Publication:
Interim efficient allocation mechanisms

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URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10016/7220
ISSN: 2340-5031
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we002006.PDF (2.93 MB)
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2000-02
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Abstract
In this paper, I characterize the set of interim incentive efficient allocation mechanisms for a broad class of problems with private information, which includes those associated with the provision of public goods (with or without exclusion) as well as the allocation of one or more units of a private good.
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Incomplete information, Interim efficiency, Pooling of types
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DE - Working Papers. Economics. WE
Economists Online