Publication:
Cooperative production and efficiency

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URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10016/739
ISSN: 2340-5031
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we0705021.pdf (189.98 KB)
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2007-04-23
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We characterize the sharing rule for which a contribution mechanism achieves efficiency in a cooperative production setting when agents are heterogeneous. The sharing rule bears no resemblance to those considered by the previous literature. We also show for a large class of sharing rules that if Nash equilibrium yields efficient allocations, the production function displays constant returns to scale, a case in which cooperation in production is useless.
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DE - Working Papers. Economics. WE
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