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|Title: ||Reputation with observed actions|
|Author(s): ||Celentani, Marco [celentan]|
|Issued date: ||Oct-1996|
|Citation: ||Economic Theory, 1996, 7, p. 407-419|
|Abstract: ||Summary A single long-run player plays a fixed stage game (simultaneous orsequential move) against an infinite sequence of short-run opponents that play only once but can observe all past realized actions. Assuming that the probability distributions over types of long and short-run players have full support, we show that the long-run player can always establish a reputation for theStackelberg strategy and is therefore guaranteed almost his Stackelberg payoff in all Nash equilibria of the repeated game.|
|Publisher version: ||http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01213658|
|Keywords: ||Repeated games|
|JEL Classification: ||C72|
|Appears in Collections:||DE - Artículos de Revistas|
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