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http://hdl.handle.net/10016/9793
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| we1035.pdf | -- 2010-12-10 -- Available on Internet -- preprint | 93,85 kB | Adobe PDF | |  |
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| Title: | Bagwell's paradox, forward induction and outside option games |
| Author(s): | Ferreira, José Luis [jlferr] |
| Publisher: | Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía |
| Issued date: | Dec-2010 |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/10016/9793 |
| Abstract: | In Stackelberg-like games there is an advantage of moving first. However, Bagwell (1995) shows that this result may not hold if the second player can make only imperfect observations. We explore whether this paradox also holds when the advantage comes from forward induction arguments in the class of outside option games. |
| Serie / Nº.: | UC3M Working papers. Economics
10-35 |
| Keywords: | Bagwell's paradox
Commitment
Observability
Noise
Outside option games
Forward induction |
| JEL Classification: | C72 |
| Appears in Collections: | Economists Online
DE - Working Papers. Economics. WE
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