Publication: Credible equilibria in non-finite games and in games without perfect recall
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1997-05
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Abstract
Credible equilibria were defined in Ferreira, Gilboa and Maschler (1995) to handle situations of preferences changing along time in a model given by an extensive form game. This paper extends the definition to the case of infinite games and, more important, to games with nonperfect recall. These games are of great interest in possible applications of the model, but the original definition was not applicable to them. The difficulties of this extension are solved by using some ideas in the literatue of abstract systems and by proposing new ones that may prove useful in more general settings.
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Bad sets, credible equilibrium, good sets, infinite games, imperfect recall, semistable partitions, stable sets, ugly sets