Publication: Ideological versus Downsian political competition
Loading...
Identifiers
Publication date
2002
Defense date
Authors
Advisors
Tutors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Springer
Abstract
We analyze a one-dimensional model of spatial political competition
with two parties and uncertainty on the distribution of voters’ types. We assume
that parties are formed by regular members and professional politicians;
members care about the policy enacted, while professional politicians, on the
contrary, care only about winning the election. We consider two possibilities:
that members choose the political platforms and that professional politicians
are the ones who choose such platforms. The expected utility for party members
is analyzed under these two cases. We find that when professional politicians
have no informational advantage, it is on the interest of both parties
to let professional politicians choose the platforms. Only in the case in which
professional politicians have much better information than the members of the
party about voters is it possible that party members obtain a greater expected
utility choosing the platforms themselves rather than letting the professional
politicians choose.
Description
The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com
Keywords
Partidos políticos, Sociología política
Bibliographic citation
Social Choice and Welfare, 2002, v. 19, n. 3, pp. 551-567