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On the existence of Bayesian Cournot equilibrium

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URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10016/663
ISSN: 2340-5031
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we070603.pdf (275.27 KB)
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2007-02
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Abstract
We show that even in very simple oligopolies with differential information a (Bayesian) Cournot equilibrium in pure strategies may not exist, or be unique. However, we find sufficient conditions for existence, and for uniqueness, of Cournot equilibrium in a certain class of industries. More general results arise when negative prices are allowed.
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Oligopoly, Incomplete information, Bayesian, Cournot, Equilibrium, Existence, Uniqueness
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DE - Working Papers. Economics. WE
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