, since the sample of monitors is biased towards large Tier-1 networks, we assume that this is a reasonable approximation. We discuss how it influences our results, along with other limitations of the methodology in Section 6.

5. Applying the Proposed Methodology

In this section, we show how we can apply the proposed methodology on real data obtained from an operational major Japanese ISP. The network dataset includes BGP routing tables, traffic data, topology data and the billing scheme from the ISP looking to monitor the behavior of its customers. The analysis of this data, corroborated with an external view from the monitors active within the RIPE RIS and RouteViews projects, offers the information necessary for the detection of deaggregation strategies and the analysis of their economic impact.

5.1. The Dataset

The primary set of data we integrate in our study, the BGP routing data, is periodically collected from a monitor inside the ISP’s network. Every two hours we obtain the complete routing information from the ISP. The routing snapshot (i.e., the complete BGP routing table taken at a certain moment in time) offers an accurate perspective on the dynamics of the customer prefixes which are of interest for our study. We assume that if a prefix is present in consequent snapshots it was also there between the snapshots. In addition, prefixes not present did not appear between the snapshots. The two-hours timescale offers a small enough granularity in order to capture the long-lived
changes in the deaggregation strategy of the customer network. In order to correctly separate the customer network information from the BGP snapshots, we use the internal community tags the ISP uses for the routes received from its customers. We target only networks with public AS numbers, since it is likely that they also have multiple providers.

The collection of transit links through which each of these customers connects to the provider is necessary when extracting the traffic data corresponding to the detected cases of strategic deaggregation. In order to extract the topology information, we parse all the configuration files from the provider’s edge routers, characteristic to different vendor-specific operating systems.

The traffic data is collected in NetFlow format and spans over the two months period of May - June 2012, capturing two different billing cycles. The sampling rate used for most routers is \( \frac{1}{8,192} \). However, for some routers this may differ, depending on the traffic load on the router and its processing power. We analyze the traffic data that corresponds to the two different billing-compatible time intervals, i.e., one month before and another month after the deployment of strategic deaggregation. This limits us to detecting cases of customer networks deploying the deaggregation mechanism in the time-window corresponding to the two months of the study. This limitation comes from the characteristics of the major ISP itself, which stores the traffic data for its customer only during the latest two months.

Finally, we add to our analysis the type of billing scheme employed by the ISP. Generally, the billing method relies on the 95\(^{th}\) percentile rule and the exact interval used for billing is the calendar month.

5.2. The Results

We illustrate the use of the proposed methodology using as an input the complete dataset described in the previous section. First, we perform an extended analysis of “new” deaggregation strategies initiated within a period of 6 months (i.e., from May until October). This is aimed at providing a better understanding of the dynamics concerning deaggregation within the customer base of the Japanese ISP. We thus quantify the amount of more-specifics injected by customers of the ISP within the previously-mentioned period and monitor their evolution in time. First, we iteratively select as a reference time the last snapshot time-stamp taken within each month, from May to October. By applying the algorithm described in Section 4.1, we are further able to identify the set of customer networks that start to deploy deaggregation within the month previous to each of the 6 reference times. For being able to asses the impact of deaggregation on the transit traffic bill, it is also important to make sure that the newly injected more-specific prefixes are active throughout a whole billing period after the moment of deaggregation. To this end, we verify the routing data provided by the operational ISP for one month after each reference time, i.e., from June until November.

We summarize the detection results in Table 1. For example, we note that during August there were 6 different customer ASes which started to inject 19 new more-specific prefixes to the Japanese provider. We conclude that, generally, there are few customers deaggregating. And even more, the number of more-specifics injected to the ISP for each of the months analyzed is generally low, as observed in the third column.
Table 1: Number of deaggregating customer ASes and total advertised deaggregated prefixes per month.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>No. of customer ASes</th>
<th>No. of more-specifics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

from Table 1. Overall, we observe 212 new more-specifics being injected throughout the 6 months analyzed.

Given that we have traffic data available only for two months, we present the analysis of the economic impact for deaggregation strategies identified in this particular period. In order to differentiate the cases of strategic deaggregation, we merge the results of the previous analysis with the external routing data from the monitors active in the RIPE RIS and RouteViews projects. We use the results corresponding to the prefixes deaggregated in May, which also persist in the routing table for the next month.

Overall, we detect 154 more-specific prefixes injected by the customers of the Japanese ISP during the month of May. The prefixes are injected by 7 of the networks purchasing transit from the Japanese provider, as noted in Table 1. Among the 154 more-specific prefixes first injected in May, we are able to identify one case of deaggregation combined with selective advertisements, which fulfills all the requirements imposed. Our analysis shows that on the 28th of May, at around 16:00 hours, a customer prefix is deaggregated and the resulting more-specific prefix is injected to only one of the providers (i.e. the major ISP providing data). Moreover, the more-specific prefix is not re-aggregated into his covering prefix at any point during the following month of June.

For the quantification of the impact of strategic deaggregation on the transit bill, we compare the traffic pattern for the identified prefix during a month prior to the moment of deaggregation (i.e. May) with the traffic pattern for the more-specific during a month after the moment of deaggregation (i.e. June). Since the billing period used by the Japanese ISP is the exact calendar month, we compare the bill from May with the bill from June. In order to extract from the traffic collection the data that interest us, we must first identify the physical links connecting the customer network under study and the provider. By parsing all the router configuration files, we obtain the identity of all the interfaces on the routers connecting the two networks. We then evaluate the chargeable amount of traffic for each case using the 95\textsuperscript{th} percentile billing rule. We conclude that, even if the expected amounts of traffic for the two prefixes are comparable, the transit bill is 20\% lower for the customer AS after selectively injecting

\footnote{The number of more-specifics injected in May is larger that in the other months due to a heavy deaggregator, which injects 120 more-specifics out of the total identified.}
the deaggregated prefix, as observed in Figure 7.

The difference in the chargeable volume of traffic per month may be due to the surge we observe in the traffic profile depicted in Figure 7 during the first analyzed month. In order to check that this increase is caused by routing changes that influence the way large sources send their traffic towards the destination AS, we would need a complete view of the evolution in time of the BGP routing tables for the source networks. However, this type of information is unavailable at this point. Instead, we observe the changes in the number of active sources out of the top 20 which forward their traffic to the destination prefix via the Japanese provider, as depicted in Figure 7. We extract this information from the NetFlow traffic data of the Japanese ISP. The analyzed sources are prefixes with length 24 and are responsible for more than 50% of the total traffic towards the destination prefix. After the injection of the more-specific prefix, the traffic has a more stable behavior than in the previous case and, also, the number of active traffic sources is more stable in time. We can also notice that there is a symmetry between the surge of traffic and an increase in the number of sources that forward their traffic through the transit link. The observed correlation between routing changes and traffic fluctuations supports the hypothesis according to which the $95^{th}$ percentile billing rule can be gamed by the customer networks by restricting the choices of transit links diversity towards the destination prefix. However, we cannot demonstrate the causality between the changes we observe in the traffic pattern and the deaggregation strategy being deployed because of the lack of interest cases which fulfill the model requirements.

Based on the single perfect match for the strategic deaggregation previously identified, we can only conclude that the study result supports the analytic observations for the economic impact of deaggregation.
6. Discussion

We proposed a novel methodology to identify all the cases of strategic deaggregation generated by the customers of any ISP and measure their economic side-effect. The methodology comes also with a number of limitations and challenges, which we hereafter explain and address.

In order to identify real occurrences of the interest scenario, we demonstrate the use of this methodology on the real data from an operational ISP. We obtain all the necessary information from a major Japanese ISP. This includes routing data that enable us to monitor how customers advertise their address space over time and the corresponding traffic traces, router configuration information needed to identify on which links to look for the traffic data and finally, the billing scheme used. The quality of the results is conditioned by the quality of the data. Though the amount of information we handle is very large, it does not offer perfect information regarding the operations of the customers.

The Japanese ISP maintains fine-grained traffic information for its customer prefixes only for the latest two months from the moment of analysis. Consequently, the complete dataset from the major active ISP spans over a period of two months. Since we require the traffic traces both before and after the strategic deaggregation mechanism was deployed, this limits the traffic analysis only to cases of strategic deaggregation that have occurred as far as one month previous to the moment of analysis.

We validate that the more-specific prefixes are selectively advertised only towards the Japanese ISP using all the routing information gathered from ASes that are active in the RIPE RIS and RouteViews projects. Given that the number of monitors active within the RIPE RIS and RouteViews project is limited to approximately 150, we have only a partial picture of how external sources of traffic reach the prefixes identified. Consequently, a prefix may be thought to be selectively advertised when it is in fact advertised to multiple providers. In this case, though, we should not see a lower transit bill than in the aggregated case.

When analyzing the real data from the Japanese ISP, we do not observe many cases of strategic deaggregation occurring within the time-window of interest. Though we do find a number of general deaggregation cases, the corresponding prefixes look like expressions of stable strategies, justified by general operational practices. Consequently, this does not allow for an extensive evaluation of the impact of this deaggregation strategy at the economic level.

All together, in the context of the Japanese Internet community we conclude that strategic deaggregation is generally not a practice used actively within the customer base. The results of our study show that the customers of the Japanese ISP do not make an extensive use of prefix deaggregation in general, and even less in the strategic form defined in this paper. There are a number of reasons why this may be the case, including the general pressure of the community regarding the negative impact of deaggregation, the unwillingness to increase the overall complexity of the Internet or even the lack of basic necessary expertise which would allow the deployment of such strategies at the interdomain level. It is, however, important to keep in mind that these conclusions are based on data from one major ISP, and the results may be different for other entities from other geographical regions.
7. Conclusion

The impact of IPv4 prefix deaggregation on the routing system has long been a reason of debate in the Internet community. Though usually frowned upon, this strategy is more commonly used nowadays, especially in light of the IPv4 address space depletion. In this paper, we show that individual networks deploying prefix deaggregation may also, given certain general Internet conditions, have an economic impact on their transit providers. Using a general Internet model, we analyze how, after splitting its allocated address space, a customer AS can “control” which of the transit providers is used to reach each more-specific prefix through the use of selective advertisements. This further decreases the number of choices in terms of transit link used to reach the destinations advertised. As a side-effect, this translates into a more deterministic traffic pattern on that particular transit link, which consequently means decreased traffic fluctuations and thus a smaller monthly transit traffic bill. This comes as a result of the unique interaction between several elements that are characteristic to the current operational Internet: the path dynamics in the current Internet, the asymmetrical popularity of traffic sources and the popular billing method which relies on the 95th percentile of traffic. Should any of these elements change (e.g., should the provider bill its customers using a different billing model than the 95th percentile), the observed collateral benefit might no longer apply. This does not mean, however, that deaggregation in the fist place will no longer be used.

The real cost of deaggregation in the Internet is not easily quantifiable. The marginal cost of injecting one more prefix at the interdomain level does not only depend on the cost of an additional entry in an already bloated routing table. Since routers are currently capable of handling very large BGP routing tables, the real threat deaggregation poses regards the convergence time of the global routing system. Consequently, when thinking about the cost of deaggregation, we need to consider its impact on the global routing system and on the Internet community. Until now, the transit providers did not have the right incentives to refrain from advertising the deaggregated prefixes as injected by their customer [10]. Taking into consideration the monetary aftermath of strategic deaggregation analyzed in this paper, the new economic incentives might be enough to push providers to change their strategy and transfer some of the costs of prefix deaggregation back to their customers. This could imply an important shift in the prefix deaggregation strategies adopted by the ASes in the Internet, moving the set of individual deaggregation strategies closer to the social welfare, where everybody enjoys increased benefits.

Though the analytical model proves the possibility of inadvertent economic benefit for the deaggregating party, we further verify for real-life occurrences of such scenarios. To this end, we propose a novel methodology to a-posteriori identifying cases of prefix deaggregation generated by the customers of any ISP within a predefined time-window. We focus on identifying cases of selectively advertised deaggregated prefixes. We explain how the economic side-effect of the strategic deaggregation can be measured. In order to identify real occurrences of the interest phenomena, we demonstrate the use of this methodology on the real traffic and routing data from a major Japanese ISP. Overall, we do not observe much deaggregation generated from the customer networks of the Japanese ISP. We cannot know whether this is an artifact of the particular
analyzed network providing us all the data or it is a general feature throughout the Internet. I may happen that in the case of some other transit providers, such deaggregation scenarios are much more frequent. We distinguish and analyze a strategic deaggregation case that fulfills all the constraints imposed by the methodology. We find that through selectively injecting more-specifics, the customer AS is able to smoothen the traffic variations and save approximately 20% on its transit bill. In the long term, this may negatively impact the business of the ISP. This result supports the hypothesis of an economic impact of strategic deaggregation, but it is not sufficient for generalization.

References


