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Brazilian Export Growth and Divergence in the Tropics during the Nineteenth Century

CHRISTOPHER DAVID ABSELL and
ANTONIO TENA-JUNGUITO *

Abstract. The objective of this article is to reappraise both the accuracy of the official export statistics and the narrative of Brazilian export growth during the period immediately following independence. We undertake an accuracy test of the official values of Brazilian export statistics and find evidence of considerable under-valuation. Once corrected, during the post-independence decades (1821–50) Brazil’s current exports represented a larger share of its economy and its constant growth is found to be more dynamic than any other period of the nineteenth century. We posit that this dynamism was related to an exogenous institutional shock in the form of British West Indies slave emancipation that afforded Brazil a competitive advantage.

Keywords: Brazil, export growth, accuracy, tropics, nineteenth century, slavery

JEL Classification: F14, N76

The great desideratum of every student of national finance and economy must be a thorough and trustworthy compilation of the respective statistics, that, embracing a long period, will afford a safe basis on which to found deductions, without which all conclusions are little better than mere speculations.

J. P. Wileman

Christopher David Absell is a PhD candidate in Economic History at the Departament of Social Sciences, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Email: christopherdavid.absell@uc3m.es. Antonio Tena-Junguito is an associate professor in the Department of Social Sciences and a member of the Figuerola Institute, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Email: antonio.tena@uc3m.es.

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Brazil’s export sector is the focal point of much of the country’s economic historiography. It has been described as the motor of the Brazilian economy during the nineteenth century. For better or for worse, the export sector was the principal source of the productivity growth of the Brazilian economy. It was the magnet for the first waves of foreign capital investment, the initiator of railway expansion, and an important contributor to the government’s coffers.

Furthermore, it defined Brazil’s role in the world economy as a member of the primary product producing periphery during the first globalization. For these reasons, much of the economic history of the country has been dedicated to the export sector, covering almost every conceivable aspect of its development. The country’s export performance is a defining aspect of this history. Much of the historiography of this export performance has been based on an analysis of official Brazilian export statistics. Until now, however, the accuracy of these statistics has not been verified to a satisfactory extent. The objective of this article is therefore to test the official Brazilian export statistics for their accuracy, utilising a methodology that has proven fruitful in other case studies. As we shall see, the official values of Brazilian export statistics demonstrate a bias that distorts our understanding of Brazil’s export performance during the first half of the nineteenth century. When reappraised and put into comparative perspective, it becomes apparent that Brazilian export growth during the post-independence decades was more dynamic than any other period of the nineteenth century.

These conclusions do not sit well with the traditional narrative of this period. Traditionally, economic historians have focused on the second half of the century, when Brazil entered a ‘novo equilíbrio econômico’ in which coffee in the south-east was the principal protagonist in the growth of the quantum and value of the country’s exports. During the period from independence to mid-century, according to the traditional narrative, Brazil remained a stagnant, ‘sleeping giant’. Although the process of independence was not overwhelmingly detrimental to export growth, the first few decades of

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4 For the full series of data underlying this article, please see the online appendix.

independence were described as being anything but dynamic. As classic studies by Caio Prado Júnior and Celso Furtado both indicated, this was largely due to the demise of the eighteenth-century gold rush and the stagnation and decadence of the previously dominant sugar and cotton export industries in the north-east of the country. Furthermore, according to this narrative, export growth was impeded by other factors including seemingly insurmountable internal trade costs, political and institutional instability, technological backwardness and the profound scarcity of factors of production.

This traditional narrative has been taken to task by much of the empirical work on the Brazilian economy during this period. Amongst the first scholars to seriously ‘check the relevance of the stylised facts’ was Nathaniel Leff, who argued that the second half of the century was not as dynamic as previous descriptive studies had claimed. Furthermore, Leff’s calculations revealed that export growth during the post-independence period was in fact more dynamic than the second half of the century. Leff was primarily concerned with overall income growth, however, and his conclusions emphasised the importance of the regional disparity in export growth and its impact on the country’s long-run income distribution. What is more, his conclusions were based on the official trade statistics and, given Leff’s recognition of the limitations of these statistics, were thus tentative. Leff’s work has been complemented by a literature that, as we shall see in the following section, paints a more dynamic picture of the post-independence Brazilian economy.

While the traditional narrative has been thoroughly questioned by the subsequent work on Brazil’s export economy, there still remains the problem of the accuracy of the official statistics which serve as the basis of much of this work. Here we seek to lend quantitative support to this literature through the reconstruction and analysis of the country’s export series. The article is

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7 Nathaniel H. Leff, ‘A Technique for Estimating Income Trends from Currency Data and an Application to Nineteenth-Century Brazil’, Review of Income and Wealth, 18: 4 (1972), p. 363. Leff used data on the currency stock, together with official export statistics, to estimate the long-run trend of income growth, estimating growth rates of 2.7 per cent from independence to 1869, 2.1 per cent from 1869 to 1894, and 4.3 per cent from 1895 to 1913.
8 Leff, ‘Tropical Trade and Development in the Nineteenth Century’, Table 4, p. 683.
structured as follows. The next section outlines the literature on early Brazilian economic dynamism. The second section concerns the accuracy and reconstruction of Brazil’s export statistics. The third section reappraises the country’s export performance. Concentrating on the post-independence period, we then place this performance in comparative perspective and provide an empirical basis for the revisionist narrative. Based on an examination of the empirical evidence regarding comparative growth rates and export market shares in the tropical Americas, we posit that the abolition of slavery in the British West Indies provided Brazil a competitive advantage that incentivised producers to expand the country’s factor endowment through the large-scale importation of slaves and the expansion of the agricultural frontier. The final section concludes.

The Literature on Early Brazilian Economic Dynamism

Our results notwithstanding, there are other indications that Brazil’s post-independence economy was much more dynamic than traditionally thought. Using alternative indicators of economic dynamism, the literature on this period has recast the Brazilian experience in a more dynamic and geographically disparate light. To begin with, Brazil was exceptional in the sense that it was not subjected to the political and institutional instability conventionally associated with the process of independence in Spanish America. As Leandro Prados de la Escosura noted, in the context of Latin American independence, Brazil provided ‘a counterpoint of stability and gradual institutional transition while opening up to international commodity and factor markets’.\(^1\)

Unlike most of Spanish America, imperial collapse did not come with the baggage of balkanisation or anti-trade policy that characterised other countries

of the region. Furthermore, Brazil did not experience the institutional turmoil derived from slave abolition until much later in the century and only after suffering from a prolonged series of restrictions to its Atlantic slave trade.

While Brazil remained relatively free of the domestic institutional shocks associated with independence, institutional change plays an important role in the narrative of Brazil’s early dynamism. As a number of scholars have argued, the aftermath of the Haitian Revolution and the institutional shock of slave emancipation in the British West Indies effectively opened room for more competitive tropical agricultural producers. The export economies of those countries that remained slave plantation economies, such as Brazil, Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Southern slave plantations of the United States expanded rapidly during the same period. Thus, while Brazil was not affected directly by domestic institutional shocks until later in the century, it was affected indirectly by institutional changes in the region. This is an important point to which we will return in the fourth section.

Indications of Brazilian economic dynamism run parallel with the profound institutional changes taking place in the British West Indies. One such indicator is the prodigious number of slave arrivals during the post-independence period. The Atlantic slave trade, in the words of Herbert Klein and Francisco Vidal Luna, ‘reached its peak in the third decade of the nineteenth century’. Brazil was at the centre of this trade, drawing the major part of slave importations during the period between independence and the abolition of the Brazilian slave trade in 1881. During the period from 1810 to 1881, more slaves were imported into Brazilian ports than any other destination.

11 However, Brazil was by no means immune from border disputes or secessionist revolts during the post-independence period. See Victor Bulmer-Thomas, *The Economic History of Latin America since Independence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 62.

12 Leff, ‘Tropical Trade and Development in the Nineteenth Century’, pp. 64–6; Herbert


13 Klein and Vidal Luna, *Slavery in Brazil*, p. 74.

during any decade in the recorded history of the Atlantic slave trade. While the anti-slave trade law of 1811, the product of unyielding political pressure from the British, curtailed importations for a number of years, the trade continued and expanded considerably after 1831 until final abolition in 1851. Although the ports in the south-east received the largest share of imports, a similar trend is observed in the north-east, effectively feeding the expansion of sugar plantations. The demand for labour was apparently so high that a considerable rise in slave prices, which began in the late 1820s, seemingly in anticipation of abolition, did not curtail importations. After 1831 and the banning of the slave trade, an internal redistribution of the slave population from the north-east to the south-east took place, until eventual abolition and government subsidised immigration later in the century.

Another indicator concerns the expansion of the agricultural frontier. The years from 1830 to 1840 recorded the highest number of new sugar engenho registrations in Bahia during the nineteenth century. There are also indications of a similar trend in the number of fazendas in the south-east. Indeed, the country possessed a relatively superior endowment of fertile land in the


18 On slave prices in Bahia, see Barickman, A Bahian Counterpoint, p. 139. For long-run slave price trends in Minas Gerais and Rio de Janeiro, see Klein and Vidal Luna, Slavery in Brazil, pp. 98–299. For a comparison with Cuba, see David Eltis, Economic Growth and the Ending of the Transatlantic Slave Trade (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), appendix C.


south-east that, due to climatic conditions, favoured the cultivation of coffee. In the north-eastern regions, particularly around the Recôncavo in Bahia but also in Pernambuco, large swathes of uncultivated land allowed for the gradual expansion of sugar, tobacco and cocoa plantations. Moreover, from independence until 1841 the enforcement of property rights for land remained largely unregulated. Besides the pre-existing land titles (sesmarias) granted by the Crown before independence, the definition of property rights during the first three decades of the independent empire was achieved through informal occupation (posse). While the ambiguous nature of property rights frequently resulted in conflict, there were few legal impediments to the expansion of cultivation, particularly by the more powerful ‘large-scale squat-ters’. The Land Law (Lei de Terras) of 1841 recognised all previously claimed poses and sesmarias but prohibited the informal occupation of land, instead only allowing for acquisition through purchase.

Furthermore, indicators of non-bank financial transactions show steady growth during the decades following independence despite the scarcity of private financial institutions and the high costs of borrowing. This complements Zephyr Frank’s work on wealth holding in the south-east, which has shown that, rather than remaining stagnant, mean wealth grew over the four decades after independence. Frank’s examination of the credit market in São João del-Rei in the state of Minas Gerais during the post-independence period revealed a ‘vast informal credit market’ associated with the domestic and export economy. Of course, the presence of an informal market


implied higher borrowing costs. In the absence of regulated financial institutions, planters were in large part beholden to the services of intermediaries (comissários) for credit. Inheritance, marriage and personal loans from non-bank lenders were other informal ways of obtaining credit. Given the speculative nature of much of this borrowing and the lack of a regulatory framework, the cost of borrowing during this period was generally quite high. Such conditions, however, did not seem to reduce the demand for credit.

An additional indicator of post-independence dynamism can be observed in the demand for traditional modes of transportation. It is certain that during this period infrastructure was rudimentary at best; before the introduction of rail, the common mode of transport was the mule. The high incidence of transport costs affected not only the profit margin of producers but also the productivity of plantations. In the case of coffee, Herbert Klein estimated that one-third of a fazenda’s slave labour force was dedicated to the transportation of coffee sacks to market. Thus the expansion of the agricultural frontier was limited until the development of the rail network that took place after the 160 s. In fact, like many economies in Latin America, investment in transport infrastructure was largely driven by the demands of the planters. Construction did not begin until 1841 and continued during the final half of the nineteenth century, effectively generating large social savings for freight services and providing an impetus to the development of the domestic market. Despite the lack of infrastructure and associated transport costs, however, it is evident that the supply of traditional modes of transportation

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29 Ryan, ‘Credit where Credit is Due’, pp. 82–103; Eisenberg gives prime interest rates for Recife, which descended from 18 per cent in 1835 to 9.43 per cent in 1857. Eisenberg, *Sugar Industry in Pernambuco*, p. 64.


increased alongside the expansion of export industries. According to Klein’s estimates, the average arrival of mules to the Sorocaba market in the state of São Paulo doubled during the 1840s and showed a steadily increasing trend until the 1870s. Aida Lavalle and Carlos Suprinyak observed similar tendencies in Rio Negro and Itapetininga, respectively.

Here we seek to provide a solid empirical basis for the literature on Brazilian export dynamism during the post-independence decades. Before doing so, however, a thorough reconstruction and analysis of the Brazilian export series is necessary.

The Reconstruction of Brazil’s Export Statistics

Foreign trade statistics are perhaps unique in the statistical universe for being a useful case of double accounting: the quantity and value of imported and exported commodities appear in records of differing nationalities. This allows for a comparison of these records in order to ascertain the accuracy of origin or destination statistical sources. Unfortunately, at least for the period under examination, there existed no homogeneous international classification system regulating foreign trade statistics. The absence of such regulation engendered a debate regarding the reliability of these statistics. Oskar Morgenstern’s observation that ‘Writers on all phases of foreign trade will have to assume the burden of proof that the figures on commodity movements are good enough’ has since led to a substantial amount of quantitative soul-searching by economic historians and students of international trade. Although D. C. M. Platt was slightly less pessimistic about Latin American trade statistics, his conclusions were still disheartening. Over the last few years the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean have been subjected to an audit of their historical foreign trade statistics. Much of this work

has contradicted Morgenstern and Platt’s pessimistic view of the reliability of these statistics.

The accuracy of Brazil’s historical foreign trade statistics, while being included in a number of these studies, has not been conclusively evaluated. Certainly a number of scholars have recognised and attempted to correct the limitations of these statistics. This work includes the correction of the inclusion of bullion in the official series of exports and imports and the examination of the accuracy of the official value of exports. These studies, however, have only focused on later periods, and have not definitively addressed problems involving the value and destination of official export statistics. Here we focus primarily on the accuracy of the official values.

During the period under study, the official values of exports were fixed by the *pauta semanal*, a price schedule issued on a weekly basis by a government committee in consultation with local commodity brokers and commercial associations. The average weekly market prices of each commodity included in the nomenclature of the pauta were ‘verified’ in the market before being published and sent to the Ministry of Finance, provincial customs houses and major periodicals. Export duties were collected at the port of shipment by applying the values listed in the pauta to the quantities given in the man-ifeasts of the ocean going vessels. Until the end of the nineteenth century the values used to calculate export statistics were those fixed by the pauta. Any bias in the official price schedule would thus be reflected in the statistics. In 1900, after publishing his landmark study of 16, *Brazilian Exchange: The*

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41 Wileman, *Brazilian Exchange*.


Study of an Inconvertible Currency, the British civil engineer J. P. Wileman was contracted by the Brazilian Ministry of Finance to assist in the modernisation of the state’s statistical apparatus and the creation of the Serviço de Estatística Comercial.  

From 1910 onwards, the official trade statistics were published annually by the Serviço in a publication that would assume the title Comércio exterior do Brasil. The values listed in this publication were calculated using the market price given at the port of departure. These values included export duties and other transaction costs (such as the cost of cartage, packing and loading) but not freight, insurance or landing costs.

Due to the reliance upon official values for the calculation of export statistics during the nineteenth century, the veracity of these values was sensitive to the fiscal exigencies of the government, the influence of the brokers and commercial associations and the competencies of the statistical apparatus of the state. Apart from the recognition of the possible inaccuracy of the official values of Brazilian export statistics, however, the veracity of these values has been the subject of little attention in the literature. Wileman included in Brazilian Exchange an examination of the accuracy of official valuations for the period 1861 to 188. He concluded that the official statistics were mar-ginally under-valued. Wileman assumed somewhat arbitrarily that trade and

55 Although occasionally reference was made to the pauta. For example see Brazil, Importação e exportação, movimento marítimo, cambial e do café da República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1901), pp. 9–802.
56 Brazil, Commercio exterior do Brasil, 191a 4191, Vol. 1, p. XXI.
57 While it is outside the purview of this article to provide a comprehensive explanation for the bias shown in the official statistics, it is possible to offer a number of conjectures. One reason might be simply that official values were not updated in a timely fashion. There is evidence of this in the case of import values which were modi-fi ed only by Act of Parliament and thus were frequently unrepresentative of market values. See Flávio Rabelo Versiani, ‘Industrialização e economia de exportação: a experiência brasileira antes de 1914’, Revista Brasileira de Economia, 34: 4 (1980), p. 24. This is evident in certain cases (for example, cotton during the first decade of independence) in which official prices tend to lag behind international price changes. Another reason for the bias may be the influence of commercial associations. As Eugene Ridings observed, it was in the interest of export lobbies to reduce as much as possible the elasticity of the official price schedule with relation to ascending price movements in order to avoid an increased tax burden. If prices were descending, however, they would lobby for the frequent adjustment of official prices in order to avoid paying more taxes. See Eugene Ridings, Business Interest Groups in Nineteenth-century Brazil (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 199. This remains an open question for future research.
59 Summarising his conclusions over three periods, Wileman estimated the ratio of local to foreign valuations as 97 per cent for the period 1865 to 1878, 88.3 per cent for the period 1879 to 1886, and 98 per cent for the period 1886 to 1888. Wileman’s sample of trading partners included Great Britain, France, Belgium, Germany (Hamburg), the United States, Portugal, Austria, Uruguay and Argentina. To the total valuation of imports from Brazil
transaction costs accounted for 51 per cent of the official value which included ‘all expenditure from date of purchase to delivery on board’ but excluded the cost of freight rates. This assumption is difficult to sustain for the periods preceding (when freights weighed heavily on total export value) and succeeding (when export duties for certain commodities sometimes exceeded 51 per cent) Wileman’s study.

Here we confirm and extend Wileman’s findings by way of the construction of a price accuracy index for Brazilian exports during the period 1811 to 1831. Following the methodology commonly employed in the literature to test for price accuracy, we collect the prices of a representative sample of export commodities including cacao, coffee, cotton, hides, rubber and sugar. These prices are then contrasted with their corresponding international prices.

As a proxy for the average level of international prices, we have used two sources. For the period 1811 to 1831, we use the prices derived from the United Kingdom’s import statistics. We assume that the latter reflect the international price of these commodities, an assumption that is supported by a comparison of the UK data with Augustus Sauerbeck’s series of international prices of selected commodities. The period before 1811 is more problematic due to the absence of a common point of reference such as the Sauerbeck series. In order to confirm the accuracy of this period and achieve the most representative series possible, we have constructed a weighted average of prices from different origins to the UK and Philadelphia for the

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51 Ibid., p. 124.
53 This ‘price’, as well as those derived from the UK import statistics, is effectively the computed unit value; that is, total value over total quantity. We take the official prices of these commodities from Brazil, Anuário estatístico do Brasil de 1939/1940 (Rio de Janeiro: IBGE, 1941), pp. 1374–8.
54 Tobacco and herva mate, while also occupying lesser but still important portions of Brazil’s exports, have been dropped due to the absence of data on international prices. Even in the absence of these commodities, the sample covers an average of 88 per cent of the value of exports during the period in question, ranging from a minimum of 66.6 per cent in 1844/45 and a maximum of 93.9 per cent in 1895 according to official statistics.
55 The correlation coefficients of the selected commodities during the period 1854–1912 are as follows: coffee = 0.91, sugar = 0.98, cotton = 0.99, hides = 0.84.
56 Import price data records of UK, France and Belgium were valued at fixed prices until 1854, 1847 and 1846, respectively. This implies that the use of these records to evaluate Brazil’s official valuation is not useful and justifies the use of the international price series used here.
commodities in the sample. As weights we use the distribution of each origin in the sum of the quantum of exports of all origin countries for each commodity. An important consideration when choosing which price series to include in the weighted average is the quality of the commodity in question. Coffee is a particularly difficult commodity in this regard as quality is largely dependent upon the singular characteristics of each producer. To account for this somewhat heterogeneous nature, we have included a wide range of series. Sugar, however, is a different story. The majority of Brazilian exports of cane sugar during this period were of the muscovado variety. We have thus excluded other qualities, such as white or beet varieties, from the sugar series. While it is impossible to perfectly homogenise each weighted average by quality given the limited information available, we have taken the utmost care to include only the price series of certain qualities that, where possible, reflect those qualities exported from Brazil. Finally, we have taken the arithmetic average of each series and Sauerbeck’s series during the period 1846–55 to ensure a smooth transition between the weighted average and UK series. The resulting price series for each commodity can be found in online appendix 1A.

The international series represents the c.i.f. (cost, insurance and freight) values of Brazilian exports or their value at the Brazilian border plus insurance, freight and other associated trade costs. From 1821 to 1900 official Brazilian statistics are presented as f.o.b. (free on board) values, representing the value of exports at the Brazilian border and not including trade costs. As mentioned previously, from 1901 onwards these statistics include the value of export taxes but not freight or insurance costs. In order to make any meaningful comparison with the Brazilian data, the international series must therefore be converted to f.o.b. values. With this in mind, we have constructed a new series of freight rates and export taxes and we have used these costs, together with data on the insurance cost, to adjust the international series from the c.i.f. values to the f.o.b. values reflected in the Brazilian statistics.

For this period we are obliged to drop rubber from the sample due to the lack of international price data. This is not such a problem, however, as rubber occupied a marginal portion of Brazil’s total exports. The sources for prices and weights are given in online appendix 1.


For the period 1910 to 1913 it accounted for 57.73 per cent of total sugar exports. Brazil, Commercio Exterior do Brasil, 1910 a 1914, Vol. 1, pp. 72–5.

For a precise explanation of how this transition has been undertaken, see online appendix 1 and Figure A1. In the case of hides, we were unable to locate data on world exports, and thus our price series until 1846 is the arithmetic average of a number of different sources. This is not such a problem for the reconstruction of our series, however, given that hides occupied a relatively minor share of exports during the century. Furthermore, our adjustment serves to establish a middle ground between the dynamism of the early series and the trend of the UK series.

The weight of trade costs depends largely on the commodity in question. Generally, this factor ranged between 4.37 per cent (sugar, 1857) to 23.46 per cent (rubber, 1898) of the
Figure 1. *Price Accuracy Index, Brazil, 1821–1913*

![Price Accuracy Index](image)

Sources: See online appendix 1.

Figure 1 shows the general price accuracy index of the commodity sample for the years 1821 to 1913. If perfectly accurate, the adjusted international series should reflect the official Brazilian f.o.b. export values. However the index clearly confirms Wileman’s findings of under-valuation. This under-valuation is particularly acute during the first half of the century. Furthermore, as predicted, the series tends towards perfect accuracy after the institution of the *Serviço de Estatística Comercial* in the early 1900s. Disaggregation by commodity reveals the trends underlying this general under-valuation. As Figure 2 shows, each commodity was consistently under-valued with the exception of a few notable periods. Most notably, cotton and sugar tended towards over-valuation immediately after the founding of the Republic in 1889, a tendency that continued into the twentieth century. Such variability was due not to freight rates, which generally tended to decline during the period, nor to insurance costs, but rather to export taxes which differed quite drastically between commodities, particularly during the Republican period. Unlike other Latin American countries, Brazilian export taxes did not decline during the latter half of the century. Instead, provincial governments took advantage of the opportunity to define export taxes awarded to them by the Republican Constitution of 1891. This resulted in a sharp increase in the weight of taxation during the last decade of the nineteenth century which, in the case of the taxation of rubber exports in the state of Pará, saw ad valorem taxes rise as high as 22 per cent. For the case of Amazonia, see Felipe Tâmega Fernandes, “Stretching the Inelastic Rubber: Taxation, Welfare and Lobbies in Amazonia, 1870–1910”, Harvard Business School Working Paper 10–032 (2009).
century. Given the weight of coffee in the export economy, however, this overvaluation is not reflected in the general price accuracy index.

A Reappraisal of Brazilian Export Growth

In sum, an examination of the accuracy of the values of Brazil’s export statistics reveals a clear bias towards under-valuation. In order to correct this bias, we reconstruct the series using international prices. During the period under consideration the commodity structure of Brazil’s exports changed considerably. Although coffee played a leading role in the export sector from 1831 onwards, four other commodities also maintained substantial shares during different periods: cotton (1821–37, 1862–74), hides (1821–32, 1844–46), sugar (1821–85) and rubber (1886–1913). Given the long-run nature of the study it is important to utilise a methodology that accounts for the changes in Brazil’s composition of exports. We thus elaborate a Fisher export price index using the corrected prices of the commodities in the sample. This index is used to deflate the series from current to constant prices, from which the growth rates are calculated. We compare the new growth rates to those calculated using a number of other export price indices based on the official unit values. The first is a Fisher export price index for the period from 1850 to 1913 which was elaborated by Reinaldo Gonçalves using the unit values given in the official Brazilian statistics. Furthermore, we compare the reconstructed series to a second export price

Sources: See online appendix 1.

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Figure 2. Price Accuracy Indices by Commodity, Brazil, 1821–1913

Sources: See online appendix 1.

Reinaldo Gonçalves, ‘Índices de comércio exterior do Brasil’, Revista Brasileira de Estatística, 42: 168 (1981), pp. 331–62. This index uses a sample of eight commodities (cacao, coffee, cotton, herva mate, hides, rubber, sugar and tobacco) with 1880 as the base year, the unit values of which are taken from the Anuário Estatístico of 1939/40. This index was later
Table 1. Export Growth Rates, Brazil, 1821-1913

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<th>Gonçalves</th>
<th>BHW</th>
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Sources: See online appendices 1 and 2.

index commonly used in the literature on export growth constructed by Christopher Blattman, Jason Hwang and Jeffrey Williamson (hereinafter BHW) using the same commodity sample and spanning the period from 1860 to 1913.⁶⁴

Table 1 displays the growth rates of exports derived from the new series at constant prices alongside the official, Gonçalves and BHW series. We present both medium- and long-term periods beginning from 1821, 1850, 1870 and 1890 in order to capture the changes in the composition of exports. The two decades prior to the series represented here were characterised by considerable price volatility, due in large part to the effect of the Napoleonic Wars. After 1818, however, the prices of Brazil’s principal export commodities began a gradual descent that ended in the 1830s.⁶⁵ Although quantum data for


Brazilians exports after the end of the Portuguese trade monopoly in 1808 are difficult to come by, descriptive evidence suggests that liberalisation had a positive impact on Brazil’s export industries during the decade prior to independence despite falling international prices. As can be seen in Table 1, the period from 1821 to 1913 is not particularly exceptional, with growth rates of the corrected series for the period from mid-century onwards lying between the Gonçalves series and the dynamism of the BHW series. The period from 1821 to 1850, however, reveals a much more dynamic panorama. Exports grew faster than any other period of the nineteenth century at a rate of 5.9 per cent per annum. Further disaggregation of this period into decades is even more revealing. The export growth of this period to a large degree took place during the decade immediately following independence.

Disaggregation by commodity highlights a number of divergent tendencies. Table 2 displays the growth rates of the value of Brazil’s principal export commodities in constant prices. Coffee was the principal protagonist of this period, exhibiting a growth rate in its sterling value of 9.7 per cent per annum. Sugar, although showing considerably less dynamism at 4.5 per cent per annum, was far from the stagnation and decadence that would characterise its experience in the latter half of the century. On the other hand, cotton, which had occupied such a central role in the export growth of the north-east during the late

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Table 2: Volume and Prices Commodity Growth Rates, Brazil, 1821-1913

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Volume</th>
<th>1821-50</th>
<th>1850-70</th>
<th>1870-90</th>
<th>1890-1913</th>
<th>1870-1913</th>
<th>1821-1913</th>
<th>1850-1913</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cacao</td>
<td>4.89%</td>
<td>0.66%</td>
<td>1.69%</td>
<td>7.10%</td>
<td>4.48%</td>
<td>3.71%</td>
<td>3.24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coffee</td>
<td>9.73%</td>
<td>2.98%</td>
<td>2.03%</td>
<td>4.34%</td>
<td>3.19%</td>
<td>3.09%</td>
<td>3.08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>1.52%</td>
<td>5.60%</td>
<td>-6.52%</td>
<td>4.90%</td>
<td>-0.38%</td>
<td>1.18%</td>
<td>1.46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hides</td>
<td>2.36%</td>
<td>1.62%</td>
<td>-0.24%</td>
<td>3.36%</td>
<td>1.63%</td>
<td>1.83%</td>
<td>1.61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rubber</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7.70%</td>
<td>6.00%</td>
<td>3.90%</td>
<td>4.76%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5.58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>4.50%</td>
<td>0.13%</td>
<td>0.28%</td>
<td>-14.62%</td>
<td>-7.53%</td>
<td>-2.06%</td>
<td>-5.06%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prices</th>
<th>Cacao</th>
<th>2.22%</th>
<th>0.03%</th>
<th>2.93%</th>
<th>0.24%</th>
<th>1.45%</th>
<th>-0.01%</th>
<th>0.99%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coffee</td>
<td>-3.41%</td>
<td>0.39%</td>
<td>2.26%</td>
<td>-0.81%</td>
<td>0.60%</td>
<td>-0.69%</td>
<td>0.52%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>-0.34%</td>
<td>2.02%</td>
<td>-2.89%</td>
<td>1.10%</td>
<td>-0.73%</td>
<td>-0.02%</td>
<td>0.13%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hides</td>
<td>-1.39%</td>
<td>0.92%</td>
<td>-1.03%</td>
<td>4.80%</td>
<td>2.04%</td>
<td>0.71%</td>
<td>1.67%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rubber</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.75%</td>
<td>0.94%</td>
<td>0.41%</td>
<td>0.64%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.58%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>-0.80%</td>
<td>-0.97%</td>
<td>-3.11%</td>
<td>-0.79%</td>
<td>-1.82%</td>
<td>-1.29%</td>
<td>-1.53%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: See online appendices 1 and 2.

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eighteenth century, was clearly showing signs of stagnation at 1.3 per cent per annum. It must be noted that the unparalleled growth of sugar and coffee occurred during a period in which international prices were generally declining. The decline of coffee prices is especially notable given the dynamism of the observed growth rates.

Finally, the corrected series allows for the calculation of the exports-to-GDP ratio. As can be seen in Figure 3, Brazil’s degree of openness to the international economy was higher during the earlier period than previously thought. In previous work, Leff estimated an export-to-GDP ratio of 16 per cent for the period 1911–13. Given that the export sector was the fastest growing sector of the Brazilian economy, Leff argued that such a figure would suggest a much lower portion during most of the nineteenth century. This led Leff to the conclusion that the internal market was the principal driving force behind Brazil’s economic growth, employing the majority of the country’s economically active population. As can be seen in the figure, however, if we assume that the GDP estimation is reliable, the export sector accounted for a growing and much larger portion of the economy during the post-independence period, falling to Leff’s predicted levels only after 1870.67 Although this is certainly surprising, it serves as further evidence of the dynamism of the post-independence Brazilian export economy. In terms of income growth, however,

Brazil’s relatively positive export performance must be qualified. As can be seen by the commodity-level data, export growth was largely confined to a single sector: coffee. What is more, coffee production was highly concentrated in the south-eastern regions of the country, gradually diffusing from Rio de Janeiro to São Paulo. 8 So while export growth following independence and during the 1950s was more dynamic than previously appreciated, this growth was unequally distributed both in sectoral and geographic terms. 9

World Demand and Brazilian Competitiveness during the Post-independence Decades

The corrected series effectively permits us to reappraise the traditional narrative of Brazilian export growth and to lend support to the literature on early Brazilian economic dynamism. Here we explore the conditions surrounding Brazil’s dynamic export growth experience during the post-independence decades. The first step is to ascertain how much of this growth was attributable to factors related to Brazil’s international competitiveness, and how much was due to the shift in world demand for Brazil’s commodities. In order to untangle the effects of these determinants, we undertake a constant market share analysis of Brazilian export growth. The underlying assumption of constant market share analysis is essentially counter-factual; we assume that Brazil’s export share in the world market remains unchanged over time. Any differentials that arise between our constant-share assumption and observed export performance are attributable to a residual factor, commonly interpreted as a competitiveness effect. 97 Here we perform a simple disaggregation of Brazil’s export growth into two factors. 17 The first, the demand effect, uses the

8 Prado Júnior, História econômica do Brasil, pp. 76–951.
9 Leff, ‘Economic Development and Regional Inequality’, pp. 5–244.


Although it is customary to further disaggregate export growth into market distribution and commodity composition effects, we are restricted by the questionable quality and paucity of official bilateral data. A test of the accuracy of the geographical distribution of bilateral statistics by value and quantity highlights a number of serious problems. To begin with, the series is incomplete. Data are only available for the years 1842/43, 1852/53, 1862/63, 1872/73, and the period from 1901 onwards. Furthermore, the Brazilian export records are found to be considerably and consistently overvalued when compared to trading partner import records. This incorrect geographic assignment of exports might have been driven by differing conceptions of origin and destination and in some cases by smuggling or fraudulent practices by government officials in customs houses. See Platt, ‘Problems in
growth of world exports as a proxy for world demand, and reports how much of Brazil’s market share is explained by the increase (or decrease) of this demand. The second, the competitiveness effect, reveals how much is explained by the increase (or decrease) of a country’s competitiveness vis-à-vis other suppliers. We present an aggregate (which includes 55 countries) and disaggregate (which includes France, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States) world in order to control for the growth of world demand unrelated to Brazil’s principal export markets. Table 3 displays the results.

Constant market share analysis reveals that world demand was the principal determinant of Brazil’s export growth during the post-independence decades and the first globalisation. The negative sign of the competitiveness effect indicates that Brazil’s response to the expansion of world demand was

Table 3. *Constant Market Share Analysis, 1821-1913* (Millions of 1911 pounds sterling)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1821–50</th>
<th>1850–70</th>
<th>1870–90</th>
<th>1890–1913</th>
<th>1821–1913</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>World</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil export increase</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>72.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World demand</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>94.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitiveness effect</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>-9.7</td>
<td>-15.5</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>-22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Partners</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil export increase</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>28.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World demand</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>40.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitiveness effect</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
<td>-4.8</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>-34.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cacao</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil export increase</td>
<td>114.8</td>
<td>80.3</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>564.0</td>
<td>812.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>World demand</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>83.8</td>
<td>68.0</td>
<td>256.5</td>
<td>142.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitiveness effect</td>
<td>92.8</td>
<td>-3.5</td>
<td>-14.6</td>
<td>307.6</td>
<td>669.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coffee</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil export increase</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>-31.2</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World demand</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>118.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitiveness effect</td>
<td>-10.6</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>-62.7</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>-108.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cotton</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil export increase</td>
<td>85.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>134.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World demand</td>
<td>66.9</td>
<td>143.5</td>
<td>179.8</td>
<td>94.2</td>
<td>854.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitiveness effect</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>-140.5</td>
<td>-173.0</td>
<td>-58.1</td>
<td>-719.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: see online appendix 3.
negatively affected by the loss of competitiveness. This does not change when
the world is reduced to its principal trading partners. The implication of
these results is that, at least on an aggregate-level, Brazil consistently lost
market share for its exports across the nineteenth century. As we have seen,
however, the nuances of Brazil’s long-run export performance were
commodity-specific and thus will only be detected by way of a disaggregated
analysis.

Indeed, such an analysis confirms our revision of Brazil’s export growth
performance. The initial dynamism was driven principally by the relative
gains of competitiveness of the coffee sector. From mid-century this
competitiveness disappeared only to return during the period \(27.310–11\)In
the case of Brazil’s other principal export commodities, we observed a
different tendency. Sugar expanded faster than world demand in the initial
period, due in part to increased competitiveness. After 891, however, Brazil’s
sugar export sector lost competitiveness and growing international demand
for the commodity buoyed the observed export growth. Cacao evinced a
similar tendency. While cotton gained a competitive advantage due to the
shock of the American Civil War and its effect on Southern Big Cotton, this
advantage was largely ephemeral, and in the long-run the sector lost com-
petitiveness over the century. In short, the rapid expansion of world demand
for Brazil’s products, coupled with an increase in competitiveness for coffee
and, initially, for sugar and cacao, determined the observed export growth
pattern.

**Brazilian Dynamism and Divergence in the Tropics**

As the various indicators outlined in the literature demonstrate, the circum-
stances afforded Brazil by the turmoil of other tropical agricultural producers
in the region stimulated a voracious appetite for slave labour which, when

\(^{27}\)While an analysis of the competitiveness of Brazil’s coffee exports post-
1897 is outside the
purview of this article, it is possible to briefly speculate on the determinants of such competi-
tiveness. Despite the abolition of slavery and the post-1906 government valorisation scheme
that used Brazil’s monopoly supplier position to alter world prices in favour of Brazilian pro-
ducers, competitiveness was most likely achieved by way of the devaluation of the exchange
rate, which itself was linked to the revenues derived from the renewed coffee export boom of
this period. On exchange rates for Brazil, see Luis A. V. Catão and Solomos N. Solomou,
‘Effective Exchange Rates and the Classical Gold Standard Adjustment’, *The American
Nineteenth-Century Brazil: An Econometric Model’, *Journal of Development Studies*, 19:
2 (1983), p. 175. On the coffee crisis and subsequent intervention see Delfim Netto, *O pro-
blema do café no Brasil*, Lincoln Hutchinson, ‘Coffee “Valorization” in Brazil’, *The
of Brazil’s market power, see Marcelo de Paiva Abreu and Felipe Tâmega Fernandes,
‘Market Power and Commodity Prices: Brazil, Chile and the United States, 1820s–1930’,
combined with the expansion of the agricultural frontier, drove the observed initial dynamism of export growth. Here we explore Brazil’s export performance from a comparative perspective and examine the empirical evidence supporting this view.

Such a comparison is offered in Table 4, showing the export growth rates for the Americas during the nineteenth century based on the World Trade series constructed by Giovanni Federico and Antonio Tena-Junguito. 37 These export growth figures confirm Brazil’s dynamic export performance during the post-independence years. Brazilian export growth from independence to mid-century more than doubled the South American average and was comparable to that of the United States. Despite the regional disparities in export growth derived from the success of coffee in the south-east and the relative failure of cotton and, to a lesser extent, sugar in the north-east, it is clear that the country’s overall rate of export growth was comparatively quite high. The table includes the British and French colonies of the West Indies and the Guianas, as well as the Spanish Caribbean (Santo Domingo, Puerto Rico and Cuba), Spanish Central America (Guatemala, Honduras, Costa Rica, Nicaragua y Panama) and, of course, Brazil. Amongst this group can be found most of Brazil’s principal coffee- and sugar-producing competitors. Another Asian competitor and Dutch colony, Java, would also occupy a leading role in the international coffee (and later, rubber) market, although it is not included here for geographical reasons. While the export growth of this region generally stagnated over the century, disaggregation by country reveals a different trend in those economies which maintained slave (or coerced) labour. During the first half of the nineteenth century these tropical agricultural producers would be torn between countervailing tendencies. On the one hand, Cuba (which became increasingly specialised in sugar production), Puerto Rico and Brazil showed high export growth rates, comparable only to North America on a continental level. On the other hand, the other tropical agricultural producing countries experienced a (in some cases violent) contraction of exports. The British tropical colonies experienced the most severe contraction, Jamaica being the extreme case. The export economies of the French tropical colonies, particularly French Guyana, also contracted. It is clear, therefore, that there was considerable divergence in the export performance of the tropical agricultural producers during the post-independence decades and that this divergence corresponded with the profound institutional changes taking place in the labour markets of the British West Indies.

Table 4. *Export Growth Rates, the Americas, 1821–1913*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern USA</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern USA</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tropical agr.</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>4.4</td>
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<td>3.2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
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<td>Cuba</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rico</td>
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<td>3.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>−3.4</td>
<td>−5.6</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>−2.4</td>
<td>−1.7</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leeward Islands</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>−0.2</td>
<td>−0.8</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>−0.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Guyana</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>−3.5</td>
<td>−4.1</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>−3.7</td>
<td>−1.2</td>
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<td>Martinique</td>
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<td>−0.2</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iberian tropical</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British tropical</td>
<td>−1.3</td>
<td>−2.3</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>−0.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French tropical</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>−0.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
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<td>South America</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL AMERICAS</td>
<td>3.5</td>
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<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources:* Federico and Tena-Junguito, ‘World Trade’. 
The effect of the slave emancipation shock is also discernible in the evolution of the relative export market shares of the tropical agricultural producers. Specifically, we examine the effect of this shock on Brazil’s market share of coffee and sugar.\(^74\) To ascertain the nature of the evolution of Brazil’s market share of world coffee exports, we take a sample of the principal coffee-exporting countries for which there are data available from around the time of Brazil’s independence, and calculate their relative shares of the world market.\(^75\) The results can be seen in Figure 4. It is clear that Brazil’s

\(^{74}\) According to Bulmer-Thomas, sugar accounted for over 50 per cent of the commodity exports of the Caribbean in 1820. This would rise to close to 70 per cent in 1880 and fall thereafter. Coffee was the second most important export of the region, maintaining its share throughout the century. See Bulmer-Thomas, The Economic History of the Caribbean, Figures 5.2 and 5.2.

\(^{75}\) This sample includes Cuba, Guadalupe, Haiti, Indonesia (Java), Jamaica, Martinique, and Suriname. Together with Brazil this sample represented 81.63 per cent of the quantum of world exports in the period 1831–55. Unfortunately, data for total world exports is only available from 1851–55 onwards, calculated by five-year averages. To provide estimates for the decades up until mid-century, we assume that our sample represents 80 per cent of world exports during the period 1823–50, and estimate world exports based on the sum of the sample countries. This is by no means an unrealistic assumption. At the beginning of the nineteenth century nearly all coffee exported to the world market was apparently produced by European colonies, including, most notably, the ex-colony of Haiti (previously Saint Domingue), the world’s leading coffee exporter at the turn of the nineteenth century, followed by other French colonies such as Martinique, Dominica, Guadalupe, the Dutch and British colonies in the Guianas and Jamaica. Once estimated, we use the world exports estimate to calculate five-year average country shares. On the world market for coffee, see Topik, ‘The World Coffee Market in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries’, p. 16.
market share of coffee gradually widened over the nineteenth century at the expense of all of its major competitors. Furthermore, it is evident that most of this market share was gained before 1850. The effect of the slave abolition shock of the 1830s on the British colonies impacted considerably on their market shares. British Jamaica moved from being the fourth largest exporter to holding a relatively minuscule share by the end of the 1830s. After the Napoleonic Wars many French Caribbean coffee-exporting colonies suffered an involution. Indeed, many of the French colonies all but disappeared from the market by the 1850s. The only competitor that did not experience a considerable reduction of its market share during the post-independence decades was Java. Like certain Spanish colonies of the Caribbean, Java was not subjected to the institutional shocks associated with independence or slave abolition. In fact, Java was not a slave plantation economy, although coffee cultivation was imposed upon the peasantry by a strict system of state control. Thus it also responded to the competitive advantage afforded by the slave abolition shock by expanding its market share of coffee during the post-independence decades. Javanese expansion was brought to a halt, however, by the spread of *Hemileia vastatrix*, a coffee-leaf blight that would devastate Javanese and other Asian and African producers late in the century, effectively permitting Brazil to consolidate its world market share.

In the case of sugar, we obtain data on the world production of both cane and beet sugar and examine the market share of a sample of tropical agricultural countries for the period 1820–1900. Figure 5 displays the results. It is clear that Cuba’s market share of sugar expanded substantially during the first half of the nineteenth century. This expansion came at the expense of the British colonies and, to a lesser extent, Brazil. Unlike Brazil’s hold over the international coffee market, however, the sugar market would remain sufficiently diversified to prevent Cuban supply from dictating the price trend of the market. Furthermore, the substitution of cane for beet sugar in Western Europe would serve to undermine the market power of tropical agri-

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78 This sample includes the British (Trinidad and Tobago, St Lucia, St Kitts, Nevis, Monserrat, Jamaica, Guyana, Grenada, Dominica, Barbados and Antigua), French (French Guyana, Guadeloupe, Martinique), Danish (Danish Virgin Islands), Dutch (Dutch Antilles, Suriname) and Spanish (Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, Cuba) colonies of the Caribbean, as well as a number of African and Asian producers (Mauritius, Réunion, Indonesia).
cultural producers. Still, as the export growth rates indicate, the export performance of both Brazil and Cuba diverged quite considerably from that of the other tropical agricultural producers.

Further empirical evidence of the effect of the slave abolition shock is provided in Figure 5. We compare the shares of the Southern United States (separated from the north for comparative purposes), Brazil, Cuba and the British West Indies in total world exports. The trend of the world export shares of Brazil and the Southern United States is positive until mid-century, when the abolition of the slave trade would affect Brazil’s export industries and the Southern United States would be torn asunder by the effect of the Civil War. Cuba did not respond so positively, due principally to increased European beet sugar production, although it managed to maintain its share across the period. The world export share of the British West Indies,

Sources: See online appendix 1.

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80 We proxy exports from the Southern United States with the sum of exports of tobacco and thus our estimate might undervalue their total share.

81 According to Eisenberg, beet production in France and Germany increased from 46,472 metric tons in 1841–45 to 2,647,888 metric tons around the turn of the century. His estimate of world beet sugar production in 1896–1900 was 5,009,931 metric tons compared to world cane sugar production of 2,445,469. Eisenberg, *Sugar Industry in Pernambuco*, pp. 237–40. Furthermore, Cuba’s export industries were buoyed by the incorporation of indentured Chinese labour from 1847 onwards. See Evelyn Hu-Dehart, ‘Chinese Coolie Labour in Cuba in the Nineteenth Century: Free Labour or Neo-slavery?’, *Slavery and Abolition*, 14:1 (1993), pp. 67–86.
however, declined steadily after abolition. The shock affected the British colonies in a number of ways. Those colonies with relatively small land to labour ratios were affected by the cost of the transition between labour regimes, but did not suffer the loss of much of the work force. Those countries with a greater and unexploited endowment of land suffered not only from an increase in the cost of labour, but also a reduction of supply as many former slaves moved to subsistence farming. A good example of the latter case is British Jamaica that, as we have seen, suffered a violent contraction of exports after abolition. Faced with an exodus of former slaves, the government was forced to source indentured labour from Asia.  

The effect of the shock is also discernible in the trends of the international prices of these commodities as shown in Figure 7. It is evident that the commodity prices of all of the tropical agricultural producers included responded to the shock of emancipation. The degree of this shock, however, differed across producers. Thus, while British colonial exports (in this case Jamaican

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Figure 6. World Export Market Share, 1820-70

Sources: Federico and Tena-Junguito, ‘World Trade’, online appendix D.

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coffee and Guyanese cotton) clearly responded to the slave abolition shock, Brazilian and Cuban exports were buffered by the resilience of slavery. In the case of coffee, Jamaican exports were subjected to a threefold increase from 24.9 in 1830 to 72.1 and 80.6 in 1833 and 1839 respectively, while Brazilian exports demonstrated a more moderate increase from 46.9 to 51.9 and 40.9 in the same years. Similarly, the price of Jamaican sugar exports increased twofold from 18.8 in 1830 to 40.2 in 1840, whereas Cuban sugar prices showed a comparatively modest increase of 34.5 in 1831 and 48.2 in 1836. British Guyanese cotton prices also show a similar reaction to emancipation. Despite the convergence of trends in coffee and sugar prices during this decade, over the long-run these prices displayed very different tendencies. Unlike coffee, sugar prices showed a decreasing secular trend at least from the 1840s onwards, the result of increased competition in the international market and the expansion of European sugar beet production. Coffee prices, on the other hand, after experiencing rather dramatic fluctuations following the Napoleonic Wars and the slave abolition shock, generally responded to Brazil’s supply schedule until the crisis and government intervention of the 1890s, due largely to the strength of Brazil’s market power.

Sources: See appendix 1.

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The objective of this article has been to re-evaluate both the statistical basis and narrative of Brazil’s export performance during the nineteenth century. As we have seen, the official Brazilian export series was in fact under-valued, thus misrepresenting both the relative share of exports in GDP and the true dynamism of Brazil’s export growth during the post-independence decades. Our conclusions lend empirical support not only to the literature on Brazilian economic dynamism during the post-independence period, but also to the comparative study of the export performance of the tropical agricultural producing periphery as a whole. A cross-country comparison shows that Brazil was one of the most dynamic countries in the region. Furthermore, there is clear evidence of divergence within the tropical agricultural producers of the Americas. The catalyst for this divergence was an institutional shock in the form of British West Indies slave emancipation that gave Brazil an initial competitive advantage vis-à-vis other producers of the region. Brazilian producers, both in the north-east and south-east, responded to the incentives provided by the shock by expanding both the agricultural frontier and imported slave labour. Output expanded rapidly and Brazil increased its market share.

Our findings also highlight the importance of a comparative perspective, even when examining individual case studies. Moreover, emphasis must be placed not only on the importance and relevance of a comparative perspective, but also upon the ways in which divergent economic experiences were interrelated. In the case of Brazil, the focus on the relatively smooth transition to an independent empire has overlooked the importance of the impact of exogenous institutional shocks on the country’s export performance. Only by adopting a regional comparative perspective do we comprehend that the story of Brazil’s exceptional post-independence export performance was a story of institutional shocks.

Together these conclusions indicate a direction for future research. To begin with, the divergence that took place in the tropics during the post-independence decades is deserving of more attention. Further study of the mechanisms underlying this divergence will surely help to understand not only the diversity of short-run economic outcomes but also the long-run development trends of these countries. In respect to Brazilian economic historiography, greater attention should be paid to the post-independence decades in order to further elucidate the drivers and subtleties of the country’s dynamic export performance. Finally, an examination of the long-run impact of this period on both export performance and regional income growth would provide a greater understanding of Brazil’s economic development during the nineteenth century.
Supplementary material

To view supplementary material for this article, please visit http://dx.doi.org/7101.01/S6122200X14300061.

Spanish and Portuguese abstracts

Spanish abstract. El objetivo de este artículo es reconsiderar tanto la exactitud de las estadísticas oficiales de exportación y la narrativa del crecimiento de exportaciones de Brasil durante el período inmediatamente posterior a la independencia. Aquí se realiza un examen sobre la exactitud de los valores oficiales de las estadísticas sobre la exportaciones brasileñas y encontramos evidencias de una subvaloración consider-able. Una vez corregidas, durante las décadas post independentistas (08121−1), las exportaciones de Brasil representan una parte mayor de su economía y demostramos que su constante crecimiento resultó ser más dinámico que en cualquier otro período de ese siglo. Sostenemos que dicho dinamismo se relacionó con un choque institucional externo en la forma de la emancipación de esclavos de las colonias británicas en el Caribe que dio a Brasil una ventaja competitiva.

Spanish keywords: Brasil, crecimiento de exportaciones, exactitud, trópico, siglo XIX, esclavitud

Portuguese abstract. O objetivo deste artigo é reavaliar tanto a precisão das estatísticas oficiais relacionadas às exportações quanto as narrativas sobre o crescimento das exportações brasileiras no período logo após a independência. Realizamos um teste de precisão dos valores das estatísticas oficiais de exportações brasileiras e encontramos evidências de uma considerável subvalorizarão. Uma vez feitas as correções, durante as décadas pós-independência (08121−1) as exportações brasileiras representaram uma parcela maior da economia do país e o crescimento constante das exportações demonstra ter sido mais dinâmico que em qualquer outro período do século XIX. Postulamos que este dinamismo estava relacionado ao choque institucional exógeno representado pela abolição da escravidão nas Índias Ocidentais británicas que garantiram uma vantagem competitiva ao Brasil.

Portuguese keywords: Brasil, crescimento das exportações, precisão, trópicos, século XIX, escravidão