Publication: Rewarding cooperation in social dilemmas
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2007-06
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Abstract
One of the most direct human mechanisms of promoting cooperation is rewarding it. We study
the effect of sharing a reward among cooperators in the most stringent form of social dilemma.
Thus, individuals confront a new dilemma: on the one hand, they may be inclined to choose the
shared reward despite the possibility of being exploited by defectors; on the other hand, if too
many players do that, cooperators will obtain a poor reward and defectors will outperform them.
By appropriately tuning the amount to be shared we can cast a vast variety of scenarios,
including traditional ones in the study of cooperation as well as more complex situations where
unexpected behavior can occur. We provide a complete classification of the equilibria of the nplayer
game as well as of the evolutionary dynamics. Beyond, we extend our analysis to a
general class of public good games where competition among individuals with the same strategy
exists.
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Reward, Social dilemma, Prisoner's dilemma, N-player game