Abstract

This paper studies the impact of financial constraints on the persistency of high markups in a class of markets, including public procurement, known by practitioners as bidding markets. We develop an infinite horizon model in which two firms optimally reinvest working capital and bid for a procurement contract each period. Working capital is constrained by the firm’s cash from previous period and some exogenous cash flow, it is costly and it increases the set of acceptable bids. We argue that the latter is a natural consequence of the presence of progress payments or the existence of moral hazard. We say that the firm is (severely) financially constrained if its working capital is such that only bids (substantially) above production cost are acceptable. We show that markups are positive (high) if and only if one firm is (severely) financially constrained. Our main result is that markups are persistently high because one firm is severely financially constrained most of the time.

JEL Classification Numbers: L13, D43, D44. Keywords: bidding markets, financial constraints, markups.

* We are grateful to Luis Cabral, Dan Kovenock, Gilat Levy and Matthew Shum for their comments. We thank Fundación Ramón Areces for its financial support. Ángel Hernando-Veciana also thanks the financial support by the Spanish Ministry of Science through project ECO2009-10531.
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1 Introduction

The persistency of high markups is a long standing concern in industrial organization and, in particular, in bidding markets. Little attention has been given to the role of financial constraints in spite of being very common in these markets. This is surprising because the usual mismatch between inflows and outflows of cash naturally translates into high markups when firms have limited access to financing. For instance, the common practice of periodic progress payments (with or without retainage) in procurement means that a firm with little working capital that wins a contract can cover its cash outflows only when its bid was sufficiently high. The following example illustrates this point:

Consider a two-month project that costs $300,000, with one third of its planned expenses corresponding to the first month. If progress payments are monthly and proportional to project completion, a firm that has secured working capital up to $150,000 can finance the project only if its bid is larger than $450,000. The first month expenses, $100,000, are paid out of the firm’s working capital and the second month expenses, $200,000, out of the remaining working capital, $50,000, and the first progress payment, which is equal to one third of the bid. Analogously, for a firm with working capital $200,000 the lower bound on bids is the cost $300,000.

This example suggests that whenever the financing opportunities of each firm depend on its bid and only bids that can be financed are submitted, prices are high if firms have little working capital. We underscore that the dependence of prices on financial constraints is a common feature of bidding markets that applies beyond public procurement:

“Offers submitted on Monday by Global Infrastructure Partners and a consortium led...”

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1Bidding markets are those in which trade is organized through bidding, see Klemperer (2005). The most commonly cited example is public procurement, see Bajari and Ye (2003), Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003), and OFT (2004). See also OECD (2006) for other examples including auctions.

2The most frequent explanations for high markups in this market invokes either collusion or capacity constraints, see for instance Che (2008) or Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003), respectively.

3Practitioners mention this, e.g. Mendes (2003): “subcontractors have worked hard at educating all of the players in the construction industry about problems such as [...] bid inflation to account for retainage.”

4A real life example with the same qualitative features can be found in CALTRAN’s contract 03-4E6504, available at http://www.dot.ca.gov/hq/asc/oap/payments/public/034e6504.htm.

5This occurs not only with progress payments but also when the firm has access to a credit line whose size depends on the profitability of the project.
by Manchester Airport Group have been depressed [...] by the problems of raising the necessary bank finance.”

“Ferrovial receives depressed bids for Gatwick,” Financial Times, April 28th, 2009

Our main result is that the impact of financial constraints does not fade away and explains the persistency of markups in bidding markets even if the cost of accumulating working capital is small. Our model predicts that market concentration should be greater for larger projects than for smaller projects, a prediction in line with the empirical evidence.⁶

A representative example of the institutional details of the bidding markets we are interested in is highway maintenance procurement. As Hong and Shum (2002) pointed out “many of the contractors in these auctions bid on many contracts overtime, and likely derive a large part of their revenues from doing contract work for the state.” Besides, Porter and Zona (1993) explain that “The set of firms submitting bids on large projects was small and fairly stable[...] There may have been significant barriers to entry, and there was little entry in a growing market.”⁷ Motivated by these observations, we study an infinite horizon model in which a procurement contract is allocated through a first price auction every period and two firms reinvest and bid optimally. At the beginning of each period, the cash available to be reinvested as working capital is observable and equal to the last period unspent working capital plus the earnings in previous procurement contract and some exogenous cash flow. Holding working capital is costly. The auction is held after firms have chosen their working capital.

We are interested in setups in which bids are acceptable if they are backed by a surety bond.⁸ In our model, sureties back a bid only when they anticipate that the firm will

⁶Porter and Zona (1993) explain that “the market for large jobs [in procurement of highway maintenance] was highly concentrated. Only 22 firms submitted bids on jobs over $1 million. On the 25 largest jobs, 45 percent of the 76 bids were submitted by the four largest firms.”

⁷Moreover, it can be shown that in a model with many firms and entry the natural extension of the equilibrium we study has the feature that only the two firms with more cash enter the market.

⁸In the U.S., the Miller Act regulates the provision of surety bonds for federal construction projects. State legislatures have enacted “Little Miller Acts” that establish similar requirements for state contracts. A surety bond plays two roles: first, it certifies that the proposed bid is not jeopardized by the technological and financial conditions of the firm, and second, it insures against the losses in case of non-compliance. Indeed, the Surety Information Office highlights that “the surety [...] may require a financial statement
comply with the contract. We assume that the latter occurs only if the bid is above a
certain threshold that decreases with the firm’s working capital. As our previous exam-
ple illustrates, this is a natural consequence of progress payments and limited access to
financing. We show in Appendix B that this is also the theoretical prediction of a model
inspired by the observation of Tirole (2006), page 114, that “The borrower must [...] keep
a sufficient stake in the outcome of the project in order to have an incentive not to waste
the money.”

By a Bertrand argument, the firm with more working capital wins the contract at a
price equal to the minimum acceptable bid for the firm with less working capital. Thus,
the markup is high if and only if one firm holds little working capital.

The strategic considerations that shape equilibrium reinvestments are easier to under-
stand in a one-period version in which firms start with different amounts of cash. We name
leader the firm with more cash and laggard the other firm. Reinvesting resembles an all
pay auction in that only the firm that reinvests more wins but both firms bear the cost
of working capital. In this sense our model is similar to Galenianos and Kircher (2008)
though it differs in that their working capital is not bounded by cash. As in the analysis
of the all pay auction with complete information, the equilibrium verifies here the follow-
ing two properties: (i) each firm plays a mixed strategy in a connected support; and
(ii) in the interior of this support firms use a density that equalizes the marginal cost and
marginal benefit of reinvesting. However, the randomization depends on the distribution
of cash in our model.

In general, the threshold depends not only on the working capital but also on other aspects as the
distribution of costs along time and the periodicity of the progress payments that we ignore for simplicity.
In particular, it resembles Che and Gale’s (1998a) model of an all pay auction with caps in that
reinvestments are bounded by cash. Our model is more general in that they assume exogenous caps that
are common to all agents. Another difference is that the size of the prize varies with the rival’s action.
To the best of our knowledge, the literature on all pay auctions, see Kaplan, Luski, Sela, and Wettstein
(2002) and Siegel (2009), has only considered the case of prizes that vary with the agent’s action.
Consequently, the laggard-leader scenario that we describe below does not arise in their model.
We expect our equilibrium to be the limit of the equilibrium of a game in which firms have private
information about their costs, as Amann and Leininger (1996) have already shown for the standard all pay
auction.

[that] [...] helps the surety company evaluate the working capital and overall financial condition of the

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auction.
In what we call a symmetric scenario, a firm that reinvests the laggard’s cash makes losses for any pair of strategies that verify (i) and (ii). This means that firms cash is sufficiently abundant to render it irrelevant for the equilibrium. Thus, firms randomize with equal probability of winning as in the equilibrium of the standard symmetric all pay auction, and its usual zero profit condition implies here that the expected markup just covers the expected cost of working capital. Consequently, the markup tends to zero as the cost of working capital becomes negligible.

Instead, in what we call the laggard-leader scenario, the leader finds it profitable to reinvests the laggard’s cash when the strategies verify (i) and (ii). Actually, this is what the leader does in equilibrium with a probability that tends to one as the cost of working capital becomes negligible. Thus, the laggard’s chances of winning tend to zero,13 which explains why the laggard’s probability of reinvesting also tends to zero and the markup becomes maximum.

In our infinite horizon model, these considerations also apply to the unique equilibrium that is the limit of the sequence of equilibria of models with an increasing number of periods.14 At any period, reinvesting also resembles an all pay auction because reinvesting more than the rival gives not only the procurement profits, as above, but also the benefits of being leader next period, and it is still costly because working capital has no value for future competition. The latter is because when the firm wins, it becomes leader and the leader’s cash does not affect future competition, and when the firm loses, it remains laggard and the laggard’s continuation payoffs are pinned down by the zero profit condition that holds in both scenarios. Interestingly, it is the prospect of strong future competition that dumps current incentives to reinvest and, as a consequence, current competition.

On the equilibrium path, the frequency of each scenario depends on the severity of the financial constraint. We say that the financial constraint is tight (resp. loose) when

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13 Assuming a tie breaking rule that allocates to the leader in case of a tie in which the laggard is reinvesting all its cash. This guarantees that the leader’s has a best response when the laggard reinvests all its cash, a condition necessary to ensure existence of an equilibrium. Intuitively, it gives the same outcome as the limit when the leader reinvest marginally more than the laggard’s cash. Alternatively, we could derive our results assuming the usual uniform random tie-breaking rule and that bids are chosen from a discrete grid with a sufficiently large number of elements.

14 The uniqueness result is proved in the supplementary material.
exogenous cash flow is small (resp. large) relative to the working capital that renders financial constraints irrelevant for bidding.

Our main result that financial constraints explain persistent high markups holds because the laggard-leader scenario occurs most of the time, even as the cost of working capital becomes negligible, when the financial constraint is sufficiently tight. Another consequence is that the same firm tends to win consecutive procurement contracts. On the contrary, firms win each contract with the same probability when the financial constraints are so loose that the symmetric scenario occurs every period. This explains our prediction of greater market concentration for larger projects to the extend that one can associate the tightness of the financial constraint to the project’s size.

Che and Gale (1998b) and Zheng (2001) already showed that markups can reflect financial constraints. Our results show that this is the typical situation once we allow firms to relax their financial constraints endogenously. Note, however, that whereas they assume that firms do not differ ex ante in the severity of their financial constraints, our results show that this is seldom the case. Bids decrease with working capital in their models due to the cost of financing the bid. Zheng (2001) and Calveras, Ganuza, and Hauk (2004) also show that limited liability and default imply that bids can also be increasing in working capital if the cost of financing is sufficiently low.

Calveras, Ganuza, and Hauk (2004) started the analysis of surety bonds in procurement. They show that a surety bond with a sufficiently large penal sum can make bids independent of assets. However, one can show that bids would decrease in the firm’s working capital if the surety’s cost of completing the project were higher than the firm’s.19

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15To the extend that joint profits are larger in the laggard-leader scenario than in the symmetric scenario, our result is related to the literature on increasing dominance due to efficiency effects (see Budd, Harris, and Vickers (1993), Cabral and Riordan (1994) and Athey and Schmutzler (2001).) The novelty of our model is that the underlying static game displays neither strategic complementarity nor strategic substitutability.

16As we show in Appendix B.


18We are reinterpreting both models in the context of procurement.

19At least, when the contract between the surety and the firm includes the price of the bid.
Our characterization of the dynamics resembles that of Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) in that we study a Markov process in which two persistent scenarios occur infinitely often and we ask which of the two occurs most of the time as the randomness vanishes. We want to underscore that while the transition function of their stochastic process is exogenous, ours stems from the equilibrium strategies of the infinite horizon game. As in Cabral (2011), a typical time series of market shares displays not only a lot of concentration but also, and more importantly, tipping, i.e. the system is very persistent but moves across extremely asymmetric states.

Other explanations for the persistency of markups are capacity constraints and collusion. Our model is empirically distinguishable from these models in that it predicts negative correlation between the laggard’s cash and the bids (or the price). An alternative to distinguish our model from the model of capacity constraints when the laggard’s cash is not observable by the econometrician is to use as a proxy either the progress payments of the firms uncompleted contracts\textsuperscript{20} or past bids.\textsuperscript{21} These proxies do not explain the current bids in the models of capacity constraints once one controls by backlog and costs, see Bajari and Ye (2003) and Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003).

Another way in which our model is empirically distinguishable from the models of collusion is that the time average of the price may decrease with patience\textsuperscript{22} and winning today increases the probability of winning tomorrow. Collusive models predict that patience increases the time average of the price, see Green and Porter (1984) and Athey and Bagwell (2001), and that winning today has either no effect on winning tomorrow, see Athey, Bagwell, and Sanchirico (2004), or decreases its probability, see McAfee and McMillan (1992), Athey and Bagwell (2001) and Aoyagi (2003).

Section 2 defines our canonical model of procurement with financial constraints. Section 3 illustrates the strategic forces that shape our results in a static version of our main model. The latter is analyzed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. We also include an appendix with the more technical proofs (Appendix A) and an extension of our model to endogenize financial constraints (Appendix B).

\textsuperscript{20}Caltran makes this information available in http://www.dot.ca.gov/hq/asc/oap/payments/public/ctnums.htm
\textsuperscript{21}The latter holds true because the laggard’s past and current cash are positively correlated.
\textsuperscript{22}This is what happens when the financial constraint is sufficiently loose.
2 A Reduced Form Model of Procurement with Financial Constraints

In this section, we describe a model of procurement that we later embed as a stage of the models in Sections 3 and 4.

We model the market as two firms\textsuperscript{23} competing for a procurement contract of common and known cost $c$ in a first price auction:\textsuperscript{24} Each firm submits a bid, and the firm who submits the lower bid gets the contract at a price equal to its bid. Thus, a firm that bids $p$ has potential profits $p - c$,\textsuperscript{25} and if it wins the markup is $p - c$.

Bids are acceptable when they are backed by a surety bond. We assume that sureties back a bid only when they anticipate that the firm will comply with the contract.\textsuperscript{26} Motivated by our discussion in the Introduction, this occurs only if the bid is above a certain threshold $\pi(w) + c$ that decreases with the firm’s working capital $w$. Thus, only bids with potential profits larger then $\pi(w)$ are acceptable. For simplicity, we assume that $\pi$ is also continuously differentiable.

**Remark 1.** Our analysis in Sections 3 and 4 applies whenever the set of acceptable bids is defined as here regardless of the institutional details that give rise to $\pi$.\textsuperscript{27}

We say that the firm is financially constrained if its working capital is such that only bids strictly above production cost are acceptable. We denote by $\theta$ the working capital that renders financial constraints irrelevant for bidding. Formally, $\theta$ is the supremum of

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\textsuperscript{23}As in all pay auctions, see Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (1996), assuming more than two firms rises the problem of multiplicity of equilibria. It may be shown that there is always an equilibrium in which two firms play the strategies we propose below for our two-firm model and the other firms do not reinvest.

\textsuperscript{24}The particular auction framework turns out to be of little relevance because we assume symmetric information between the two firms. We conjecture similar results in a second price auction.

\textsuperscript{25}A sale auction of a good with common and known value $V$ can be easily encompassed in our analysis assuming that $c = -V < 0$ and bids are negative numbers.

\textsuperscript{26}Alternatively, we could have assumed that it was costly for the firm to submit a bid and not complying. This might be because either no surety bond is required and the firm bears a direct cost in case of default or a surety bond is required and it is the surety who bears the cost of default and charges a positive price for the bond to compensate for this (expected) cost.

\textsuperscript{27}For instance, the model of auctions with budget constraints analyzed by Che and Gale (1998b) in Section 3.2 does not assume a surety bond. However, it can be analyzed in our framework with $\pi(w) = V - w$ and the interpretation of our model as a sale auction, see Footnote 25.
the set of working capitals for which the firm is financially constrained and we assume that $\theta \in (0, \infty)$.

### 3 A Static Model

We consider in this section a one-period version of the model we analyze in Section 4 to illustrate the strategic trade-offs that shape our results.

Our game has two stages. In the first stage, *the morning*, each firm starts with some cash (publicly observable) that can be either reinvested in the firm as working capital or distributed to the shareholders. In the second stage, *the afternoon*, firms choose an acceptable bid for a market as described in Section 2. We assume that the firms’ working capitals are publicly observable at the beginning of the afternoon to avoid the complexities of asymmetric first price auctions.

The firm cares about the sum of the morning payments to the shareholders and the working capital plus market profits discounted at rate $\beta < 1$. The working capital reinvested in the firm has a rate of return $r \in [1, 1/\beta)$ between the morning and the afternoon.\(^{28}\) Hence, a firm has working capital $w$ in the afternoon if it reinvested in the morning $w/r$ out of its cash and one unit of working capital has an implicit cost of $1 - \beta r > 0$. Throughout this paper, we say that the *cost of working capital becomes negligible* when we let $r$ tend to $r^* \equiv 1/\beta$ from below.

We restrict to the case in which both firms start with different cash\(^{29}\) and call *leader* to the firm that starts with more cash and *laggard* to the other firm.

In this model, it is important we model explicitly the tie-breaking rule in the auction.\(^{30}\) In case of a tie, the firm with more working capital wins, and if both firms have the same amount of working capital, a uniformly random tie-breaking rule is used except when the

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\(^{28}\)Later, we are interested in the limit in which $1 - \beta r$ tends to zero and while all our results hold true when we set $r = 1$ and make $\beta$ tend to one, our arguments are more obscure because firms continuation values diverge to infinity in the model of Section 4.

\(^{29}\)We endogenize the firms’ cash in the model of next section and show that our interest in the case in which both firms start with different cash is motivated in that it holds almost surely along the equilibrium path because of the mixed strategies firms use every period.

\(^{30}\)As it is usually the case in Bertrand games and all pay auctions, we deviate from the more natural uniformly random tie-breaking rule to guarantee the existence of an equilibrium, see also Footnote 13.
laggard was reinvesting all its cash. In this latter case, the leader wins.

We solve the game by backward induction. There is a unique equilibrium in the second stage as can be deduced from the standard arguments in Bertrand competition. In this equilibrium both firms bid \( c \) if acceptable for both, and otherwise, the minimum acceptable bid for the firm with less working capital. Leaving aside the case where firms reinvest at least \( \theta/r \), which is suboptimal, the firm that wins has profits equal to the minimum profitability requirement of the other firm which are strictly positive by definition of \( \theta \). The firm with more working capital wins except for the case of a tie where the rule described above applies.

The continuation play described above implies that reinvesting resembles an all pay auction in that only the firm that reinvests more wins the procurement contract but both firms bear the cost of working capital. As it is usually the case in all pay auctions, there is no pure strategy equilibrium in the morning. This can be easily understood when both firms’ cash is weakly larger than \( \theta/r \). If both firms choose different reinvestments, the one reinvesting more has a strictly profitable deviation: decreasing marginally its reinvestment.\(^{31}\) If both firms reinvests the same \( x \), there is also a strictly profitable deviation: increasing marginally its reinvestment if \( x < \theta/r \), and otherwise, no reinvestment.\(^{32}\)

The usual indifference condition of a mixed strategy equilibrium is verified if firms randomize with a density \( \tilde{f}(x) \equiv \frac{1-\beta r}{\beta \pi(rx)} \) in a support\(^{33}\) \([0, \tilde{\nu}r] \) for some \( \tilde{\nu}r < \theta/r \).\(^{34}\) This is because \( \tilde{f}(x) \) equalizes the marginal cost \( 1 - \beta r \) of reinvesting \( x \) with its marginal expected benefit \( \tilde{f}(x)\beta \pi(rx) \). The latter arises as a marginal increase in reinvestment around \( x \) let the firm move from losing to winning the procurement contract when the rival reinvests close to \( x \). This event occurs with a limit probability approximated by the

\(^{31}\)It saves on the cost of working capital without affecting to the procurement outcome.

\(^{32}\)In the former case, the deviation is profitable because \( x < \theta/r \) implies that winning the procurement contract gives strictly positive profits and the deviation breaks the tie in favor of the deviating firm with an arbitrarily small increase in the cost of working capital. In the latter case, \( x \geq \theta/r \) implies that there is no profit in the procurement contract and the deviation saves the cost of working capital.

\(^{33}\)We use the definition of support of a probability measure in Stokey and Lucas (1999). This is the smallest closed set with probability one.

\(^{34}\)That \( \tilde{\nu}r \) is well defined can be deduced from the fact that continuous differentiability of \( \pi \) implies that the differential of \( \pi \) is uniformly bounded below in \([0, \theta] \) by a constant \(-\kappa\) and hence, \( \pi(x) \leq \kappa(\theta - x) \), and \( \lim_{x \uparrow \theta/r} \int_0^x \frac{1-\beta r}{\beta \pi(rx)} \, dx = +\infty \).
density of the rival’s randomization at $x$, i.e. $\tilde{f}^r(x)$, and the firm discounted profits in the procurement contract when this event occurs are equal to $\beta \pi(\rho x)$.

We refer to the case in which the laggard’s cash is weakly greater than $\tilde{\nu}^r$ as the symmetric scenario.

**Proposition 1.** There is a unique equilibrium in the symmetric scenario. In this equilibrium both firms randomize with density $\tilde{f}^r(x) = \frac{1 - \beta r}{\beta \pi(\rho x)}$ in the support $[0, \tilde{\nu}^r]$.

In this equilibrium, each firm’s expected profits in the second stage are equal to its costs of working capital. This can be easily deduced from the fact that the support of the firms’ randomization includes zero and in this case the firm loses and has zero cost of working capital.

**Corollary 1.** In the symmetric scenario: (i) both the laggard and the leader have the same probability of winning the procurement contract, (ii) a marginal change in the initial distribution of cash has no effect on the equilibrium play; and (iii) as the cost of working capital becomes negligible, each firm’s reinvestment converges to $\theta/r^*$ and the markup converges to zero.

The first two results are straightforward. The third result arises because the density of the equilibrium randomization of reinvestments collapses to zero and the probability mass concentrates around $\theta/r^*$. Intuitively, as the cost of working capital becomes negligible financial constraints become irrelevant.

The above equilibrium strategy is not feasible for the laggard if its cash is strictly less than $\tilde{\nu}^r$. We refer to this case as the laggard-leader scenario.

**Proposition 2.** There is a unique equilibrium in the laggard-leader scenario. In this equilibrium both firms use a truncation of the strategy in Proposition 1 at the laggard’s cash. The laggard puts the remaining probability in an atom of probability at zero, and the leader at the laggard’s cash.$^{36}$

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$^{35}$In what follows, convergence is always in distribution unless stated otherwise.

$^{36}$Interestingly, this equilibrium has the same features as the equilibrium of an all pay auction in which both agents have the same cap but the tie-breaking rule allocates to one of the agents only. The latter model has been studied in an independent and simultaneous work by Szec (2010).
Both firms put their atom of probability at points that do not upset the incentives of the rival to play its equilibrium randomization. There is only one such point for the laggard, whereas the leader’s randomization takes the minimum working capital which ensures that it wins the procurement contract.

The leader makes discounted expected profits in the second stage strictly greater than its cost of working capital. This is because the laggard puts an atom of probability at zero, and hence the leader expects to win the procurement contract at a profit by reinvesting arbitrarily little.

**Corollary 2.** In the laggard-leader scenario: (i) the leader wins the procurement contract with strictly greater probability than the laggard; (ii) a marginal increase in the laggard’s cash changes the equilibrium play, and in particular, decreases the expected markup; and (iii) as the cost of working capital becomes negligible, the laggard’s and leader’s equilibrium reinvestment converge to zero and to the laggard’s cash, respectively, the probability that the leader wins the procurement contract converges to one, and the markup converges to \( \pi(0) \).

The first two results are a straightforward consequence of the atoms in the equilibrium distributions. The limit results arise because the density of the equilibrium randomization of reinvestments collapses to zero and the probability moves to the mass points. Intuitively, there is an increasing preemption effect since the laggard’s chances of winning vanish as the leader’s equilibrium randomization increases its mass at the laggard’s cash.

4 **The Dynamic Model**

In the analysis of the previous section, the qualitative features of the equilibrium hinge on whether the symmetric or the laggard-leader scenario occurs which depends on the initial distribution of cash. In this section, we endogenize this distribution by assuming that it is derived from the past market outcomes and we show that the laggard-leader scenario occurs most of the time.
4.1 The Game

We consider the infinite repetition of the time structure of the game in last section in which the cash in the first period is exogenous and afterwards, it is equal to its working capital in the previous period plus the profits in the procurement contract and some exogenous cash flow $m > 0$. We assume that $m$ is constant across time and firms, and interpret it as derived from other activities of the firm. The firm pays to the shareholders only in the morning and maximizes the discounted value of these expected payments. The corresponding time-line is represented in Figure 1.

A Markov strategy consists of a reinvestment function, $\sigma$, and a bid function, $b$. The reinvestment function of a firm with cash $m$ that faces a rival with cash $m'$ is a randomization over the feasible reinvestments described by its cumulative distribution function $\sigma (\cdot | m, m') \in \Delta(m)$, where $\Delta(m)$ denotes the set of cumulative distribution functions with support in $[0, m]$. The bid function of a firm with working capital $w$ that faces a rival with working capital $w'$ is an acceptable bid $b(w, w') \geq c + \pi(w)$.

We refer to the beginning of the period lifetime payoff of a firm that has cash $m$ when

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37 All our results also hold true in the case $m = 0$, though its analysis differs slightly.
its rival has $m'$ as the firm’s value function and denote it by $W(m, m')$.

Our interest is in a model with a tie-breaking rule as described in the previous section. Here, however we shall make alternative assumptions. These assumptions do not affect the equilibrium strategies but let us avoid several technical complications that could distract from our main argument. These are the following: first, firms cannot reinvest all their cash and hence their reinvestments strategies are chosen from a subset $\Delta(m)$ of distributions in $\Delta(m)$ with no atom of probability at $m$. Second, if both firms have the same working capital and submit the same bid $p$, they share the procurement profits, i.e. each gets $1/2(p - c)$. Third, in our equilibrium definition, see below, we do not put any constraint in information sets at the beginning of the morning in which both firms have the same amount of cash.

We denote by $\phi(w, w', p, p')$ the cash of a firm that, in the previous afternoon, had working capital $w$ and bid $p$ against a rival that had working capital $w'$ and bid $p'$. Formally:

$$\phi(w, w', p, p') \equiv w + m + \begin{cases} p - c & \text{if } p < p', \text{ or } p = p' \text{ and } w > w', \\ \frac{1}{2}(p - c) & \text{if } p = p' \text{ and } w = w' \\ 0 & \text{o.w.} \end{cases}$$

Definition: A (symmetric) Bidding and Investment (BI) equilibrium associated to $\pi$ is a value function $W$, a bidding function $b$ and a reinvestment function $\sigma$ such that for every $w, w', m, m' \in \mathbb{R}_+, m \neq m'$:

1. $\sigma(\cdot | m, m')$ is a maximizer of:

$$\max_{\tilde{\sigma} \in \Delta(m)} \int \left[ m - x + \beta \int W \left( \phi^b(x, x'), \phi^b(x', x) \right) \sigma(dx' | m', m) \right] \tilde{\sigma}(dx),$$

where $\phi^b(x, x') = \phi(rx, rx', b(rx, rx'), b(rx', rx))$.

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38This is the model that we study in the supplementary material when we discuss the uniqueness of the equilibrium.

39The first assumption makes the cash irrelevant for the tie-breaking rule. The second assumption eliminates the need of introducing a new random variable to solve ties. The third assumption eliminates the analysis of information sets that are irrelevant for our equilibrium.

40As we show in the supplementary material, our restriction to symmetric equilibria is without loss of generality if one is interested in the limit of equilibria of the version of our model with finitely many periods.
(b) \( b(w, w') \) is a maximizer of:
\[
\max_{\tilde{b} \geq c + \pi(w)} W \left( \phi(w, w', \tilde{b}, b(w', w)), \phi(w', w, b(w', w), \tilde{b}) \right).
\]

(c) The value of the problem in (a) is equal to \( W(m, m') \).

Conditions (a) and (b) are the usual one-shot deviation properties that must be verified in a Markov equilibrium. Condition (c) is the corresponding Bellman equation.

In what follows, we define a value function and a bidding and a reinvestment functions\(^{41}\) and show that they are a BI equilibrium.

### 4.2 The Equilibrium Strategies

Let the bid function be defined by \( b^*(w, w') \equiv c + \pi(\min\{w, w'\})^+ \).\(^{42}\) To define the reinvestment function, we use some auxiliary functions. Consider the following functional equation:
\[
\hat{\Psi}(x) = \beta(1 - \hat{F}(x, \hat{\Psi})) \left( \pi(0) + \hat{\Psi}(m) \right),
\]
for
\[
\hat{F}(x, \hat{\Psi}) \equiv \min \left\{ 1, \int_0^x \frac{1 - \beta r}{\beta((\pi(r \tilde{x}))^+ + \hat{\Psi}(r \tilde{x} + m))} d\tilde{x} \right\}.
\]

**Lemma 1.** Equation (1) has a continuous decreasing solution \( \hat{\Psi} : \mathbb{R}_+ \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+ \) that verifies that \( \hat{F}(\theta/r, \hat{\Psi}) = 1 \), and hence \( \hat{\Psi}(x) = 0 \) for any \( x \geq \theta/r \).

Let \( W^* \) be a value function strictly increasing in the first argument and weakly decreasing in the second one that verifies:
\[
W^*(m, m') = \begin{cases} 
  m + \frac{\beta m}{1 - \beta m} & \text{if } m < m' \\
  m + \frac{\beta m + \Psi(m')}{1 - \beta m} & \text{if } m > m'
\end{cases}
\]
(2)

Thus, \( \Psi(m') \) is the difference in continuation value between being leader or laggard when the other firm has cash \( m' \).

\(^{41}\)We show in the supplementary material that the version of our model with finitely many periods has a unique equilibrium and it is symmetric. The equilibrium studied here corresponds to the limit of that equilibrium.

\(^{42}\)We adopt the convention that \( a^+ = a \) if \( a \geq 0 \) and \( a^+ = 0 \) otherwise.
Let \( \nu^r \in [0, \theta/r] \) be the solution in \( \nu \) to \( \hat{F}(\nu, \Psi) = 1 \) and \( F^r \) a cumulative distribution function equal to \( \hat{F}(., \Psi) \) in \([0, \nu^r]\) with density \( f^r(x) \equiv \frac{1-\beta r}{\beta (\pi(rx)^+ + \Psi(rx+m))} \). We define the reinvestment function \( \sigma^*(|m, m'|) \) in a very similar way as in Section 3. It is equal to \( F^r \) if both \( m \) and \( m' \) are weakly greater than \( \nu^r \), and otherwise a truncation of \( F^r \) at the minimum of \( m \) and \( m' \) that puts the remaining probability at either zero or the minimum between \( m \) and \( m' \) depending on whether \( m < m' \) or \( m > m' \).

**Proposition 3.** \((W^*, \sigma^*, b^*)\) is a BI equilibrium.

To understand why \( \sigma^* \) verifies condition (a) of a BI equilibrium note that it has the same qualitative features as the equilibrium reinvestment randomization in Section 3. In particular, its density equalizes the marginal cost of working capital, \((1 - \beta r)\), with the marginal benefit of reinvesting \( f^r(x)\beta (\pi(rx)^+ + \Psi(rx+m)) \). The additional term \( \Psi(rx+m) \) appears here because reinvesting more than the rival also allows the firm to become leader next period which means a jump in the continuation value of \( \Psi(rx+m) \). The reason why \( b^* \) verifies condition (b) of a BI equilibrium is that as in Section 3, the firm finds it profitable to win at any price above the production cost \( c \) when the continuation payoffs are given by \( W^* \).

To understand why the value function \( W^* \) satisfies condition (c) of a BI equilibrium consider the laggard and the leader separately. For the laggard, recall that the support of its randomization includes not reinvesting today which gives current payoffs of \( m \) plus the discounted value of being again laggard tomorrow with cash \( m \), which is equal to \( \frac{\beta}{1-\beta}m \).

For the leader, note that the support of its randomization includes reinvesting arbitrarily little which gives limit current payoffs of \( m \) plus a continuation value that depends on whether the laggard reinvests or not. In the former case, which occurs with probability \( F^r(m') \), the leader does not win today’s procurement contract and gets the discounted

---

This is:

- If \( m < m' \):
  \[
  \sigma^*(x|m, m') \equiv \begin{cases} 
  F^r(x) + 1 - F^r(m) & \text{if } x \in [0, m) \\
  1 & \text{o.w.}
  \end{cases}
  \]

- If \( m > m' \):
  \[
  \sigma^*(x|m, m') \equiv \begin{cases} 
  F^r(x) & \text{if } x < m' \\
  1 & \text{o.w.}
  \end{cases}
  \]
value of being laggard next period with cash $m$, i.e. $\frac{\beta}{1-\beta}m$. In the latter case, which occurs with probability $1 - F^r(m')$, the leader wins today’s procurement contract and gets the discounted value of being leader next period with cash $m + \pi(0)$, which is equal to $\frac{\beta}{1-\beta}m + \beta(\pi(0) + \Psi(m))$. Thus, the continuation value is equal to:

$$\frac{\beta}{1-\beta}m + (1 - F^r(m'))\beta(\pi(0) + \Psi(m)) = \frac{\beta}{1-\beta}m + \Psi(m'),$$

as can be deduced from the definition of $\Psi$ in Equation (1) evaluated at $x = m'$ and $\hat{\Psi} = \Psi$.

We can also distinguish here between a symmetric and a laggard-leader scenarios, and an analogous version of Corollaries 1 and 2 holds true as well. This is direct for the results described in the first two items, whereas those in the third item can be deduced from the following lemma.

**Lemma 2.** As the cost of working capital becomes negligible:

$$F^r(x) \to \begin{cases} 
0 & \text{if } x < \theta/r^*, \\
1 & \text{if } x > \theta/r^*, 
\end{cases} \quad \text{and} \quad \nu^r \to \theta/r^*.$$

Another interesting feature is how markups evolve. Denote by $w_{\min}$ the minimum of the firms’ working capitals in a given period. Then, the equilibrium markup is equal to $\pi(w_{\min})^+$ and the laggard’s cash in the morning next period is equal to $w_{\min} + m$. We say that the markup is increasing in an interval if the expected difference between the markup tomorrow and today conditional on $w_{\min}$ is non-negative for any realization of $w_{\min}$ in that interval and strictly positive in its interior. We also say that the markup is decreasing in an interval when the symmetric inequalities hold. We also refer to the pre-laggard-leader scenario to $(0, \theta/r^* - m)$ and to the pre-symmetric scenario to $(\theta/r^* - m, \theta)$ and analyze the (point-wise) limit properties of the markup.

**Proposition 4.** Suppose $\pi(0) > \pi(w)$ for any $w > 0$. As the cost of working capital becomes negligible, the markup is increasing in the pre-laggard-leader scenario and it is decreasing in the pre-symmetric scenario.

\footnote{Note that $w_{\min}$ belongs to the pre-laggard-leader scenario if and only if $w_{\min} + m$ belongs to the limit of the laggard-leader scenario as the cost of working capital becomes negligible. A similar statement also holds true for the pre-symmetric scenario and the symmetric scenario.}
4.3 The Equilibrium Dynamics

To study the frequency of the symmetric and the laggard-leader scenarios, we study the equilibrium stochastic process of the laggard’s cash. Its state space is equal to \([m, r\nu + m]\) because the procurement profits are non negative and none of the firms reinvests more than \(\nu\). Moreover, the laggard’s cash is determined by the equilibrium reinvestments and bidding in the previous period. The latter depends on the laggard’s working capital in the previous period, which has a distributions that, as the equilibrium reinvestments, only depends on the laggard’s cash in the previous period. Thus, the laggard’s cash follows a Markov process. Its transition probabilities \(Q^r : [m, r\nu + m] \times B \to [0, 1]\), for \(B\) the Borel sets of \([m, r\nu + m]\), can be easily deduced from the equilibrium. In particular, they are defined by:\(^{45}\)

\[
Q^r (m, [m, x]) = 1 - \left[1 - F^r \left(\frac{x - m}{r}\right)\right] \cdot \left(F^r (m) - F^r \left(\frac{x - m}{r}\right)\right)^+. \tag{3}
\]

This expression is equal to one minus the probability that both the laggard and the leader reinvest strictly more than \(\frac{x - m}{r}\).

A distribution \(\mu^r : B \to [0, 1]\) is invariant if it verifies:

\[
\mu^r (\mathcal{M}) = \int Q^r (m, \mathcal{M}) \mu^r (dm) \quad \text{for all } \mathcal{M} \in B. \tag{4}
\]

Standard arguments\(^{46}\) can be used to show that there exists a unique invariant distribution and it is globally stable. A suitable law of large numbers can be applied to show that the fraction of the time that the Markov process spends on any set \(\mathcal{M} \in B\) converges (almost surely) to \(\mu^r (\mathcal{M})\).

The invariant distribution puts positive probability in any open set in \([m, r\nu + m]\) if the transition probability gives positive probability to arriving to any such set in a finite number of periods. It is straightforward that this property is verified if one starts in the symmetric scenario. In the other scenario, it is sufficient to note that there is positive probability that the laggard’s working capital increases at least \(m\) each period, and hence transits to the symmetric scenario in a finite number of periods.

To further characterize the invariant distribution, we distinguish two cases. We say that the financial constraint is loose when the ratio \(\frac{r^* m}{\theta}\) is weakly greater than one. Since

\(^{45}\)As a convention, we denote by \([m, m]\) the singleton \(\{m\}\).

\( \nu^r \leq \frac{\theta}{r^*} \) for any \( r \leq r^* \), this condition guarantees that the symmetric scenario occurs every period. We also say that the \textit{financial constraint is tight} when the ratio \( \frac{r^* m}{\theta} \) is strictly less than \( \frac{1}{1 + r^*} \). This condition is equivalent to \((1 + r^*)r^* m < \theta\) and hence it means a firm that begins a period with cash \( m \), faces a rate of return \( r^* \) and does not win the current procurement contract is still financially constrained next period.

Typically, the invariant distribution depends on a non trivial way on the transition probabilities. An exception is when the transition does not depend on the state which corresponds in our model to an exogenous cash flow sufficiently large to guarantee that only the symmetric scenario occurs, e.g. when the financial constraint is loose. In this case, the transition probability does not depend on the laggard’s current working capital and \( \mu^r([m, \tilde{m}]) = 1 - (1 - F^r(\frac{x-m}{r}))^2 \). The properties of the equilibrium prices can be inferred from Corollary 1 and their limit from Lemma 2.\(^{47}\)

More generally, the frequency of each scenario depends on the severity of the financial constraint. We say that the \textit{extreme laggard-leader scenario occurs most of the time} as the cost of working capital becomes negligible when \( \mu^r([m]) \to 1 \).

**Theorem 1.** \textit{If the financial constraint is tight, the extreme laggard-leader scenario occurs most of the time as the cost of working capital becomes negligible.}

This theorem characterizes the limit of the invariant distribution as the cost of working capital becomes negligible.\(^{48}\) To understand its intuition let \( A \equiv \{m\} \), \( B \equiv [m, \tilde{m}] \) and \( C \equiv (\tilde{m}, \theta + m] \) for some \( \tilde{m} \in (m(1 + r^*), \theta/r^*) \). That such \( \tilde{m} \) exists is a consequence of the financial constraint being tight. It follows from Lemma 2 that the probability of transiting to \( B \) vanishes and so does \( \mu^r(B) \). Hence, the limit of the invariant distribution puts probability in at most \( A \) and \( C \), and it is sufficient to argue that the ratio of \( \frac{\mu^r(A)}{\mu^r(C)} \) diverges.

\(^{47}\)In the more difficult case in which the transition probabilities depend on the state, the invariant distribution associated to the limit transition probabilities as the cost of working capital becomes negligible has an easy characterization. This is because the transition probabilities become degenerate and concentrate its probability in one point only, either \( m \) or \( \theta + m \), and thus any distribution with support in \( \{m, \theta + m\} \) is an invariant distribution. Since there are multiple invariant distributions, we cannot apply a continuity argument to characterize what happens when the cost of working capital is small.

\(^{48}\)In what follows, we let \( Q^r(m, M) = Q^r(m, M \cap [m, r\nu^r + m]) \) and \( \mu^r(M) = \mu^r(M \cap [m, r\nu^r + m]) \) for any Borel set \( M \) of the real line.
Recall that any invariant distribution equalizes the probability of being in a set times the probability of exiting from it with the probability of being one transition away from that set times the probability of entering to it. The definition of \( \tilde{m} \) imply that one cannot transit from \( A \) to \( C \) in one period when \( r \) is close to \( r^* \). Hence, \( \frac{\mu^r(A)}{\mu^r(C)} \) satisfies:

\[
\sum_{S=B,C} \left( \frac{\int_S Q'(m,A)\mu^r(dm|S)}{\int_B Q'(m,C)\mu^r(dm|B)} \frac{\mu^r(S)}{\mu^r(B)} \right) \cdot \left( \frac{\int_A (1-Q'R(m,A))\mu^r(dm|A)}{\int_C (1-Q'R(m,C))\mu^r(dm|C)} \frac{\mu^r(A)}{\mu^r(C)} \right) = \sum_{S=B,C} \left( \frac{\int_S Q'(m,A)\mu^r(dm|S)}{\int_B Q'(m,C)\mu^r(dm|B)} \frac{\mu^r(S)}{\mu^r(B)} \right). \tag{5}
\]

The gist of the proof is to show that the exit ratio is uniformly bounded above and the first entry ratio diverges to infinity. To understand the first result note that to exit from \( A \) we need that the laggard reinvests in \((0, m)\) and to exit from \( C \) that either of the two firms reinvests in \([0, \tilde{m} - m/r]\). The probability of the former event is less than the probability of the latter for \( r \) close to \( r^* \) because by definition of \( \tilde{m} \) the former set is contained in the latter. For the second result note the laggard-leader scenario occurs in \( B \) and hence the probability of transiting to \( A \), that is the laggard no reinvesting, goes to one.

This corollary follows from Theorem 1 and the properties of the laggard-leader scenario.

**Corollary 3.** If the financial constraint is tight, as the cost of working capital becomes negligible: (i) the probability that the leader wins the procurement contract converges to one; and (ii) the fraction of time the markup is \( \pi(0) \) converges to one (almost surely).

**Remark 2.** In this section we have focused on the case in which financial constraints are either tight or loose. It can be shown that as one moves \( r^* \frac{m}{r} \) from the former case to the latter, the frequency of the extreme laggard-leader and the symmetric scenarios vary from 1 to 0 and from 0 to 1, respectively, as the cost of working capital becomes negligible.

### 4.4 Numerical Solutions

Our analytical results apply to the extreme case where the cost of working capital, \( 1 - \beta r \), is close to zero. In order to explore what happens for values of \( 1 - \beta r \) farther from 0, we solve numerically for the invariant distribution for empirically grounded values of the parameters\(^{50} \) and \( \pi(w) = 1 - w \). The numerical results are useful, on the one hand, to

\[\text{We let } \mu'(dm|M) = \frac{\mu'(dm|M)}{\mu^r(M)} \text{ if } \mu'(M) \neq 0, \text{ and } \mu'(dm|M) = 1 \text{ if } \mu'(M) = 0 \text{ for } M \in \{A, B, C\}.\]

\[\text{Early work of Hong and Shum (2002) suggests that firms that do highway maintenance typically bid in 4 contracts per year: } \text{"a data set of bids submitted in procurement contract auctions conducted by the}\]

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49\ We let \( \mu'(dm|M) = \frac{\mu'(dm|M)}{\mu^r(M)} \) if \( \mu'(M) \neq 0 \), and \( \mu'(dm|M) = 1 \) if \( \mu'(M) = 0 \) for \( M \in \{A, B, C\} \).

50\ Early work of Hong and Shum (2002) suggests that firms that do highway maintenance typically bid in 4 contracts per year: “a data set of bids submitted in procurement contract auctions conducted by the..."
show that mark-ups are largely as described in Theorem 1 and Corollary 3 and, on the other hand, to shed some light on the invariant distribution of market shares, which was not easy to characterize analytically.

For the case where the financial constraint is tight (we set $r^* m \theta = 0.4$), our numerical solution shows that the extreme laggard-leader scenario occurs (i.e. $\mu(m)$ is) $99.52\%$ of the periods and the largest markup ($\pi(0) = 1$) arises in $99.87\%$ of the extreme laggard-leader scenarios. Therefore, the average markup is at least $0.9939$. In contrast, for the case where the financial constraint is loose (i.e. $r^* m \geq 1$), where we are always in the symmetric scenario, the average markup is $0.1021$.

The figure below plots the invariant distribution of annual market shares for our parametrization of tight and loose financial constraint. It shows that in the former case the same firm wins all the annual procurement contracts $98\%$ of the years. Therefore, a typical time series of market shares displays not only a lot of concentration but also, and more importantly, tipping as in Cabral (2011), i.e. the system is very persistent but moves across extremely asymmetric states. On the contrary, in the case of a loose financial constraint there is little concentration in that each firms wins at least $25\%$ of the annual procurement contracts in $85\%$ of the years.

![Figure 2: Invariant distribution of annual market shares (one year equals four periods).](image)

NJDOT in the years 1989-1997 [...] firms which are awarded at least one contract bid in an average of 29-43 auctions.” See also Porter and Zona (1993). Thus, we compute annual market shares for years of four periods. We also choose $\beta = 0.9457$ and $r = 1$ so that the annual discount rate is $0.80$, as in Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003), implying an annual expected cost of working capital of $0.20$.
5 Conclusions

We have studied a dynamic model of bidding markets with financial constraints. A key element of our analysis is that the stage at which firms choose how much working capital to reinvest resembles an all pay auction with caps.

The above features, and thus our results, seem pertinent for other models of investing under winner-take-all competition, like patent races. A more general approach should start by considering the robustness to our results to private information and to alternative models of winner-take-all competition with financial constraints. Existing results for all pay auctions and general contests\footnote{Amann and Leininger (1996) study the relationship between the equilibrium of the all pay auction with and without private information, see also our Footnote 12, and Alcalde and Dahm (2010) study the similarities between the equilibrium outcome in an all pay auction and in some other models of contests.} suggest this may be fruitful line of future research.

Finally, our analysis points out a tractable way to incorporate the dynamics of liquidity in Galenianos and Kircher’s (2008) analysis of monetary policy.

Appendix

A Proofs

Proof of Proposition 1

To see why the proposed strategy is an equilibrium note that the expected payoff of Firm $i$ with cash $m^i$ when it reinvests $x^i$ and the other firm randomizes its reinvestments according to a distribution with density $\tilde{f}^r$ is equal to:

$$m^i - (1 - \beta r)x^i + \int_0^{x^i} \beta \pi(rx) \tilde{f}^r(x) \, dx,$$

which by definition of $\tilde{f}^r$ is equal to $m^i$ for any $x^i \leq \tilde{\nu}^r$, and strictly less than $m^i$ otherwise, as required.

As we argue in the main text, we can restrict to strategies with support in $[0, \theta/r]$. We prove two properties that any equilibrium $(\sigma^1, \sigma^2)$ must verify. Later, we show that the proposed strategy is the only one that verifies them. These two properties also hold true
in the more general case in which we do not restrict to \( m^1, m^2 \geq \tilde{\nu}^r \).

**Claim 1:** If \( x \in (0, \theta/r] \) belongs to the support of \( \sigma^i \), then \( \sigma^j((x - \epsilon, x]) > 0 \) for any \( \epsilon > 0 \). In the particular case \( x = \theta/r \), it must also be verified that \( \sigma^j((x - \epsilon, x)) > 0 \) for any \( \epsilon > 0 \).

Suppose that \( x \in (0, \theta/r] \) belongs to the support of \( \sigma^i \) and \( \sigma^j((x - \epsilon, w]) = 0 \) for some \( \epsilon > 0 \). We argue that this contradicts the equilibrium. Firm \( i \) strictly prefers reinvesting \( x - \epsilon \) to reinvesting \( x \) because the former saves on the cost of working capital without affecting the probability of winning at a profit. Thus, we can argue by continuity that Firm \( i \) can strictly improve by moving the probability that \( \sigma^i \) puts in the set \((x - \epsilon', x + \epsilon')\) to \( x - \epsilon \) for \( \epsilon' \in (0, \epsilon) \) and small enough. That Firm \( i \)'s payoff are continuous at \( x \) is a consequence of the contradiction hypothesis that \( \sigma^j((x - \epsilon, x]) = 0 \) which rules out that Firm \( j \) puts an atom at \( x \). The proof of the result for the particular case \( x = \theta/r \) is similar. The only difference is that the contradiction hypothesis \( \sigma^j((x - \epsilon, x)) = 0 \) allows for an atom at \( \theta \). This, however, does not upset continuity because the procurement contract gives zero profits when the other firm picks working capital \( x = \theta/r \).

**Claim 2:** If for some \( x \in (0, \min\{\theta/r, m^j]\} \), \( \sigma^j((x - \epsilon, x]) > 0 \) for any \( \epsilon > 0 \), then \( \sigma^i(\{x\}) = 0 \) for \( i \neq j \).

By contradiction, suppose an \( x \in (0, \min\{\theta/r, m^j\}) \) for which \( \sigma^j((x - \epsilon, x]) > 0 \) for any \( \epsilon > 0 \) and \( \sigma^i(\{x\}) > 0 \). For \( \epsilon' > 0 \) small enough, Firm \( j \) can improve by moving the probability that its puts in \((x - \epsilon', x]\), to a point slightly above \( x \). This deviation increases Firm \( j \)'s cost of working capital marginally but allows the firm to win the procurement contract at a strictly positive profit if Firm \( i \) plays the atom at \( x \).

Claim 1 and 2 imply that (i) the only point where there can be a mass point in the strategies is at zero, (ii) at most one of the firms’ strategies can have an atom at zero, and (iii) the support of both \( \sigma^1 \) and \( \sigma^2 \) must be the same and equal to an interval \([0, \nu]\) for some \( \nu \geq 0 \). The usual indifference condition that must hold in a mixed strategy
equilibrium implies that both $\sigma^1$ and $\sigma^2$ have density $\tilde{f}^r$ a.e. in $(0, \nu]$, for some $\nu > 0$, and this together with (i) and (ii) imply that neither $\sigma^1$ nor $\sigma^2$ puts an atom at zero and hence $\nu = \tilde{\nu}^r$ as desired. ■

Proof of Proposition 2

We start showing that the proposed strategies are an equilibrium. Let $m_{\text{min}}$ be the laggard’s cash. The leader has no incentive to deviate when the laggard plays the proposed strategy because, first, the leader is indifferent between any reinvestment in $(0, m_{\text{min}}]$ by the same reasons as in the proof of Proposition 1, and, second, because neither zero reinvesting nor reinvesting strictly more than $m_{\text{min}}$ improves its payoffs. The former deviation is not profitable because it has almost the same cost of working capital as a marginally small reinvestment but it differs in that the leader lose the profits of the procurement contract with strictly positive probability when the laggard reinvests zero. The latter deviation is not profitable because it lets the leader win in the afternoon in the same cases as $m_{\text{min}}$ but has a greater cost of working capital. Similarly, the laggard has no incentive to deviate when the leader plays the proposed strategy because, first, the laggard is indifferent between any reinvestment in $[0, m_{\text{min}})$, and, second, the laggard cannot improve by moving probability mass to $m_{\text{min}}$ because the only difference with a working capital marginally lower occurs when the leader also carries working capital $m_{\text{min}}$ but in this case our tie breaking rule implies that the leader wins the procurement contract.

To prove that there is no other equilibrium, note that Claims 1 and 2 in the proof of Proposition 1 also hold true here. They imply here that (i) the laggard’s strategy can have a probability mass only at zero and the leader’s only at either zero or $m_{\text{min}}$, (ii) at most one of the firms’ strategies can have an atom at zero, and (iii) the support of both $\sigma^1$ and $\sigma^2$ must be the same and equal to an interval $[0, \nu]$ for some $\nu \in [0, m_{\text{min}}]$. Again, the usual indifference condition that must hold in a mixed strategy equilibrium implies that both $\sigma^1$ and $\sigma^2$ have density $\tilde{f}^r$ a.e. in $(0, \nu)$, and this together with (i)-(ii) and $m < \tilde{\nu}^r$ imply that $\nu = m_{\text{min}}$ and that the laggard puts the remaining probability at zero and the leader at $m_{\text{min}}$. ■
Proof of Proposition 3

We first show that \( \sigma = \sigma^* \) verifies (a) in the definition of a BI equilibrium for the value function \( W^* \) and the bid function \( b = b^* \). In case \( m < m' \), \( \sigma^* \) has support \([0, m]\). Thus, it is sufficient to show that any degenerate reinvestment function in \( \Delta(m) \), i.e. any reinvestment \( x \in [0, m) \), gives the same expected payoffs. The expected payoffs of reinvesting \( x \) are equal to:

\[
m - x + \beta rx + \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta} m + \beta \int_0^x (\pi(rx') + \Psi(rx' + m)) f^r(x') dx'.
\]

One can easily see after substituting \( f^r \) by its value that this expression is constant in \( x \) as desired. In case \( m > m' \), \( \sigma^* \) has support \([0, m']\) and puts no atom of probability at zero. Thus, it is sufficient to show that any reinvestment \( x \in (0, m'] \) gives the same expected payoffs, and that these payoffs are weakly larger than either no reinvestment or reinvesting strictly more than \( m' \). To prove so, note that a reinvestment \( x \in (0, m) \) gives expected payoffs:

\[
m - x + \beta rx + \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta} m + \beta \int_0^{\min\{x, m'\}} (\pi(rx') + \Psi(rx' + m)) f^r(x') dx' + \beta(1 - F^r(m'))(\pi(0) + \Psi(m)).
\]

(6)

One can easily see after substituting \( f^r \) by its value that this expression is constant in \( x \) up to \( m' \) and then decreasing as desired. Reinvesting \( x = 0 \) gives payoffs:

\[
m + \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta} m + \beta \frac{(1 - F^r(m'))}{2} (\pi(0) + \Psi(m)),
\]

which is strictly less than Equation (6) evaluated at \( x = 0 \) as desired.

We next check that \( b = b^*(w, w') \) verifies (b) of the definition of a BI equilibrium for the value function \( W = W^* \). If \( w, w' \geq 0 \) then \( b^*(w, w') = b^*(w', w) = c \) and \( \tilde{b} = c \) is optimal since any bid \( \tilde{b} \geq c \) gives the same payoffs \( W^*(w + m, w' + m) \), and any bid \( \tilde{b} < c \) gives continuation payoffs \( W^*(w + \tilde{b} - c + m, w' + m) < W^*(w + m, w' + m) \). If \( w < w', \theta \), then \( b^*(w, w') = b^*(w', w) = c + \pi(w), \) and \( \tilde{b} = c + \pi(w) \) is optimal since any bid \( \tilde{b} \geq c + \pi(w) \) gives payoffs \( W^*(w + m, w' + \pi(w) + m) \). If \( w' < w, \theta \), then \( b^*(w, w') = b^*(w', w) = c + \pi(w'), \) and \( \tilde{b} = c + \pi(w') \) is optimal since any bid \( \tilde{b} > c + \pi(w') \) gives payoffs \( W^*(w + m, w' + \pi(w') + m) < W^*(w + m, w' + \pi(w') + m, w' + m) \), and any bid \( \tilde{b} < c + \pi(w') \) gives payoffs \( W^*(w + \tilde{b} - c + m, w' + m) < W^*(w + \pi(w') + m, w' + m) \).

Finally, if \( w = w' < \theta \), then \( b^*(w, w') = b^*(w', w) = c + \pi(w) \) and \( \tilde{b} = c + \pi(w) \) is optimal.
since it gives payoffs $W^*(w + m + \pi(w)/2, w' + \pi(w)/2 + m)$ and any bid $\tilde{b} > c + \pi(w)$
gives payoffs $W^*(w + m, w' + \pi(w) + m) < W^*(w + m + \pi(w')/2, w' + \pi(w)/2 + m)$.

The computations described above for the proof of condition (a) also show that the
condition (c) in the definition of a BI equilibrium is verified. ■

**Proof of Lemma 1**

Let $\mathbb{C}$ be the set of bounded continuous and decreasing functions from $\mathbb{R}_+$ to $\mathbb{R}_+$ and
\{\Psi_n\} $\subset \mathbb{C}$ be a sequence defined recursively by $\Psi_0(x) = 0$, and,
\[
\Psi_{n+1}(x) = \beta \left( 1 - \hat{F}(x, \Psi_n) \right) (\pi(0) + \Psi_n(m)).
\] (7)

This sequence verifies that if $\Psi_n \geq \Psi_{n-1}$, then:
\[
\Psi_{n+1}(x) = \beta(1 - \hat{F}(x, \Psi_n)) (\pi(0) + \Psi_n(m)) \geq \\
\beta(1 - \hat{F}(x, \Psi_{n-1})) (\pi(0) + \Psi_{n-1}(m)) = \Psi_n(x).
\]

Moreover, $\Psi_1(x) \geq 0 = \Psi_0(x)$. Hence, we can argue by induction that our sequence is
increasing and, thus, has a pointwise limit. We can use an adaptation of the argument in
Footnote 34 to show that $\Psi_n(\theta/r) = 0$ implies that $\Psi_{n+1}(\theta/r) = 0$. Thus, we can also
argue by induction that the pointwise limit of the sequence is equal to zero at $x = \theta/r$.

Finally, one can deduce that the pointwise limit of the sequence verifies the limit equation
in Equation (7) applying the monotone convergence theorem (Theorem 16.2 in Billingsley
(1995)) to the sequence of integrals that corresponds to the sequence \{\hat{F}(x, \Psi_n)\}. ■

**Proof of Lemma 2**

For any $x < \theta/r^*$ that $F^r(x) \xrightarrow{r \to r^*} 0$ is a direct consequence of the fact that for $r$ sufficiently
close to $r^*$, $x < \theta/r$, and hence $F^r(x) \leq f^r(x) x \leq \frac{(1-\beta r)}{\beta x} x$ since $f^r$ is increasing and $\Psi$
is non-negative. For any $x > \theta/r^*$, that $F^r(x) \xrightarrow{r \to r^*} 1$ is a direct consequence of the fact that
for $r$ close to $r^*$, $x > \theta/r$ and hence $x > \nu^r$. This last fact also means that to prove that
$\nu^r \xrightarrow{r \to r^*} \theta/r^*$, it is sufficient to show that $\liminf_{r \to r^*} \nu^r \geq \theta/r^*$. We prove this last claim
by contradiction. Suppose there exists an $\epsilon > 0$ and a sequence \{\nu_n\} converging to $r^*$ such
that $\nu_n < \theta/r^* - \epsilon$ along the sequence. This means that $F^{\nu_n}(\theta/r^* - \epsilon) \geq F^{\nu_n}(\theta/r^*) = 1$
along the sequence, which contradicts the first limit of the lemma. ■
Proof of Proposition 4

In equilibrium, the markup is equal to \( \pi \) evaluated at \( r \) times the minimum reinvestment. The probability that the minimum reinvestment is weakly less than \( x \) when the laggard’s cash is equal to \( m \) is equal to one minus the probability of the complementary event (that both firms reinvest strictly more than \( x \)):

\[
1 - \left[ 1 - F^r(x) \right] \cdot \left( F^r(m) - F^r(x) \right)^+.
\]

Lemma 2 implies that this distribution converges weakly to a mass point at 0 if \( m < \theta/r^* \) and to a mass point at \( \theta/r^* \) if \( m > \theta/r^* \). This implies that the expected markup converges to \( \pi(0) \) if the realization of \( w_{\text{min}} \) belongs to the pre-laggard-leader scenario and converges to \( \pi(\theta) = 0 \) if the realization of \( w_{\text{min}} \) belongs to the pre-symmetric scenario which implies the proposition. ■

Proof of Theorem 1

We show that as the cost of working capital becomes negligible: (i) \( \mu^r(B) \) tends to 0 and (ii) \( \frac{\mu^r(A)}{\mu^r(C)} \) diverges to infinity, where the sets \( A, B \) and \( C \) are defined after Theorem 1.

(i) can be deduced from the definition of an invariant distribution in Equation (4) applied to \( \mathcal{M} = B \), Lemma 2, the definition of \( \tilde{m} \) and the fact that for any \( m \in [m, r\nu + m] \):

\[
Q^r(m, B) = Q^r(m, [m, \tilde{m}]) - Q^r(m, \{m\})
\]

\[
= 1 - \left[ 1 - F^r(\frac{\tilde{m}-m}{r}) \right] \cdot \left( F^r(m) - F^r(\frac{\tilde{m}-m}{r}) \right)^+ - (1 - F^r(m))
\]

\[
= F^r(m) - \left[ 1 - F^r(\frac{\tilde{m}-m}{r}) \right] \cdot \left( F^r(m) - F^r(\frac{\tilde{m}-m}{r}) \right)^+
\]

\[
\leq 1 - \left[ 1 - F^r(\frac{\tilde{m}-m}{r}) \right]^2,
\]

where we have used Equation (3) in the second equality, and that the expression in the third line is increasing in \( m \) in the inequality.

To prove (ii), we use the following general property of an invariant distribution \( \mu : \tilde{\mathcal{B}} \to [0,1] \) associated to a transition probability \( Q : M \times \tilde{\mathcal{B}} \to [0,1] \) defined on an arbitrary interval \( M \) and \( \tilde{\mathcal{B}} \) the Borel sets of \( M \):

\[
\int_{\mathcal{M}} (1 - Q(m, \mathcal{M})) \mu(dm) = \int_{\mathcal{M} \setminus \mathcal{M}} Q(m, \mathcal{M}) \mu(dm) \quad \forall \mathcal{M} \in \tilde{\mathcal{B}}.
\]

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As a consequence:

\[
\int_A (1 - Q^r(m, A)) \mu^r(dm) = \sum_{S=B,C} \int_S Q^r(m, A) \mu^r(dm),
\]

and hence:

\[
\int_A (1 - Q^r(m, A)) \mu^r(dm|A) \mu^r(A) = \sum_{S=B,C} \int_S Q^r(m, A) \mu^r(dm|S) \mu^r(S).
\]

By a similarly argument:

\[
\int_C (1 - Q^r(m, C)) \mu^r(dm|C) \mu^r(C) = \int_B Q^r(m, C) \mu^r(dm|B) \mu^r(B),
\]

since for \( r \) close to \( r^* \), \( Q^r(m, C) = 0 \) by definition of \( \tilde{m} \).

Lemma 2 and our argument in the main text that the invariant distribution puts positive probability in any open set in \([m, rv^r + m]\) implies that \( \mu^r(C) > 0 \) for \( r \) close to \( r^* \). Thus, the combination of the last two equations implies Equation (5) in the main text.

To complete the argument we show that the exit ratio in that equation is bounded above while the first entry ratio diverges to infinity.

Note that \( Q^r(m, A) = Q^r(m, \{m\}) \) whereas \( Q^r(m, C) = 1 - Q^r(m, [m, \tilde{m}]) \). Hence, an increase in \( m \) decreases the former expression and increases the latter, as can be deduced from Equation (3). This means that the first entry ratio is bounded below by:

\[
\frac{Q^r(\tilde{m}, \{m\})}{1 - Q^r(\tilde{m}, \{m\})},
\]

and the exit ratio is bounded above by:

\[
\frac{1 - Q^r(m, \{m\})}{Q^r(rv^r + m, [m, \tilde{m}])}.
\]

The former ratio diverges to infinity because \( Q^r(\tilde{m}, \{m\}) \) tends to one as can be deduced from Equation (3) and Lemma 2. Equation (3) also means that the latter ratio is equal to:

\[
\frac{F^r(m)}{F^r \left( \frac{\tilde{m} - m}{r} \right) \left( 2 - F^r \left( \frac{\tilde{m} - m}{r} \right) \right)},
\]

which is weakly less than one for \( r \) close to \( r^* \) by definition of \( \tilde{m} \). ■
B A Model of Financial Constraints

In this Appendix, we endogenize the function \( \pi \) in a model in which non compliance arises due to moral hazard. In this model, limited liability implies that the firm may find it profitable to choose a risky project that fails with certain probability but gives larger private profits when it succeeds. The main implication is that there is a decreasing function \( \pi(w) \) that gives the minimum potential profits for the bid of a firm with working capital \( w \) to be acceptable. In Section B.1, we revisit the model of Section 2 to endogenize the function \( \pi \), and in Section B.2, we embed this revised model in the model of Section 4.

B.1 A Structural Model of Procurement with Financial Constraints

We assume that the firm that wins the procurement contract may choose between a safe project or a risky project. The safe project has cost \( c \) and succeeds with probability one, whereas the risky project has a lower cost \( c(1 - \varepsilon) \), \( \varepsilon \in (0, 1) \), but only succeeds with probability \( \rho < 1 \) and fails otherwise. In case of failure the firm cannot comply with the procurement contract, and hence only the safe technology ensures compliance. For simplicity, we assume a competitive banking sector that provides all the necessary financing, \( c?w \) if the firms working capital \( w \) is less than \( c \). Since sureties back a bid only when they anticipate that the firm will comply with the contract, the bank loans are risk free. Thus, the net interest rate is zero because there is no discounting between the afternoon and the following morning.

B.2 A Dynamic Model with Endogenous Financial Constraints

We revisit the model of Section 4 and assume the model of procurement with financial constraints described in previous section for the afternoon stage of each period.

Sureties are competitive, and hence do not charge for underwriting a bid that induces the firm to choose the safe technology. Thus, the role of sureties is summarized by the set of bids that they are willing to underwrite. These are the acceptable bids for the firm. The surety decides to underwrite a bid upon observing the firm’s working capital \( w \). The surety, however, observes neither the other firm’s working capital nor the history of past
play.

We restrict to equilibria in which the set of bids underwritten by sureties is symmetric and monotone. Symmetric in the sense that the sureties’ equilibrium strategy does not distinguish the identity of the firm and monotone in the sense that the sureties underwrite any bid with potential profits above a certain minimum profitability requirement that we denote by \( \pi(w) \).

We assume that a firm not complying with a procurement contract is banned from any other future procurement and it is replaced the following morning by another firm with working capital equal to \( m \). Since a firm banned from the procurement can still consume the exogenous revenue (which has a discounted value \( \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta}m \)) Firm \( i \) finds it profitable to choose the safe project if and only if,

\[
\beta W(w + \Pi + m, w' + m) \geq \rho \beta W(w + \Pi + \varepsilon c + m, w' + m) + (1 - \rho) \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta}m.,
\]

for \( W \) the continuation value in the morning of next period, \((w, w')\) the distribution of firms’ working capitals and \( \Pi \) the potential profits of the safe project. For a fixed distribution of working capitals, we say that the potential profits induce the safe project when the inequality in Equation (9) holds. If the opposite (weak) inequality holds, we say that the potential profits induce the risky project.

The behavior of sureties requires that the bids that are underwritten along the equilibrium path induce the safe project. Besides, sequential rationality requires that the surety believes that if rejected bids had been accepted and won the procurement contract, the firm would take the risky project. Formally, given a continuation value \( W \), a bid function \( b \) and a distribution of working capitals, we say that the sureties believe that some potential profits would implement the risky project if they induce the risky project and the associated bid wins with positive probability when the rival bids according to \( b \).

**Definition:** We call a financial, bidding and investment (FBI) equilibrium, a decreasing minimum profitability requirement function \( \pi \) and a BI equilibrium \((b, \sigma, W)\) associated to \( \pi \) such that:

(i) For any distribution of working capitals in which Firm \( i \) wins the procurement contract with positive probability in the BI equilibrium \((b, \sigma, W)\), Firm’s \( i \) potential profits in the procurement contract induce the safe project.
(ii) For any working capital of the firm, the sureties believe that potential profits strictly below the minimum profitability requirement would implement the risky project for some working capital of the other firm.

We are interested in an FBI equilibrium that generalizes the BI equilibrium in Proposition 3. Note, first, that the functions \((b^*, \sigma^*, W^*)\) in the BI equilibrium are defined for some given \(\pi\) function. To make this dependence transparent, we shall slightly abuse of the notation and denote them by \(b^*_\pi, \sigma^*_\pi\) and \(W^*_\pi\) for a given decreasing function \(\pi : \mathbb{R}_+ \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+\). We define \(F^*_\pi, \nu^*_\pi\) and \(\Psi_{\pi}\) in a similar way.

In what follows, we characterize sufficient conditions for \((W^*_\pi, \sigma^*_\pi, b^*_\pi, \pi)\) to be an FBI equilibrium. We start with condition (i) of an FBI equilibrium. If both firms use \(b^*_\pi\), the winner of the procurement contract has more working capital than the loser. Besides, the inequality in Equation (9) for \(W = W^*_\pi\), see Equation (2), and \(w \geq w'\) is equivalent to:

\[
\Pi \geq \hat{\theta} - w - \Psi_{\pi}(w'),
\]

where \(\hat{\theta} \equiv \frac{\rho}{1-\rho} \varepsilon c\). Since \(\Psi_{\pi}\) is decreasing and in a BI equilibrium the potential profits of the procurement contract are at least \(\pi(w)\), the most stringent case for (i) is when \(\Pi = \pi(w)\) and \(w' = w\). Hence, a sufficient condition for (i) is:

\[
\pi(w) \geq \hat{\theta} - w - \Psi_{\pi}(w).
\]

Now, we shall argue that \(\pi(w) \leq \hat{\theta} - w\) is a sufficient condition for (ii). Suppose a \(\pi\) that verifies this condition and consider a continuation value \(W^*_\pi\), a bid function \(b^*_\pi\), a distribution of working capitals \((w, w')\), where \(w\) is arbitrary and \(w'\) is strictly greater than \(w\) and so large that \(\Psi_{\pi}(w')\) is zero, and any potential profits \(\Pi < \pi(w)\). First, if the surety underwrites a bid with potential profits \(\Pi\) to the firm with working capital \(w\), \(w' > w\) and \(\Pi < \pi(w)\) means that this firm wins the procurement contract when the rival bids according to \(b^*_\pi\).\(^{52}\) Second, \(\Pi < \pi(w)\) and \(\pi(w) \leq \hat{\theta} - w\) implies that \(\Pi < \hat{\theta} - w\) which means that the potential profits \(\Pi\) induce the risky project for the continuation.

\(^{52}\)This argument does not generalize naturally to the second price auction as it hinges on both firms bidding the bid associated to the minimum profitability requirement of the firm with less working capital. For this case, a more elaborated argument can be used to show that the minimum of the \(\pi\) functions that verify the conditions of Proposition 5 is still an FBI equilibrium.
value $W_\pi^*$ and the distribution $(w, w')$. As a consequence, the sureties believe that the potential profits $\Pi$ would implement the risky project. Therefore (and no further proof is necessary):

**Proposition 5.** If $\pi^*$ is a decreasing function that verifies:

$$
\hat{\theta} - w - \Psi_{\pi^*}(w) \leq \pi^*(w) \leq \hat{\theta} - w,
$$

for any $w \geq 0$, then $(\pi^*, b_{\pi^*}^*, \sigma_{\pi^*}^*, W_{\pi^*})$ is an FBI equilibrium.

In this proposition is where the assumption $r > 1$ has some role. As the cost of working capital becomes small enough the financial constraints might disappear in that there exists an equilibrium in which sureties are willing to underwrite any bid above cost independently of the firm’s working capital, i.e. $\pi^*(w) \leq 0$ for any $w$. This is because the jump in continuation value when the firm becomes the leader, $\Psi_{\pi^*}(w)$, diverges as the cost of working capital becomes negligible. Intuitively, the prospect of winning an infinite number of periods at a strictly positive profit gives unboundedly large payoffs.

**Remark 3.** For any $\pi^*$ that verifies the conditions in Proposition 5, it can be shown that $\theta = \hat{\theta}$. Since $\hat{\theta} = \frac{\rho}{1 - \rho} c$, $c$ sufficiently large implies that the financial constraint is tight.
References


A Finite Horizon Model

In this appendix, we show that the unique equilibrium of a finite period version of the model in Section 4 converges as the number of periods tend to infinity to the equilibrium that we analyze in Section 4. As Athey and Schmutzler (2001) have argued:

If there are multiple equilibria, one equilibrium of particular interest (if it exists) is an equilibrium attained by taking the limit of first-period strategies as the horizon T approaches infinity.

Suppose a $T + 1$ period model in which all the periods but the last one are as in the model of Section 4. In the last period, all the firm’s cash is distributed to the shareholders. The dynamic link between periods and the firms’ objective functions are also as in Section 4. The game starts in the morning of period 1 with both firms having the same amount of cash. We assume that in case of a tie in period $t$: the procurement contract is assigned to the firm with more working capital; if both firms have the same amount of working capital and one firm and only one reinvested all its cash, the contract is assigned to the firm that had more cash at the beginning of the period; in the remaining cases the contract is assigned randomly with equal probability between the two firms. We study the subgame perfect equilibria of the game.

To state our results, we use the functions $\Psi_n$ defined in the proof of Lemma 1. To make the notation more easily readable, we let $\tilde{\Psi}_t \equiv \Psi_{T+1-t}$ for $t \in \{1, 2, ..., T + 1\}$. Let $F_t(x)$, $t \in \{1, 2, ..., T\}$, be a distribution function equal to $\tilde{F}(x, \tilde{\Psi}_{t+1})$ with density $f_t(x)$ and support $[0, \nu_t]$. To shorten the notation, we also denote $\tilde{\pi}_t(x) \equiv \pi(x)^+ + \tilde{\Psi}_{t+1}(x + \underline{m})$, hence $f_t(x) = \frac{1 - \beta r}{\beta \tilde{\Psi}_{t+1}(x)}$.

We start defining a function $W_t(m, m')$ that, as we show later, gives the expected continuation payoffs at the beginning of each period $t$ for a firm with cash $m$ that competes with a rival with cash $m'$: $W_{T+1}(m, m') \equiv m$, and for $t \in \{1, 2, ..., T\}$,

\[ W_t(m, m') \equiv m + \underline{m} \sum_{\tau=1}^{T+1-t} \beta^\tau + \begin{cases} \tilde{\Psi}_{t}(m') & \text{if } m > m' \\ \hat{\tilde{\Psi}}_{t}(m') & \text{if } m = m' < \gamma_t \\ 0 & \text{o.w.} \end{cases} \]
where

\[ \hat{\Psi}_t(m') \equiv \frac{\beta}{2} \hat{\pi}_t(rm') - (1 - \beta r)m', \]

and \( \gamma_t \) is equal to the unique solution to \( \hat{\Psi}_t(\gamma_t) = 0 \).

This continuation value implies that when both firms play \( b^* \) in the afternoon of period \( t \) and have continuation payoffs in the morning of period \( t+1 \) given by \( W_{t+1} \), the expected continuation payoff at the beginning of the morning of period \( t+1 \) given by \( \hat{\Psi}_t(m,m') \) is equal to:

\[
m + m \sum_{\tau=1}^{T+1-t} \beta^\tau + \Gamma_t \beta \hat{\pi}_t(rx') - (1 - \beta r)x, \tag{12}\]

where \( \Gamma_t \) denotes the probability that the firm wins the procurement contract in period \( t \):

\[
\Gamma_t = \begin{cases} \\
1 & \text{if } x > x' \text{ or } x = x' = m' < m \\
0 & \text{if } x < x' \text{ or } x = x' = m < m' \\
1/2 & \text{otherwise}. 
\end{cases}
\]

Consequently, for the case in which the continuation payoffs in period \( t+1 \) are given by \( W_{t+1} \) and both firms play \( b^* \) in the afternoon of period \( t \), \( W_t(m,m') \) is equal to the value of no reinvesting plus an extra term \( \hat{\Psi}_t(m') \) if the firm is leader, and \( \hat{\Psi}_t(m') \) if both firms have the same amount of cash and this is less than \( \gamma_t \). The term \( \hat{\Psi}_t(m') \) has the same interpretation as \( \Psi(m') \) in the model of Section 4, whereas \( \hat{\Psi}_t(m') \) is the discounted increase in the continuation payoffs of each of the firms when they have the same amount of cash \( m = m' \) and reinvest it all \( x = x' = m = m' \). In this case, both firms have the same probability of winning the current procurement contract and becoming the leader next period.

We also define a distribution over reinvestments \( \sigma_t^*(\cdot|m,m') \) that, as we shall show later, characterizes the firms equilibrium reinvestments. Let \( \sigma_t^*(\cdot|m,m') \) be equal to \( F_t(\cdot) \) if both \( m \) and \( m' \) are weakly greater than \( \nu_t \). Let also \( \sigma_t^*(\cdot|m,m') \) be equal to a truncation of \( F_t(\cdot) \) at \( m \) that puts the remaining probability at 0 if \( m < m', \nu_t \), and at \( m \) if \( m' < m, \nu_t \). If \( m = m' \in [0, \gamma_t) \), let \( \sigma_t^*(\cdot|m,m') \) be a distribution that puts all the probability mass at \( m \). Finally, if \( m = m' \in [\gamma_t, \nu_t) \), let \( \sigma_t^*(\cdot|m,m') \) be a truncation of \( F_t(\cdot) \) at \( \lambda_t(m) \) that puts the remaining probability at \( m \), where \( \lambda_t(m), m \in (\gamma_t, \nu_t) \), is the unique value of
\( \lambda \in (0, m) \) that solves:\(^{53}\)

\[
\int_{0}^{\lambda} \beta \pi_t(\tilde{x}) f_t(\tilde{x}) d\tilde{x} + \frac{\beta(1 - F_t(\lambda))}{2} \tilde{\pi}_t(rm) - (1 - \beta r)m = 0. \tag{13}
\]

This equation ensures that a firm is indifferent between reinvesting all its cash \( m \) and not reinvesting, when the payoffs are as in Equation (12) and the other firm uses \( \sigma^*_t \).

**Proposition 6.** There is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the game. In this equilibrium, and at any period \( t \in \{1, 2, ..., T\} \), both firms use \( \sigma^*_t \) in the morning and \( b^* \) in the afternoon and have continuation payoffs at the beginning of the period given by \( W_t \).

**Proof:** We prove the proposition using backward induction. It is trivial that the continuation payoffs are equal to \( W_{T+1} \) in period \( T + 1 \). We can then apply recursively the following Lemmata: first, Lemma 4, then Lemma 5, and finally Lemma 3 to update the continuation payoffs.

**Lemma 3.** The firm’s continuation payoffs in the morning of period \( t \in \{1, 2, ..., T\} \) are equal to \( W_t \) if in period \( t \) both firms play \( \sigma^*_t \) in the morning and \( b^* \) in the afternoon, and the continuation payoffs next period are given by \( W_{t+1} \).

**Lemma 4.** There is a unique equilibrium in the game defined in the afternoon of period \( t \in \{1, 2, ..., T\} \) by the continuation payoffs next period \( W_{t+1} \). In this equilibrium, both firms play \( b^* \).

**Lemma 5.** There is a unique equilibrium in the game defined in the morning of period \( t \in \{1, 2, ..., T\} \) by both players using \( b^* \) in the afternoon and by continuation payoffs next period given by \( W_{t+1} \). In this equilibrium, both firms play \( \sigma^*_t \).

**Proof of Lemma 3:** Under the conditions of the lemma, the payoffs are as described in Equation (12). We compute the expected payoffs of a firm with cash \( m \) when the rival has \( m' \) and both firms use \( \sigma^*_t \) distinguishing several cases.

---

\(^{53}\)Existence and uniqueness of the solution follows from the properties of the function in the left hand side of the equation. This is increasing in \( \lambda \) by application of the Leibnitz rule, it is negative at \( \lambda = 0 \) by definition of \( \gamma \) and since \( m > \gamma \), and it is strictly positive at \( \lambda = m \). The latter can be checked substituting \( f_t(\tilde{x}) \) and using that \( F_t(m) < 1 \) since \( m < \nu_t \).
If \( m > m' \) then our firm randomization has support \([0, \min\{m', \nu_t\}]\) whereas the rival randomizes with density \( f_t \) in \((0, \min\{m', \nu_t\}]\) and puts the remaining probability at zero. The expected payoff of any reinvestment \( x \in (0, \min\{m', \nu_t\}]\) is equal to:

\[
m + m \sum_{\tau=1}^{T+1-t} \beta^\tau + \beta(1 - F_t(\min\{m', \nu_t\}))\hat{\pi}_t(0) + \int_0^x \beta \pi_t(r\tilde{x}) f_t(\tilde{x}) d\tilde{x} - (1 - \beta r)x.
\]

If \( m' < \nu_t \), this expression is equal to \( m + m \sum_{\tau=1}^{T+1-t} \beta^\tau + \hat{\Psi}_t(m') \) as desired by definition of \( f_t, \hat{\pi}_t \) and \( \hat{\Psi}_t \). Otherwise, this expression is equal to \( m + m \sum_{\tau=1}^{T+1-t} \beta^\tau \) as desired by definition of \( f_t \).

The case \( \nu_t \leq m \leq m' \) is as the case \( m' \geq \nu_t \) above. The case \( m < m', \nu_t \) is also similar. The difference is that \( \sigma_t(\cdot|m, m') \) puts an atom at zero and the other firm at \( m \).

Nevertheless, we can also argue as above that the expected payoffs of any reinvestment \( x \in [0, m) \) is also equal to \( m + m \sum_{\tau=1}^{T+1-t} \beta^\tau \) as desired.

In the case \( m = m' \in (\gamma_t, \nu_t) \), both firms randomize with density \( f_t \) in the interval \([0, \lambda_t(m)]\) and put the remaining density at \( m \). The expected payoffs of any reinvestment \( x \in [0, \lambda_t(m)] \) are also equal to \( m + m \sum_{\tau=1}^{T+1-t} \beta^\tau \) as desired by the same arguments as in the case \( m > m' \geq \nu_t \) above. The expected payoffs of a reinvestment \( x = m \) are equal to:

\[
m + m \sum_{\tau=1}^{T+1-t} \beta^\tau + \int_0^{\lambda_t(m)} \beta \pi_t(r\tilde{x}) f_t(\tilde{x}) d\tilde{x} + \frac{\beta(1 - F_t(\lambda_t(m)))}{2} \hat{\pi}_t(rm) - (1 - \beta r)m,
\]

which is equal to \( m + m \sum_{\tau=1}^{T+1-t} \beta^\tau \) as desired by definition of \( \lambda_t(m) \).

Finally, if \( m = m' \in [0, \gamma_t) \), then \( \sigma_t(\cdot|m, m') \) puts all the probability mass at \( x = m \). Thus, the expected payoffs are equal to:

\[
m + m \sum_{\tau=1}^{T+1-t} \beta^\tau + \beta \hat{\pi}_t(rm') - (1 - \beta r)m',
\]

which is equal to \( m + m \sum_{\tau=1}^{T+1-t} \beta^\tau + \hat{\Psi}_t(m') \) as desired by definition of \( \hat{\Psi}_t \). □

**Proof of Lemma 4:** The result follows from the usual arguments in Bertrand competition because \( W_t \) is strictly increasing in the first argument and weakly decreasing in its second argument. The monotonicity of \( W_t \) is direct except at \( t < T + 1 \) and \( m = m' < \gamma_t \). For these points, we shall use that for any \( y \leq \gamma_t \): (a) \( \hat{\Psi}_t(y) \geq 0 \), and (b) \( \hat{\Psi}_t(y) \geq \hat{\Psi}_t(y) \). (a) is a direct consequence of the definition of \( \gamma_t \) and the fact that \( \hat{\Psi}_t \) is decreasing. To prove
(b) note that:

\[ \hat{\Psi}_t(y) = \beta(1 - F_t(y))\hat{\pi}_t(0) \]
\[ = \beta(1 - F_t(y))\hat{\pi}_t(0) + \beta \int_0^y \hat{\pi}_t(\tilde{x}) f_t(\tilde{x}) d\tilde{x} - (1 - \beta r)y \]
\[ \geq \beta \hat{\pi}_t(ry) - (1 - \beta r)y \]
\[ \geq \hat{\Psi}_t(y), \]

where the first and last step are direct, the second equality follows from the definition of \( f_t \) and \( \hat{\pi}_t \), and the first inequality from the fact that \( \hat{\pi}_t(\tilde{x}) \) is decreasing in \( \tilde{x} \).

To show that \( W_t \) is strictly increasing in its first argument at \( m = m' = y < \gamma_t \) we have to show that: \( W_t(y, y) - W_t(x, y) > 0 \) for any \( x < y \), and \( W_t(x, y) - W_t(y, y) > 0 \) for any \( x > y \). These inequalities follow from (a) and (b) respectively, because their corresponding left hand sides are equal to \( y - x + \hat{\Psi}_t(y) \) and \( x - y + \hat{\Psi}_t(y) - \hat{\Psi}_t(y) \). Similarly, to show that \( W_t \) is decreasing in its second argument at \( m = m' = y < \gamma_t \) we have to show that: \( W_t(y, x) - W_t(y, y) \geq 0 \) for any \( x < y \), and \( W_t(y, y) - W_t(y, x) \geq 0 \) for any \( x > y \). These inequalities follow from (b) and (a) respectively, because their corresponding left hand sides are equal to \( \hat{\Psi}_t(y) - \hat{\Psi}_t(y) \) and \( \hat{\Psi}_t(y) \).

Proof of Lemma 5: Under the conditions of the lemma, the payoffs are as described in Equation (12). If either \( m, m' \geq \nu_t \) or \( m \neq m' \), one can show that our proposed strategy is the unique equilibrium with identical arguments as in the proofs of Propositions 1 and 2. The difference is that one uses \( \hat{\pi}_{t+1}, f_t, F_t \) and \( \nu_t \) instead of \( \pi, \tilde{f}_r, \tilde{F}_r \) and \( \tilde{\nu}_r \), respectively, and payoffs are scaled up by \( m \sum_{\tau=1}^{T+1-t} \beta^\tau \).

If \( m = m' < \gamma_t \), the proposed strategy specifies that both firms reinvest all their cash \( m \) which gives expected payoffs \( m + m \sum_{\tau=1}^{T+1-t} \beta^\tau + \hat{\Psi}_{t+1}(m') \) by definition of \( \hat{\Psi}_{t+1} \). To see why a deviation is not profitable, notice that \( \hat{\Psi}_{t+1}(m') \geq 0 \) since \( m' \leq \gamma_t \) and the best deviation is to choose \( x = 0 \) which gives a payoff of \( m + m \sum_{\tau=1}^{T+1-t} \beta^\tau \). Any other deviation gives lower payoffs as it implies a greater cost of working capital without affecting the firm’s chances of winning.

If \( m = m' \in [\gamma_t, \nu_t] \), the proposed strategy specifies that both firms randomize with density \( f_t \) in \([0, \lambda_t(m)]\) and put the remaining probability at \( m \). As shown in the proof of Lemma 3, any reinvestment \( x \) in its support gives the same expected payoff. Reinvesting
\( x = \lambda_t(m) \) gives a greater expected payoff than any reinvestment in \((\lambda_t(m), m)\), since they all win in the same instances but \(\lambda_t(m)\) has less cost of working capital.

We next show that there is no other equilibrium in the case \( m = m' < \nu_t \). Note, first, that Claims 1 and 2 in the proof of Proposition 1 also hold true here. Both claims imply here that: (a) any equilibrium distribution must be atomless in \((0, m)\); (b) only one firm’s strategy can put an atom at 0 in equilibrium. Claim 1 and (a) imply that for any point \( x < m \) contained in the support of a firm’s strategy, the set \([0, x]\) must be contained in the support of both firm’s strategies in equilibrium. In this case, the usual indifference condition implies that both equilibrium distributions must have density \( f_t \) in \((0, x)\). We refer to this equilibrium condition as (c).

Next, we show that (a), (b) and (c) imply that both firms use the same strategy in equilibrium. To see why, note that the only possible asymmetric equilibrium is that one of the firms, say 1, puts an atom of probability \( \rho > 0 \) at 0, density \( f_t \) in \((0, w)\) for some \( w \in [0, m] \) and the remaining probability, if any, in an atom at \( m \), whereas the other firm’s strategy has density \( f_t \) in \((0, \bar{w})\) and the remaining probability in an atom at \( m \). Equilibrium requires that Firm 1 gets a weakly greater continuation value with a zero reinvestment than with a reinvestment of \( m \) and that Firm 2 gets weakly greater continuation value reinvesting \( m \) than with any reinvestment arbitrarily close to zero. The former condition requires that:

\[
\int_0^w \beta \tilde{\pi}_t(r\tilde{x}) f_t(\tilde{x}) d\tilde{x} + \beta \frac{1 - F_t(\bar{w})}{2} \tilde{\pi}_t(rm) - (1 - \beta r)m \leq 0,
\]

whereas the latter condition requires that:

\[
\beta \rho \tilde{\pi}_t(0) + \int_0^\bar{w} \beta \tilde{\pi}_t(r\tilde{x}) f_t(\tilde{x}) d\tilde{x} + \beta \frac{1 - F_t(\bar{w}) - \rho}{2} \tilde{\pi}_t(rm) - (1 - \beta r)m \geq \beta \rho \tilde{\pi}_t(0),
\]

and hence both conditions are incompatible when \( \rho > 0 \) and \( \tilde{\pi}_t(rm) > 0 \).

Consequently, the only possible equilibria are those in which both firms use density \( f_t \) in a set \([0, w]\) for some \( w \) in \([0, m]\) and put the remaining probability at \( m \). To conclude the proof, we show that equilibrium requires that \( w = 0 \), if \( m \leq \gamma_t \) and that \( w = \lambda_t(m) \), otherwise. Note that the case \( w = 0 \) requires that the firm weakly prefers to reinvest \( m \) to reinvest zero, i.e.:

\[
\frac{\beta}{2} \tilde{\pi}_t(rm) - (1 - \beta r)m \geq 0,
\]
whereas the case \( w \in (0, m] \) requires indifference, i.e.:

\[
\int_0^w \beta \hat{\pi}_t(r \hat{x}) f_t(\hat{x}) d\hat{x} + \frac{\beta(1 - F_t(w))}{2} \hat{\pi}_t(r m) - (1 - \beta r) m = 0.
\]

If \( m \leq \gamma_t \), the former condition holds by definition of \( \gamma_t \) but the latter does not hold for any \( w \in (0, m] \), because it is increasing by application of Leibnitz rule and it is positive at \( w = 0 \) by definition of \( \gamma_t \). If \( m > \gamma_t \), the former condition does not hold by definition of \( \gamma_t \) and the latter only holds for \( w = \lambda_t(m) \) by definition of \( \lambda_t \). \( \square \)

Finally, we show that the limit of the equilibrium of this finite game as the number of periods goes to infinity is equal to the equilibrium of the model in Section 4. To state this result, we abuse a little bit of the notation and denote by \( \sigma^*_{t,T}(w,w') \) and \( W_{t,T}(w,w') \) the functions \( \sigma^*_{t} \) and \( W_{t} \), respectively, to make the dependence in the length of the time horizon of the game explicit.

**Proposition 7.** For any \( w \neq w' \), \( \sigma^*_{t,T}(\cdot | w, w') \) converges weakly to \( \sigma^*(\cdot | w, w') \) and \( W_{t,T}(w, w') \) converges point-wise to \( W^*(w, w') \) as \( T \) goes to infinity.

**Proof:** Note that \( \hat{\Psi}_{t+1} = \Psi_{T-t} \), and \( \{ \Psi_{T-t} \}_{T=t}^{\infty} \) is an increasing sequence that converges point-wise to \( \Psi \), see proof of Lemma 1. This together with the monotone convergence theorem implies the weak convergence of \( F_t \) to \( F^r \), and hence the weak convergence of \( \sigma^*_{t,T}(\cdot | w, w') \) to \( \sigma^*(\cdot | w, w') \), for \( w \neq w' \). The point-wise convergence of \( \hat{\Psi}_t \) to \( \Psi \) also implies the convergence of \( W_{t,T}(w, w') \) to \( W^*(w, w') \), for \( w \neq w' \). \( \blacksquare \)