Publication:
How to sell to buyers with crossholdings

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2007-04-30
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Abstract
This paper characterizes the optimal selling mechanism in the presence of horizontal crossholdings. We find that this mechanism imposes a discrimination policy against the stronger bidders so that the seller´s expected revenue is increasing in both the common crossholding and the degree of asymmetry in crossholdings. Furthermore, it can be implemented by a sequential procedure that includes a price-preferences scheme and the possibility of an exclusive deal with the weakest bidder. We also show that a simple sequential negotiation mechanism, although suboptimal, yields a larger seller´s expected revenue than both the first-price and the second-price auctions.
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Optimal auctions, Crossholdings, Asymmetric auctions, Private values
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