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Converging to efficiency : the Ramón y Cajal Program experience

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URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/847
ISSN: 2340-5031
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we075328.pdf (253.55 KB)
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2007-06
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We analyze the evolution on the design of a policy measure promoted by the Spanish Government: the Ramón y Cajal Program. In the first calls of the Program, an eligibility requirement for a researcher was a preacceptance from at least one Spanish research institution. This requirement was removed in the fourth call. We model the recruiting process as a twosided matching model to find the reason for the new design. We model the situation as if research centers decided by majority to play either the old or the new mechanism. Our results prove that in a repeated game and assuming that research personnel is scarce, even endogamic centers will prefer the new mechanism after a finite number of calls. We also analyze application data for the first five calls, finding empirical support to our assumptions and theoretical findings.
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Two-sided matching, Stable matching, R&D, Policy analysis, Differences in differences, Ramon y Cajal Program
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DE - Working Papers. Economics. WE
Economists Online