Publication:
Anticommons and optimal patent policy in a model of sequential innovation

Loading...
Thumbnail Image
Identifiers
Publication date
2007-06
Defense date
Advisors
Tutors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Impact
Google Scholar
Export
Research Projects
Organizational Units
Journal Issue
Abstract
When innovation is sequential, the development of new products depends on the access to previous discoveries. As a consequence the patent system affects both the revenues and the cost of the innovator. We construct a model of sequential innovation in which an innovator uses n patented inputs in R&D to invent a new product. We ask three questions: (i) what is the net effect of patents on innovation as technologies become more complex (n increases)? (ii) are patent pools welfare enhancing? (iii) what is the optimal response of patent policy as technological complexity increases? We find that the answers to these questions depend on the degree of complementarity and substitutability between the inputs used in research.
Description
Keywords
Anticommons, Sequential innovation, Patent pools, Optimal patent policy, Complementary monopoly, Cross-Licensing
Bibliographic citation