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Executive compensation in a dynamic model

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URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/7380
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stanimir_morfov_tesis.pdf (1.81 MB)
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2009-03
Defense date
2009-06
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The thesis generalizes the notion of commitment by defining the outside options on the history observed in a dynamic contractual setting. It studies how history dependence through reservation utilities affects the provision of insurance and incentives and the dynamics of the contract with a special focus on executive compensation. Stock options and contract terminations are also analyzed
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Análisis dinámico, Modelo de equilibrio general, Dirección de empresas, Equilibrio económico, Programación dinámica
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