Publication: ¿Es necesaria la teoría para decidir casos judiciales? Sobre la crítica del pragmatismo jurídico al derecho como integridad
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2010
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Abstract
Habitualmente se analizan las relaciones entre positivismo jurídico y Derecho como integridad, sin embargo este artículo analiza las relaciones entre la visión de Dworkin y el pragmatismo jurídico, en la versión de Posner. Para delimitar los aspectos de la polémica se propondrá un análisis en el nivel de: a) la Metaética, donde se contrapone la tesis de la objetividad interna frente al escepticismo moral pragmático; b) la Teoría, donde se realiza una defensa de la filosofía moral frente al instrumentalismo pragmático y c) el Derecho, donde se contrastan las visiones de que los jueces deben basarse en principios morales o en directrices políticas. En otro nivel, se estudiará el peso del pasado, presente y futuro en la orientación de las decisiones judiciales, donde el pragmatismo jurídico presenta una posición marcadamente prospectiva. Por último, pese a que oficialmente rechaza esta posibilidad, se debatirá la hipótesis de considerar a Dworkin como un pragmático.
Usually it's analyzed the relationships between legal positivism and Law as integrity, although this article analyzes the relationships between Dworkin's vision and the legal pragmatism, in Posner's version. Establishing the limits of the polemics it's proposed an analysis in the level of: a) Metatehics, where it's opposed the thesis of the internal objectivity in front of the pragmatic moral skepticism; b) Theory, where it's defended the moral philosophy in front of the pragmatism instrumentalism y c) Law, where it's opposed the visions that judges have to be based in moral principles or in policies. In other level, it's studied the weight of the past, present and future in the orientation of judicial decision, where the legal pragmatism presents a position clearly forward-looking. Finally, although he denies officially this possibility, it's analyzed the hypothesis of considering Dworkin as legal pragmatic.
Usually it's analyzed the relationships between legal positivism and Law as integrity, although this article analyzes the relationships between Dworkin's vision and the legal pragmatism, in Posner's version. Establishing the limits of the polemics it's proposed an analysis in the level of: a) Metatehics, where it's opposed the thesis of the internal objectivity in front of the pragmatic moral skepticism; b) Theory, where it's defended the moral philosophy in front of the pragmatism instrumentalism y c) Law, where it's opposed the visions that judges have to be based in moral principles or in policies. In other level, it's studied the weight of the past, present and future in the orientation of judicial decision, where the legal pragmatism presents a position clearly forward-looking. Finally, although he denies officially this possibility, it's analyzed the hypothesis of considering Dworkin as legal pragmatic.
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Derecho como integridad, Pragmatismo jurídico, Filosofía del derecho, Interpretación judicial, Law as integrity, Legal pragmatism, Philosophy of Law, Judicial interpretation, Ronald Dworkin
Bibliographic citation
Revista Telemática de Filosofía del Derecho, nº 13, 2010, pp. 141-184