Publication:
Coalition Formation and Stability

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URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/5610
ISSN: 1432-217X
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-006-0123-1
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coalition_romero-medina_SCW_2006_ps.pdf (545.25 KB)
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2006
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Springer
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Abstract
This paper studies a class of NTU coalition formation games in which every player’s payoff depends only on the members of her coalition. We identify four natural conditions on individuals’ preferences and show that, under each condition, stable (core) allocations exists.
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The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com
Keywords
Coalition Formation, Core, NUT Games, Stability
Bibliographic citation
Social Choice and Welfare. October 2006, vol. 27, nº 2, p. 365-375
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