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On some myths about sequenced common-value auctions

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URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10016/6023
ISSN: 2340-5031
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we973412.PDF (1.07 MB)
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1997-04
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Abstract
Equilibria are constructed for classes of game models of sequenced second-price auctions having identical common-valued objects In some of these the equilibrium price falls on average, and in others the seller loses on average by committing to announce publicly something that he knows. Both of these possibilities are surprises.
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Auctions, Common valued objects, Information revelation
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DE - Working Papers. Economics. WE
Economists Online