Publication:
Endogenous Formation of Coalitions in Non-Cooperative Games

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1999-01
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Elsevier
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Abstract
In this paper we extend the definitions of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium and communication-proof equilibrium to situations of partial communication. Then we use the model of endogenous formation of coalitions of Aumann and Myerson to find that one of these situations in which the corresponding equilibrium exists will be endogenously determined by the players in the game
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Formation of coalitions, Coalition-proof, Communication-proof
Bibliographic citation
Games and Economic Behavior (1999), 26(1), 40-58